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Abstract  
This thesis provides an original theoretical and empirical analysis of the effectiveness 
of capital adequacy regulation in promoting the soundness and stability of the 
international banking system, focusing on two countries: US and Japan.  It is argued 
that capital adequacy regulation is theoretically flawed, taking no account of the 
process of balance sheet reconstruction banks undertake to achieve overcapitalisation, 
and ignoring any effect on the rest of the economy.  
 
The analysis uses a macro- economic theory -based approach to examine the impact 
of capital adequacy regulation on the probabilities of default of US and Japanese 
banks for the period, 2007-2009 and 1998-2000, respectively.  The underlying theory 
of this analysis is the capital market inflation theory, which looks at the system as a 
whole and thus making it possible to analyse the role of the Basel capital 
requirements on the real economy.  This thesis also provides an empirical evaluation 
of the capital market inflation theory, by developing a simple asset-pricing model to 
estimate the US and Japanese stock price indexes, taking into account the inflows of 
institutional investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies, into the 
capital markets.  As a reinforcing argument against capital adequacy regulation the 
shadow banking system is incorporated into the analysis as a cosmetic manicure for 
risk in balance sheet.  
 
The evidence suggests that risk-weighted capital adequacy regulation gives 
misleading signals about the soundness of banks. The empirical results imply that 
banks with higher Tier I capital ratios have a higher probability of default whereas 
banks with higher unweighted capital ratios have a lower probability of default. The 
results suggest that the negative relationship between unweighted capital ratios and 
the probability of default is the effect of illiquidity in the capital market for relatively 
risk-free assets, whereas the positive relationship between the Tier 1 capital ratios and 
the probability of defaults is the effect of crowding out in the capital market.  
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Chapter 1.  Introduction  
 
1.1 Introduction and motivation  
 
Conventional theory on banks regulation suggests that the more capital a bank holds, 
the easier it is to absorb any potential losses and therefore the more likely it is to 
survive a drain on its liquidity.  Despite the efforts of the Basel Committee in setting 
up an international ‘minimum’ capital requirement, a safe and sound banking system 
is far from being achieved.  The recent financial crisis that has caused the worst 
economic downfall the world has witnessed since the Great Depression, is perhaps the 
most immediate source of such evidence. In the aftermath of this crisis, on December 
2009 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) proposed new set of 
measures to improve the resilience of the financial system. 
 
The new set of measurements dubbed ‘Basel III’ attempts to impose higher capital 
requirement aiming to promote a safer and sound financial system. However, prior  
to the 2007-2009 financial crises banks not only faced no difficulties in achieving 
their regulatory standards  but they were also able to hold capital in excess to the 
regulatory requirement. Lehman Brothers Holdings, the fourth largest investment 
bank on Wall Street that failed during the crises, two weeks before its collapse 
announced that it had a Tier one capital ratio of 11 percent that is nearly twice what 
the US now considers is needed for a well-capitalised bank (The Economist 2010).   
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The Swiss bank UBS in June 2008 had a Tier one capital ratio of 11.6 percent -
considered one of the highest in the industry- but needed government bailout to 
survive later on that year (Gow 2008).   Washington Mutual Inc had a Tier one capital 
ratio of 8.44 percent prior to its demise 10 days after Lehman Brothers filed for 
bankruptcy (Ellis 2008). The same pattern can be observed in the case of Japan.   
Three major banks that collapsed during the Japanese banking crisis in the 1990s, 
Hokkaido Takushoku, Long-term Credit Bank of Japan and Nippon Credit Bank, had 
published capital ratios well above the 8 percent standard just prior to their collapse 
with 9.3 percent, 10.4 percent and 8.2 percent respectively (Rixtel et al., 2003).   
 
If banks were considered to be well-capitalised, in the sense that most banks held 
capital ratios above the minimum standards, why did they fail? This question casts 
doubts over the effectiveness of the proposal of tightening capital requirements. The 
historical precedent is not encouraging.  The decision to increase capital adequacy 
requirements in Japan during the 1990s, intended to overcome problems in the 
banking system, not only failed but also has been blamed for bringing on a ‘capital 
crunch1’.  The response of Japanese banks to higher regulation was reflected in a 
reduction of aggregate lending.  Despite the zero rate interest rate policy, the Japanese 
economy has remained stagnant throughout most of the subsequent decade.  
Therefore the question of how capital adequacy requirements affect the real economy 
is crucial for understanding the effectiveness of such regulation.  
                                                        
1 Defined as a reduction in bank lending in response to tighter regulations on bank 
capital (Montgomery 2001). 
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Most of the discussion on bank capital requirements tend to ignore the effects of 
varying capital requirements on the way in which the system works as a whole, and, 
hence, on the way in which the economy generates the cash flows necessary for 
setting committed financial obligations.  The exceptions are those theories based on 
the supposed effects of capital costs, which, however, ignore the cash flow 
consequences, and theories associated with Minsky, Steindl and Toporowski.  
 
This thesis employs Toporowski’s capital market inflation theory to investigate 
whether obliging banks to hold high capital makes the system less fragile, with 
reference to US and Japan. One possible explanation of this concern, given by the 
literature, is that when banks raise capital through the issue of equity the capital 
market will require greater profits in payment for additional capital. Pressured to meet 
capital requirements and investors demand for return on equity, banks are tempted to 
take on more risk.  Besides this fundamental rationale in arguing against higher 
capital requirements this thesis employs the capital market inflation theory to examine 
the impact of such regulation on the probabilities of default of US and Japanese 
banks. Within such a framework is it possible to examine the impact of such 
regulation on banks, and the economy as a whole.   
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1.2 Thesis objectives and methodology  
 
This thesis will provide an original analysis of the effectiveness of capital adequacy 
regulation in promoting the soundness and stability of the international banking 
system, focusing on two countries: US and Japan.  The originality stems from the 
approach, a macro- economic theory-based approach, employed to examine such 
impact. The existing literature tends to ignore the effects of varying capital 
requirements on the way in which the system works as a whole.  Thus the research of 
this thesis aims to contribute to the literature by using the capital market inflation 
theory to both empirically examine and highlight the effect of capital regulation on 
the banking sector and the rest of the economy.   
 
Capital market inflation has profound implications on the financing structure of 
companies in modern capitalist economies. At the core of the theory is the proposition 
that inflation in the capital market induces financial fragility in the economy by 
encouraging equity finance, which leads to the overcapitalization of companies, and 
by limiting the role of banks as financial intermediaries. The overcapitalisation of the 
financial system, in particular banks, increases the riskiness of their assets.  
Furthermore, under conditions of inelastic equity capital supply, rising capital 
adequacy requirements force non-financial firms into debt. The higher the amount of 
capital held by banks, the lower the quantity available to nonfinancial intermediaries 
in the market. Therefore, they are left with no option other than to raise their needed 
capital through the issue of debt instruments. Therefore, the excess debt level being 
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held by firm as a consequence of higher banks’ capital regulation requirement reduces 
productive investment below what it would otherwise be.   The reduced productive 
investment also reduces the cash flow of firms and their ability to service their debt.  
 
In other words, the argument of the capital market inflation theory is that bank 
overcapitalisation makes the financial system in general more fragile, because of the 
crowding out effect. This fragility then appears as growing risky debt in the banking 
system.  Nevertheless, that is not to say that overcapitalisation makes an individual 
bank more fragile.  Actually, overcapitalisation may improve the position of an 
individual bank, but at the expense of banks in general. However the position cannot 
be improved if overcapitalisation is due to shadow banking.  The relative probability 
of default of an individual bank could be explained by the shadow banking 
/overcapitalisation nexus. This way, this thesis not only shows how bank 
overcapitalisation, in general, increases the riskiness of their assets, as explained by 
the capital market inflation theory, but also incorporates shadow banking into the 
analysis as an explanation of how banks respond to the growing riskiness of their 
assets.   
 
As a first step this thesis provides an empirical evaluation of the capital market 
inflation theory, by developing a simple asset-pricing model to estimate the US and 
Japanese stock price indexes, taking into account the inflows of institutional investors, 
such as pension funds and insurance companies, into the capital markets. This 
analysis is another original contribution that this thesis provides to the literature.  
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Within the framework of capital market inflation theory, using pooled cross-sectional 
data the analysis of this thesis estimates logit models to examine the impact of capital 
adequacy ratios on the probability of bank default, for both US and Japanese banks 
for the period 2007-2009 and 1998-2000, respectively.  The time period chosen for 
the US analysis reflects the latest financial crisis associated with a large number of 
bank failures, despite most of the failed banks having high capital ratios. The analysis 
for Japan is applied to the period 1998-2000 not only because is it associated with a 
high number of bank failures but also in an attempt to capture the effect of 
introducing the capital requirements in a period when the country was already in 
economic distress following the crash of the stock market in late 1989.  
 
Much research has been devoted in examining the Japanese crisis and more recently 
the topic has gained a lot more attention with particular focus on comparing the 
causes and consequences with that of the US in 2007-09. Amongst others, Lapavitsas 
(2008) identifies three similarities between the recent financial crises that erupted in 
the US and the one of Japan in the 1980s. The first one is that the crises in both 
economies are related to property bubbles.  Secondly, is the fact the banks had 
accumulated bad debt over the years, reducing, therefore, their ability to expand their 
credit supply.  And thirdly, both crises are marked by a decline of personal 
consumption.  However, in the US consumption behaviour has drastically changed 
over the years, becoming more dependent on credit.  This has not happened in Japan. 
Nevertheless Japan experienced a decline in personal consumption as the country 
entered in recession, something that happened in the US economy during the banking 
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crises. Lapavitsas argues that Japan can act as a lesson for the US in terms of how to 
respond to banking crises.  
 
As stated above, this thesis also integrates the shadow banking system into the 
analysis, as a cosmetic manicure for risk in balance sheet.  The interaction between 
the traditional banks and the shadow banks might be a source for increasing the 
riskiness of banks as they attempt to shift their risky assets into the shadows by 
innovating financial products.  If banks can vary the riskiness of their balance sheets 
by transferring assets off-balance sheet then the published risk-weightings capital 
ratios may be inefficient measures of risk.  Goodhart’s  law argues that once a 
variable becomes a target of policy it no longer varies in the same relation to what it is 
supposed to be measuring.  Put differently, once banks are forced to hold capital in 
relation to measured risk, as under the capital adequacy regime, an alternative strategy 
for banks is to transfer risky assets into the shadow banking system, so that the 
weighted-risk assets in their published balance sheet does not reflect their true risk.  In 
turn this may suggest that the reliability of data on banks’ balance sheet changed after 
1988, when the Basel Accord was first introduced.  
 
As argued above most banks prior to the crisis recorded capital ratios exceeding the 
Basel capital regulatory standards. Despite this, in the aftermath of the crisis that both 
the US and Japan experienced during the periods under consideration, banks faced 
major financial difficulties, leading to a large number of bank failures.   
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A study from The Economist (2010) shows that during the latest crises the average 
American bank consumed about 4 percent of risk-adjusted assets in losses. Some  
banks such as Citigroup, HBOS and Belgium’s KBC lost 6-8 percent of risk-adjusted 
assets. In the extreme case Merrill Lynch lost 19 percent which suggests that it would 
have needed a core-capital ratio of 23 percent to avoiding falling through the 4 
percent requirement ratio. Similarly, UBS lost 13 percent meaning that it would have 
required a ratio of 17 percent.    
 
This evidence raises the question how much capital do banks actually need? There is 
a trade-off between safety and economic growth; a bank that took no risk at all would 
not be much use in providing credit in the economy. Getting this trade off is indeed 
difficult.  As Minsky(1994) states in an unpublished paper  the structure of regulation 
and supervision of banking might well be a ‘never-ending struggle’ because what is 
an appropriate structure at one time is not appropriate at another (Philips1997).   
 
1.3 Thesis structure  
 
This thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature whose main focus  
is the loan price implication of higher capital requirements. Different studies have 
used accounting principles to analyse the behaviour of banks when faced with tighter 
capital standards.  For many bankers and researchers, equity is considered to be too 
expensive, relative to alternative funding, and as a consequence rising capital 
requirements will raise the price of credit, damaging the economy.  But this 
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contradicts the basic theorem of corporate finance set out by Modigliani and Miller 
(1958), that in the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, asymmetric information and 
agency costs i.e. in a perfect market, the value of the firm is unaffected by its choice 
of capital structure, so that any combination of capital and liabilities is as good as 
another.  This might well be the case for firms.  However, it does not apply to banks. 
This is because by their very nature some of their assets are funded by interbank 
deposits rather than by equity (The Economist 2009).   
 
A century ago, banks had to hold a higher equity buffer than they do today, in order to 
reassure customers of their safety (The Economist 2009).  In today’s   banking, 
deposits have become insured in government-backed schemes.  Furthermore, deposits 
are priced in accordance with central banks’ short-term interest rates.  In addition, 
banks are now entitled to unlimited liquidity provision from governments.  Along 
with the guarantees, the very-short-term nature of deposits and debt means that their 
cost for banks is extremely low when central banks’ interest rates are low. In periods 
associated with low short-term interest rates, equity is indeed expensive.  However, 
the havoc and expense of crises means it is worth paying the higher cost of capital to 
avoid them (ibid).  Studies conducted by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 
the National Institute of Economic and Social Research as well as central banks, 
suggest that the benefits which are mirrored in a reduction in the probability of a 
banking crisis, exceed the cost of strengthening capital requirements in terms of their 
impact on output.   
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Thus many studies in the literature seem to presuppose that as banks increase their 
capital they have to pay more and more for capital, so this is supposed to increase the 
margin on what it charges on its loan.  However, why should it be necessary increase 
the margin on loans? As stated above by their very nature some of banks assets are 
funded by deposits rather than equity. Furthermore, these deposits are priced relative 
to central banks’ short term interest rates.   If a bank raises more capital it does not 
need to rely so much on interbank deposits. So the effect on the lending margins 
depends on what is the cost of capital relative to interbank deposits.  Another main 
argument here, arising from the capital market inflation ideas put forward by 
Toporowski (2000) is that in periods of capital market inflation people are willing to 
hold more capital not for the sake of income stream but for the appreciation of capital. 
With such inflation banks may pay less in dividends e.g. 2-3 percent, whereas the 
interbank deposits rate could well be 4- 5 percent.  Furthermore the Modigliani and 
Miller assumptions are irrelevant to this analysis since that theorem presupposes that 
no further arbitrage is possible when in fact regulation forces banks to finance in a 
manner contrary to arbitrage. That is to say, in a situation of low interbank rate, vs. 
high cost of capital, regulation forces banks to issue more capital.  With near zero 
interbank interest rates and the capital market weak, increasing capital would raise 
financing costs, in a way contrary to consideration of arbitrage. The argument 
whether or not higher capital ratios do indeed eliminate risk taking incentives of bank, 
is rather mixed. There are studies that advocate placing higher capital ratios than the 
standards proposed by the Basel Committee, whilst other studies argue that the market 
Chapter 1.  Introduction  23 
can be the best judge for bank capital. Another growing focus is given to the 
macroprudential regulation as a tool to make capital requirements countercyclical.   
 
Following the crisis, there has been a growing interest in providing arguments in how 
to better regulate banks. However, none of these studies considers empirically the 
relationship between the probability of default and capital adequacy ratios.  There are 
a few studies that have examined this relationship empirically prior to the crisis, 
however, they tend use different measures of capital ratios to serve as a proxy for the 
Basel definition of Tier I capital.  Perhaps, most importantly the literature fails to 
provide an analysis of the effect of capital regulation within a framework that 
considers the system as a whole.  In other words, there is no apparent theory that 
supports the examination of capital requirements on the financial system. The 
available studies are based on principles (perceived impact) that arise largely from the 
intuitions of individual bankers. In order to overcome this obstacle and to provide 
both an empirical examination and a better understanding on how these requirements 
might affect not only banks but also the economic system as a whole, this thesis 
employs Toporowski’s capital market inflation theory.   
 
Chapter 3 presents the capital market inflation theory, explaining its theoretical 
contribution in greater details. This thesis then examines the validity of the theory 
empirically. The theory is applied to both the US and Japanese capital market. Using 
data from the flow of funds account for the period 1964-2010 in the case of US, and 
1980-2010 in the case of Japan, the analysis derives the demand and supply for equity 
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capital. The supply of capital represents purchases of corporate equity from 
households, institutional investors and rest of the world. Demand is derived from 
combining non-financial sector issues of corporate equity with those of the financial 
sector.  The regression results for the US capital market supports the capital market 
inflation theory, that the price level of securities is determined by the inflow of funds 
into capital markets in a non-linear positive relationship.  However, when applied to 
the Japanese capital market the results provide no evidence that supports the theory. It 
is argued that various factors associated with the structure of the Japanese capital 
market could be important in explaining why the capital market inflation theory may 
not hold for Japan.  
 
This thesis also looks at the overcapitalisation of banks that has occurred since the 
end of the 1980s.  It identifies two processes linked to such overcapitalisation. The 
first process is capital market inflation, which is a generalized phenomenon picked up 
from the flow of funds accounts, shown in chapter 3, implying that the 
overcapitalisation of the financial institutions or banks, in general increases the 
riskiness of their assets.  The second process suggests a different mechanism in that 
overcapitalisation of a given bank is also achieved by removing its bad assets off 
balance sheet and their replacement by superior assets. Such assets may have become 
available through the general overcapitalisation of the financial system (more 
particularly banks).  One way by which banks were able to remove toxic assets off 
their balance sheet was to transfer such assets into the shadow banking system.   
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Chapter 4 looks at the shadow banking system and the different financial products 
innovated by banks in order to remove risk off balance sheet. The premise in this 
chapter is that banks are reporting overcapitalisation rather than being actually over-
capitalised. This also adds to the fragility of the financial system because regulators 
and participants in banking markets are deceived by a façade of sound balance sheets.   
 
Chapter 5 fills in the gap found in the literature by focusing on the capital adequacy as 
forerunner of banking crisis, using an Early Warning System model, by providing 
empirical evidence on the relationship between capital adequacy ratios and the 
probability of banks default, applied to the US. This research employs a logit model 
to estimate the probability of bank default on a pooled cross sectional data for US, 
over the period 2007-2009. Two models are estimated; a simple logit model using 
Tier 1 capital ratios, and the size of banks dummy as explanatory variables to predict 
the probability of bank failure and a multivariate logit model adding four additional 
financial variables as proxies for profitability, asset quality and liquidity and simple 
unweighted capital ratio. Both models yield results that suggest that the higher Tier 1 
capital ratio the higher the probability of bank default. However, when taking into 
account the unweighted capital ratios the results imply that the higher this ratio the 
lower the probability of default. It is argued that the positive coefficient of Tier 1 
capital ratio is the effect of crowding out in the capital market whereas the negative 
coefficient associated with unweighted capital ratio is the effect of illiquidity in the 
market for relatively risk-free assets.  The findings indicate that the current regulatory 
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capital requirements only take into account the risk of insolvency ignoring the risk of 
illiquidity in the capital market.  
 
Using the same methodology, Chapter 6, estimates the probability of banks default on 
a pooled cross sectional data for Japan, over the period 1998-2000. Due to data 
limitation only one model is estimated using Tier I capital ratios as a sole predictor of 
the probability of default. The results again indicate that the higher the capital ratios 
held by banks, the higher the probability of default. The results in both chapters are 
not only in accordance with the assumptions of the capital market inflation theory but 
also reflect the well documents fact that some of largest banks, such as Lehman 
Brothers in US and Long-Term Credit Bank in Japan, had published high capital 
ratios prior to their failure.  
 
Chapter 7 draws out the main conclusion from the analysis. The main argument of 
this thesis is that unless regulators pin down the real threats to stability, their efforts 
could simply move risk around. Shifting risk into unregulated or differently regulated 
sectors will not make the banking system more secure. Theory needs to move beyond 
an unsophisticated model of a single bank balance sheet to a more complex view of 
how bank balance sheet are integrated with other balance sheets in the economy. 
Chapter 7 also provides recommendations as possible tools in better regulating the 
banking sector. The recommendation tools derive from a combination of the ideas 
given by Toporowski and Minsky.  Whilst they both emphasise the importance of 
recognising bank heterogeneity as an important aspect when applying capital 
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standards, this research also advocates the Minsky’s idea of a cash-flow balance sheet 
examination process, as a step toward better regulation.  
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Chapter 2. Literature Review  
 
This chapter presents a detailed review of the literature on capital adequacy 
regulation, which will serve as the ground for employing an alternative approach 
presented in chapter 3. It will become apparent that very few studies have empirically 
examined the impact of capital adequacy on the probability of banks default. 
Furthermore, the literature largely fails to address the issue of such regulation on the 
system as a whole.  The first section of this chapter provides background information 
of the Basel Accords together with the motivations and aims of establishing 
international capital requirements. This section also provides a detailed discussion on 
the changing frameworks set out in Basel I, II and III.  Section 2 presents the different 
available studies that address the issue of bank capital regulation.  
 
2.1 Capital adequacy regulation  
 
Capital adequacy is seen by advocates of the Basel Accords as a means of 
maintaining a solvent banking system, and a secure banking system is necessary for a 
healthy and active economy.   Adequate bank capital is therefore a necessary 
condition for a stable economy (Tarbert 2000). The world’s economy is incredibly 
complex and dependent on credit. Banks as intermediaries pump money into the 
economy and allow it to grow by providing credit to consumers and businesses.  They 
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are the single largest source of credit for consumers. Banks lending adds leeway to the 
economy by supporting the financial needs of individuals and business.  Without such 
funds, businesses would fail as soon as their outgoings exceeded their income.  
Perhaps the most important role of all, of banks credit, is that of providing funds to 
new and existing investments, the single most important determinant of aggregate 
demand.  Therefore, banks do not just act as intermediaries between savers and 
borrowers but also create credit, that fuels investment. Keynes (1930), stresses the 
importance of the banking system in the level of economic activity. He notes ‘by the 
scale and the terms on which it is prepared to grant loans, the banking system is in a 
position…to determine-broadly speaking- the rate of investment by the business 
world’(1930, Vol.1 pp.138 and pp. 163-165, quoted in Dymski 1988). For Keynes 
banks perform a dual activity, credit creation and liquidity provision (Dymski 1988).  
Kalecki also highlights the important role of banks in determining the level of 
investment. Even though, for Kalecki, investment is the main driver of aggregate 
demand, he argues that the willingness of banks to expand the money supply and 
extend credit enables the level of investment to increase (Harcourt and Riach 2005). 
 
In an attempt to prevent banks insolvency, the governments’ main weapon in recent 
years has been to force banks to hold bigger equity buffers.  Philips (1997) notes the 
fundamental rationale for bank regulation that some aspects of banks activities are a 
public good.  Pilbeam (2010) argues that the banking sector is more heavily regulated, 
in comparison to other parts of the financial sector, for both historical reasons and 
because the most severe financial crisis have been linked to problems in the banking 
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sector.  Capital is generally perceived to act as a financial cushion that absorbs losses 
and thus protects depositors from loss as well as the financial system. Many 
economists state that adequate capital can cushion the most significant shocks to the 
banking system as well as preventing systematic failure (Tarbert 2000).      
 
Banks are financial institutions whose liabilities are mainly short-term deposits (or 
obligations to pay savers on a predetermined date or upon demand) and whose assets 
are usually longer term loans to business and consumers. On a balance sheet a loan is 
classified as an asset because the bank is entitled to receive an amount of money plus 
regular interest payment on a given date from a borrower.  The amount of net assets- 
total assets minus total liabilities- represents the banks’ capital.  When the value of 
their liabilities exceeds the value of their assets, banks are insolvent. The resulting 
banking crisis may cause a reduction in credit available to households and businesses, 
hence decreasing both the level of consumption and investment in the economy 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1998).   
 
However providing funds to borrowers is easier than getting it back.  This is why 
banks are prone to crises. When they run short of funds (money), they stop lending 
and call in loans. This in turn causes a downturn to the real economy.  Also, bank 
maturity transformation creates a risk of a bank run following adverse shocks.  
Typically banks finance longer term lending with short term deposits, making banks 
vulnerable to deposit withdrawals (runs). The interbank market plays an important 
role in liability- management around the banking system. Interbank markets play a 
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key role in providing short-term liquidity to banks. Hence, a shortage of liquidity in 
this market could affect the intermediary process from banks to households and 
corporations.  
 
Capital adequacy is not only vital to banks, but also to firms in any other business.  
However, the non-financial sector, however, is not subject to capital regulatory 
requirements. Firms hold adequate capital through self-imposed, prudent 
management. If a firm misjudges risk and has low capital, it may become insolvent or 
earn a reputation for not paying its debts.  This in turn, will either lower its business 
interactions with others or force it to pay additional rents for the transactions to 
compensate for the increased risk. Therefore, imprudent firms are disciplined by 
market forces and not by government as in the case of banks (Tarbert 2000) .  
 
The important yet delicate role of banks as financial intermediaries is the main reason 
that banks are more regulated than any other part of the financial system. Heffernan 
(2005) points to the role of banks in the financial system, which has dramatically 
changed since the 1970s.  Prior to this period banks were relatively stable and subject 
to strict regulation that limited their risk exposure.  Cartel-like behaviour ensured 
minimum competition, with returns being to some extent steady, with little or no 
incentive to innovate. However, during the 1980s was the start of deregulation of the 
banking sector, which increased competition and also marked the start of financial 
innovation. Nevertheless, even though the risks bank faced prior to these changes 
seem relatively straightforward to manage compare to what they face now, bank 
Chapter 2. Literature Review  32 
failure has been a phenomenon in almost every decade  (Heffernan 2005).  Banking 
crises are endemic, and have been so in the last century.  
 
The 1970s witnessed the failure of Franklin National Bank and Bankhaus Herstatt.  
In the UK, in 1973-74, the Bank of England organised rescues of a number of banks, 
which experienced financial distress due to the problems associated with the property 
market. In the 1980s, over 2000 US banks were in series financial trouble, with some 
failing and others surviving as a results of merging with healthy banks. 
The 1990s was a decade that witnessed a large number of bank failures throughout the 
world. In early 1990s it was the failure of Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International, followed by the collapse of Barings Bank. By the end of decade much 
of the Japanese banking system was in series trouble, resulting in a number of bank 
collapses (see chapter 6).  These events were followed by the banking crisis Germany 
experienced in the early 2000s (Heffernan 2005). The credit crunch that started in 
2007 showed that banking collapses could occur on a massive scale once again, with a 
number of banks becoming dependent on state funded bailouts to stay in the business. 
These failures clearly showed that regulation had failed to achieve the aim of avoiding 
bank failure.  BCBS(2010d) suggests that from a historical perspective banking crisis 
occur one every 20 to 25 years.  The study argues that banking crisis cause a 
substantial decline in output ‘relative to trend’ and these costs have long lasting effect 
on real economic activity.  One possible explanation given is that banking crisis 
amplifies the severity of recessions, leaving deeper scars than typical recessions 
(BCBS 2010d).  In an attempt to alleviate the concerns that linked banks with the 
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recent financial crises the Basel Committee proposed new regulatory measures 
arguing that the new capital standards will reduce the likelihood of the crises, and 
reduce the severity of crises.  
 
In the US bank capital adequacy has been a regulatory objective since the 
implementation of the Banking Act of 1933. However, it was only in 1982 that these 
requirements became an enforced regulatory tool.  Prior to 1982, regulators would 
compare an individual bank’s capital to asset ratio to other banks that shared common 
characteristics, such as asset size. If a bank was found to have a lower capital to asset 
ratio than the average of the group of the banks compared, then regulators would 
advise it to raise capital ratios (Gorton 2012).  In Japan on the other hand, capital 
requirements were implemented in May 1986.  The timing of these requirements 
being put in place is believed to have acted as a preparation tool for competition from 
foreign banks following the liberalization of Japanese financial sector (Allen 2003).   
 
The proliferation of bank failures during the 1980s, following the Third World Debt 
crisis and the US savings and loan crises, resulted in the formation of a standing 
committee of bank supervisory authorities, from the G-10 countries2 based at the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel.   
 
                                                        
2 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision consists of representatives of the 
central banks and supervisory authorities of the following countries: Belgium, 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, United States and Luxembourg. Basel I agreement was signed by all 12 
member countries   
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The main purpose of the Basel Committee is to eliminate regulatory arbitrage in the 
international banking system namely the tendency of banks to hold their risky assets 
in offshore subsidiaries.   Wagster (1996) argues than an implicit aim of the Basel 
Accord was in response to the competition inequality between Japanese banks and 
other international banks during the 1980s.  At the time Japanese banks were amongst 
the largest in the world, a position achieved, according to Wagster (1996), by 
underpricing their competitors.  This allowed Japanese banks to capture some 38 
percent of all international lending, including 12 percent and 23 percent of the US and 
UK banking market, respectively.  
 
In the original paper published in 1988, the Basel Committee stated that the main two 
objectives for the proposed capital regulatory framework were, ‘…firstly… to 
strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking system; and 
secondly that the framework should be in fair and have a high degree of consistency 
in its application to banks in different countries with a view to diminishing an existing 
source of competitive inequality among international banks’ (BCBS 1988, pg. 1).  
 
Capital adequacy regulation is influenced by the desire to maintain confidence and 
stability in the financial system.  It prevents excessive risk taking by forcing banks to 
hold capital reserves based on the riskiness of their portfolios so that the risk and the 
impact of the failure of any bank on the system would be reduced.  It is supposed to 
provide common standards of regulation, avoiding regulatory arbitrage. It is worth 
noting here that the Basel requirements and guidelines are not, as Getter (2014) notes,  
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‘treaties’. Each country can modify these standards in accordance to their needs and 
objectives when implementing national capital requirements (Getter 2014).   
 
 
2.1.1 Basel I  
 
Capital regulation under Basel I came into effect in December 1992, after being 
introduced and development since 1988.  A minimum ratio of 4 percent for Tier 1 
capital- defined as the value of all its outstanding shares less goodwill which is the 
market’s estimate of how solid a bank is- to risk-weighted assets and 8 percent for 
Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital or supplementary capital. Tier I or core capital consists of 
equity capital, reserves and retained earnings. Tier 2, which is the additional capital 
above Tier 1 capital, consists of loan-loss reserves, certain preferred stock, perpetual 
debt, undisclosed reserves and revaluation reserves.  Basel I provided risk weights to 
different classes of assets. The more risky an asset is perceived the greater the weight 
attached to it.  The framework established five category credit risks weighting 
between 0 percent and 100 percent.  The latter represented the riskiest assets such as 
corporate loans and claims on governments outside the OECD.  50 percent risk was 
attached to residential mortgages; 20 percent -bonds issued by agencies of OECD 
governments; 10 percent risk were considered claims on domestic public-sector 
entities; whereas 0 percent risk were attached to assets such as cash and bonds issued 
by OECD governments.  Basel I required at least 50 percent of the required capital 
(that is 4 percent of risk-weighted assets), to consists of equity capital and retained 
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earnings (Tier I), whereas 2 percent of risk-weighted assets to be in common equity 
(Hull 2012).   
 
However, these requirements were criticised for being too simple. Much of the 
criticism concerned the inability of Basel I to differentiate between levels of risk, 
which resulted in regulatory arbitrage. According to Pilbeam(2010), capital adequacy  
in the UK, USA and Germany rose well above the 8 percent requirements between 
1992-2003, as a results of banks selling off assets that required too high capital 
requirements under the Basel system and retaining  assets on which they considered 
capital adequacy ratios were too low relative to their own assessment of the risk.  
Another example of capital regulatory arbitrage made possible by Basel I is the fixed 
capital requirements within asset categories. That implies that a loan to a company 
associated with low default risks is assigned the same level of risk as a higher yielding 
loan to a company with high default risk. This in turn gives banks an incentive to shift 
away from low-risk borrowers and move toward high-risk borrowers, and not make 
any adjustment to regulatory capital. However, the consequence of such switch is 
higher risk for banks (Emmons et al 2005).  
 
2.1.2 Basel II  
 
In response to criticism of the original regulatory framework, a revised framework for 
dealing with regulatory arbitrage, known as Basel II, was introduced in June 2004.    
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The aim of the Basel II was to better assist regulators to better align the capital 
requirements with risk. It also recognised that the safety and the soundness of the 
financial sector could be better achieved only by the combination of effective bank-
level management, market discipline, and supervision (BIS 2001).   
Contrary to the Basel I, which provided only one option for measuring the adequate 
capital of banks, the new accord recognised that the best way to measure, manage and 
mitigate risks vary from bank to bank. Therefore the new framework introduced three 
mutually reinforcing ‘pillars’. Pillar 1 of the Basel II system defined minimum capital 
standards to buffer unforeseen losses. Total risk-weighted assets were based on a 
complex procedure that took into account  ‘credit’, ‘market’ and ‘operational’ risk.  In 
calculating the minimum regulatory capital, this accord covers operational risk and 
market risk as well as the credit risk which is essentially the same as Basel I.  The 
operational risk was defined as ‘the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed 
internal processes, people and systems or from external events’ (BIS 2001, pg. 27).  
Adding some flexibility the Committee allowed banks to choose between two 
approaches for computing their capital requirements for credit risk. The first 
methodology was the standardised approach, which group exposures into a series of 
risk classifications.  Loans to sovereigns, corporates and banks are assigned risks 
taking into account by external credit ratings. For example companies with AAA 
rating would be associated with lower risk weighting that BBB rated companies.  
 
The second was the internal rating approach, where banks are able to use their internal 
estimates to determine the riskiness of their portfolios and thus the level of capital 
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they would need to protect themselves against potential looses.  The second pillar was 
concerned with the supervisory review process which requires supervisors to ensure 
that ‘…each bank has sound internal processes in place to assess the adequacy of its 
capital based on a thorough evaluation of its risks’ (BIS 2001, pg 3). Banks need to 
demonstrate that they are well protected against adverse economic and market 
conditions. Supervisors are responsible for evaluating how well banks are measuring 
their capital adequacy needs in accordance to their risk profile (BIS 2001).  
 
The third pillar of Basel II aimed to reinforce market discipline through enhanced 
disclosure on capital and risk levels by banks.  The aim of such report is to ensure that 
market participants can be better informed on banks’ risk profiles and on the 
adequacy of their capital levels, thus market reaction will act as a means of discipline 
on banks (BIS 2001).  
 
Basel II was implemented in stages by the end of 2006 with a year extension for the 
US banks (Pilbeam 2010).  The US federal banking regulatory agencies initially 
limited the application of Basel II to the country’s 19 largest banks- those with 
consolidated total assets of at least $250 billion or at least of $10 billion of foreign   
exposure (Getter 2014). After the publication of the final rule to implement Basel II, 
in December 2007, it became effective on April 1, 2008. However it was quickly 
overtaken by the events of the credit crunch which started in the summer of 2007.   
Some argue that Basel II worsened the problems of the crises by obliging banks to cut 
lending and rise capital when the global economy was in recession (Pilbeam 2010).  
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In response to the financial crisis in 2009 the Basel Committee introduced a revised 
market risk framework, known as Basel II.5, as an amendment of Basel II.  Basel II.5 
addresses the issues associated with risk on the trading books of banks.  The trading 
book is an accounting term that refers to trading securities, that is securities that are 
not held to maturity, as opposed to banking books, that refer to assets held to 
maturity. Another major difference between the trading and banking books is the 
accounting rules that are applied to securities held in each book. For example, 
securities in  trading books are accounted for at the current market value whereas in 
the banking books they are accounted at the original book value.  Responding to the 
losses and excessive leverage in the trading books of banks, revealed by the 2007-09 
crisis, the BCBS introduced higher capital charges for the credit risk in their trading 
portfolios.  Basel II.5 imposes an incremental risk capital charge to better capture 
trading book losses with reference to default and migration risk for unsecuritized 
products (BCBS 2009a). The incremental risk charge (IRC) is estimated based over a 
year capital horizon and 99 percent confidence level, as opposed to the 10-day 
standard regulatory value at risk model3. The measure assumes a constant risk level 
and takes into account liquidity horizon of individual positions as well as sets of 
positions.  The constant risk assumption indicates that banks rebalance their 
portfolios, thus mitigating default risk.  Banks are required to estimate liquidity 
horizons in order to establish the effective holding period of each instrument subject 
                                                        
3 The market risk framework set  prior to the introduction of Basel II.5 assumed that 
trading book position were liquid, implying that banks could sell or hedge these 
positions over a 10 day period (BCBS 2012).  
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to the IRC. The liquidity horizons represent the time that would be required to sell 
positions (reduce exposure) or hedge all material risks in a stressed market  
environment.  The Committee also specifies a minimum 3 months liquidity horizon 
(BCBS 2009b).  
Higher capital charges also apply to securitized products in the banking books, 
excluding certain correlation trading activities4.  For the latter category, the 
comprehensive risk capital charge is applied as opposed to the standardised approach 
for securitized products. The comprehensive risk measure (CRM) has two separate 
components. One is the specific risk component of each security, for which an 8 
percent capital surcharge is applied for both long and short correlation trading 
positions, and the general market risk (interest rate risk in the portfolio) component. 
The following table summarizes the standardized approach to calculating the 
comprehensive risk capital measure for correlation trading activities, in which higher 
capital charges apply to resecuritization exposures:  
 
Table 1-1  Specific risk capital charges under the standardized approach based on external 
rating (banking book) 
External Credit 
Assessment  
AAA to 
AA- 
A+ to A- BBB+ to 
BB- 
BB+ to 
BB- 
Below BB- 
or Unrated 
Securitizations 
exposures 
1.6 % 4 % 8 % 28 % Deduction5 
from 
regulatory 
capital 
                                                        
4 Correlation trading activities refer to portfolio-based tranche products, such as 
bespoke credit default collateral debt obligation (CDO) and asset backed securities 
(ABS) , and their hedges (Citigroup 2013).  
5 The principal amount subtracted from capital, which 50 percent must be taken from 
Tier I and 50 percent from Tier II, making it equivalent to 100 percent total capital 
charge.  
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Resecuritization 
exposures 
3.2 % 8 % 18 % 52 % Deduction 
from 
regulatory 
capital  
Source: BCBS(2009a) 
 
For unrated positions banks are allowed to use their internal models in order to 
calculate the CRM. However their models need to get approval from banks 
supervisors, so that risk is measured accurately. More specifically the CRM models  
must capture the cumulative risk impact from multiple defaults, credit spread risk, 
volatility of implied  correlation, basis risk between an index and its single-name 
components, basis risk between the implied correlation of an index and that of 
bespoke portfolios, recovery rate volatility, the risk of hedge slippage and the 
potential costs of rebalancing those hedges. Banks are also subject to conduct rigorous 
stress tests (BCBS 2009a).   
 
The market risk framework of Basel II allowed banks to calculate capital charge 
based on a 10-day horizon, calibrated to a 99 percent confidence interval.  Calculating 
the value at risk regulatory measure assumes normal market conditions.  In order to 
calculate the regulatory VaR banks use the so-called historical simulation procedure.  
To better capture potential losses under conditions of more volatile markets Basle II.5 
requires banks to calculate the stressed VaR on their portfolios.  The stressed VaR 
have the same confidence level and holding period, as the standardized regulatory 
VaR models, but must use historical data from a continuous 1-year period that reflects 
significant financial stress, relevant to banks current portfolios (BCBS 2009a).   
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2.1.3 Basel III  
 
Financial regulation, especially the Basel capital requirements have received much  
criticism over the latest financial global crisis. One of the most frequent arguments 
has been the need to make banks more capitalized as well as having a weak 
framework to account for off-balance sheet activities.  In December 2009 the BIS 
proposed a new set of measures dubbed Basel III. These rules reinforce the view that 
the greater the risk to which a bank is exposed, the greater the amount of capital it 
needs to hold to protect its soundness and overall economic stability.  The new 
framework also attempts to deal with procyclicality of capital requirement as well 
complementing microprudentail with macroprudential in order to better deal with 
credit cycles (D’Hulster 2009).  
 
Under Basel III banks are required to maintain a least 4.5 percent of risk-weighted 
assets in common equity Tier I at all times.  Tier I capital must be at least 6 percent of 
risk-weighted assets.  Total capital, that is both Tier I and Tier II, remains the same at 
8 percent of total risk-weighted assets.  Basel III also tightens the definition of 
common equity and additional Tier I and Tier II capital.  This Accord places a strong 
emphasis on the elements that should be included in the definition of Tier I, which 
must mainly consist of common equity and retained earnings.  
 
Chapter 2. Literature Review  43 
In addition to the minimum capital requirements Basel III established a new 
conservation buffer consisting of common Tier I set at 2.5 percent of the total risk-
weighted assets. The purpose of the conservation buffer aims to protect banks from 
potential losses during periods of financial and economic distress.  While banks can 
draw on the buffer during such periods of stress, the closer their regulatory capital 
ratios approach the minimum requirements, the higher the limitations on earnings and 
distribution i.e. such banks are expected to lower dividend payments to shareholders, 
or share buy- backs until they have improved their balance sheets.  The capital 
conservation buffer will be implemented in stages by January 2019.  Banks are 
required to hold a minimum of 0.625 percent of risk-weighted assets starting on 
January 2016, and then increase it each year by 0.625 percent rising until 2.5 percent 
in January 2019.  
 
With the aim to mitigate procyclicality Basel III has introduced capital 
countercyclical capital buffer measures as a complementary to the conservation buffer 
capital.  The procyclicality of bank capital regulation is related to the interaction 
between capital requirements and economic fluctuations. During good times, when 
the economy is booming, bank capital should increase, and when the economy enters 
into recession bank capital should fall. As evident in the latest crisis, bank excessive 
lending in periods of economic expansion, can result in huge amount of losses for 
banks when the economy takes a downturn. These losses can weaken the banking 
sector, which could amplify economic recessions (BCBS 2010a). The idea of 
countercyclical buffer capital measures therefore is for banks to hold higher buffer in 
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good economic times and decrease during recessions. Taking into account the macro 
environment in which banks operate, this measure is a macroprudential tool in 
achieving financial stability by means by controlling credit growth in good times and 
putting banks in a better financial position to withstand losses during downturns 
(Jimenez et al 2012, Getter 2014). The logic behind this measure is that whilst 
requiring banks to maintain higher capital ratios in good times increases their capacity 
to withstand any unexpected losses, it could also lead to higher lending rates charged 
by banks, thereby reducing the demand for credit.  
 
In a forward looking approach accounting for the procyclicality, that the credit cycle 
introduces into the real economy, is not a new regulatory tool. Even though it is the 
first time that the Basel Committee proposes such measure, Spanish banks have been 
subject to countercyclical buffer capital measures since 2000.  Despite this measure 
being in place, Spain experienced a property bubble, fuelled by excessive credit, 
causing severe distress in the banking sector (Getter 2014).  Nevertheless, the Basel 
Committee introduced countercyclical buffer requirements that would vary between 
zero and 2.5 percent of common equity Tier I or other fully loss absorbing capital,  to 
total risk weighted assets. The size of the buffer will be set by national regulatory 
authority, depending on their judgement on credit conditions that could be a hazard to 
financial stability.  
 
For the first time the Basel Committee introduced a non-risk based leverage ratio as a 
additional measure to risk based capital requirements.  The focus on the leverage ratio 
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derives from the latest global financial crisis in which banks had built up excessive 
leverage, which in turn is believed to have exacerbated the crisis (D’Hulster 2009).  
The newly introduced standard also acts as a countercyclical instrument.  Intuitively 
higher capital means lower leverage and vice versa6. This is because in good 
economic times when asset prices are rising, bank equity as a proportion of total 
assets increases. In contrast, during economic downturns, asset price fall and as bank 
capital decreases, leverage is likely to increase.  However, it is often argued that 
leverage is procyclical with the credit cycle. As evident in the crisis the market 
imposed pressure on banks to reduce its leverage, which contributes to falling asset 
prices, contributing to greater losses, lower bank capital and decline of credit (BCBS 
2010a).  
 
D’Hulster (2009) explains the procyclicality of leverage by highlighting banks’ 
activities during the credit cycle activities used to manage their leverage, which are 
collateralized borrowing, and lending.  Under expansionary monetary policy banks 
balance sheets grow, and subsequently liquidity supply increases.  By contrast when 
monetary policy is tight, banks balance sheets shrink, thus the supply of liquidity 
decreases.  The introduction of a minimum leverage ratio by the Basel Committee, 
aims to limit the amount of banks’ debt relative to their equity capital and reinforce 
the risk-weighted capital requirements.  Currently, the BCBS is testing a minimum 
Tier I leverage ratio of 3 percent, and plan to fully implement it by January 2018. 
However, the US regulators in 2013 announced the decision to implement a higher 
                                                        
6 The leverage ratio is the ratio of total assets to capital, or Tier I capital.  
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leverage ratio than that proposed by Basel III.  The country’s largest bank holding 
companies are required to hold a minimum leverage ratio of 5 percent, whereas their 
insured depository institutions subsidiaries must hold a minimum leverage ratio of 6 
percent, in order to be considered well-capitalized (Federal Reserve 2014).  
 
Basel III also introduces new liquidity standards in an attempt to avoid a reoccurrence 
of a liquidity crisis.  The latest financial crisis revealed that despite many banks being 
well capitalised, liquidity problems are a major source of financial instability.  A 
series of papers published by the BCBS, recognizes that capital adequacy regulation is 
not enough to prevent a liquidity crisis7 (BCBS 2010b, BCBS 2009a). Therefore, the 
Committee proposed a new liquidity framework creating two regulatory liquidity 
measures: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio 
(NSFR).  
 
The LCR aims to promote short-term resilience of banks’ liquidity ensuring that it has 
enough high quality liquid assets to survive any sudden disruptions in liquidity lasting 
30 days. The numerator of the LCR consists of stock of high quality liquid assets, 
such as government securities and cash, and the denominator is comprised of cash 
outflows minus cash inflows over a 30 day period.  Therefore the stock of liquid 
assets held should be equal or greater than the net cash outflows.  
 
                                                        
7 The paper notes that […many banks –despite adequate capital levels-still 
experienced difficulties because they did not manage their liquidity in a prudent 
manner] BCBS(2010b, pg. 1).  
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The NSFR aims to promote long-term resilience by encouraging banks to rely upon 
stable sources, such as medium and long term funding, to fund their activities. The 
NSFR measures the amount of available stable funding (ASF) relative to the amount 
required stable funding (RSF). The ratio is intended to measure the minimum amount 
of funding that is expected to be stable over a one-year period taking into account the 
liquidity characteristics of a bank’s assets as well its off-balance sheet activities. The 
amount of ASF is the sum of an institution’s liabilities and capital using available 
stable funding assigning different weights (ASF factors) (Getter 2014).  In such, 
banks capital is assigned 100 percent ASF weight. Consumer deposit liabilities, such 
as retail and small and medium enterprises that are considered stable receive a 95 
percent ASF factor, whereas those deposits that are considered ‘less stable’ receive a 
90 percent ASF weight.  Corporate deposit liabilities and public sector lending with 
maturities les than one year, as well as other lending with maturities of more than six 
months but less than one year, receive a 50 percent ASF weight.  Any other liabilities 
and net derivatives receivables are assigned 0 percent ASF factor.  Thus, higher 
weights are given to those stable funding sources that have longer maturities than 
those with shorter maturities (Getter 2014). The denominator of the NSFR is 
calculated as the sum of the value of assets and funded by the institution assigning 
different RSF factors. Assets that are more liquid, in that they can be converted 
quickly into cash without any losses, receive lower RSF weights than assets that are 
less liquid and require more stable funding receive higher RSF weights. For example 
cash assets, don’t require funding hence receive 0 percent RSF weight. 
Unencumbered marketable securities with maturities more than a year receive 5 
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percent RSF weight, whilst unencumbered corporate bonds rated at least AA with 
maturity one year or more, would be assigned a 20 percent RSF factor.  Gold, 
unencumbered equity securities and corporate bonds rate AA- to A-, with one or more 
year to maturity, as well loans to non-financial corporations with maturity less than a 
year receive a 50 percent RSF factor. Residential mortgages of any maturity and other 
unencumbered loans with maturity of one year or more, that receives 35 percent or 
less risk weight under Basel II standardized approach for credit risk, would receive 65 
percent RSF factor. Loans to retail clients are subject to 85 percent RSF factor and 
any other assets receive 100 percent weight (BCBS 2010c).  The NSFR must be 
greater than 1.  So in order to maintain the NSFR equal to or greater than 100 percent 
banks could increase their capital when funding longer-term loans with a sequence of 
shorter-term loans or diversity the maturity of their own short-term debts (Getter 
2014). The NSFR also assigns different RSF weights to various off-balance sheet 
activates in order to determine the amount of stable funds an institutions should hold 
relative to its off balance sheet exposure that may be need funding over one year 
period. The LCR will be introduced in January 2015, whereas the NSFR will be 
implemented in January 2018.  
 
To sum up, the ratio of minimum total capital banks will be required to hold by 2019 
is set at 13 percent, adding the 2.5 percent conservation buffer and 2.5 percent 
countercyclical buffer capital to the 8 percent minimum total capital.  These 
requirements apply to all globally active banks. However, for larger banks, relative to 
the asset size, the so-called globally systemically important banks (G-SIBs) Basel III 
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has introduced additional loss absorbency or capital requirements.   The rationale 
behind applying higher capital standard to these banks is based on the impact that 
their distress or failure would have on global financial activities.  Hence the health of 
these banks is perceived to contribute significantly to global financial stability. The 
Committee has proposed an assessment methodology in identifying those financial 
institutions that would fit in the category of G-SIBs, using an indicator-based 
measurement approach.  
 
This approach uses both qualitative and quantitative indicators to determine the 
systematic importance of globally significant financial institutions. The identified  
G-SIBs would then be grouped into different categories of systemic importance in 
accordance to the scores produced by the indicator-based approach, and would be 
allocated into different “buckets”, based in their scores of systemic importance, 
assigning varying additional capital requirements. These requirements, to be met with 
common equity, would range from 0 percent to 2.5 percent of the total risk-weighted 
assets (BCBS 2011).  For example banks allocated in bucket 1 are required to hold a 
minimum of 1 percent additional loss absorbency, banks in bucket 2 should hold 1.5 
percent, banks in bucket 3 are required to hold 2 percent and banks in bucket 4 are 
required to hold 2.5 percent additional capital.  The additional loss absorbency 
requirements will be implemented in stages and become fully effective in January 
2019.   In 2011 the Financial Stability Board (FSB) published the first official list of 
identified G-SIBs. The list is expected to be updated yearly by the FSA. The latest 
Chapter 2. Literature Review  50 
updated official list was published in November 2013, and an additional bank to the 
G-SIBs. This brings the total number of identified G-SIBs to 29,  (FSB 2013a).  
 
The 27 member jurisdictions and 44 central banks and supervisory authorities agreed 
on Basel III proposals for capital and liquidity requirements, together with the 
proposed implementation schedules, in September 2010 (Getter 2014). In relation to 
US banks, some of the new rules clash with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act signed into law in 2010 (the Dodd-Frank Act). The Act is 
considered the largest financial regulation overhaul of the US financial sector since 
the Great Depression. Amongst other reforms, it addresses capital requirements and 
the definition of Tier I capital for the US banking institutions, which differ from what 
Basel III and Basel II.5 proposes. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act removes the use 
of credit rating agencies.  The newly Basel Accords, II.5 and III, both rely on credit 
rating agencies to assign risk to various securities, and hence determining the amount 
of capital a banks needs to hold. However, given the blame the credit agencies 
received in the 2007-09 financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act forbids their use. Instead, 
the US authorities have had to come up with new standards to determine the risk of 
various assets held by banks and apply bank capital requirements accordingly.  The 
new risk-weighted methodologies implemented by US regulatory authorities take into 
account factors such as different loan categories, issuers and the underwriting 
requirements of borrowers (Getter 2012).  The risk weights would then be multiplied 
to all bank assets, and the sum of the risk-weighted assets is then multiplied by a 
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minimum capital percentage in order to assess how much capital a bank needs to hold 
(ibid).  
 
Furthermore, section 171 of the Dodd Frank Act, the Collins Amendment, established 
minimum risk-based capital and leverage requirements for all insured depository 
institutions, their holding companies and systemically important non-bank financial 
companies. The Collins Amendments imposes equal risk capital requirements and 
leverage capital requirements to bank holding companies and significant nonbank 
financial institutions and insured depository institutions.  This is the first ‘floor’ to 
which the capital and leverage requirements are subject, established by the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury; Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System; and the FDIC (collectively known as the agencies). The second floor 
requires the minimum requirements not to be quantitatively lower than the 
requirements that were in effect when the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted, in 2010.   
The Collin Amendments also eliminates trust preferred securities as an element of 
Tier I capital for large bank holdings and systemically important financial institutions.  
The exclusion of trust preferred stock from the definition of Tier I capital for insured 
depository institutions became effective at the time of the enactment of Dodd-Frank 
Act, whereas the Collin Amendment places this requirement to bank holding 
companies with consolidated assets of $15 billion or more. The phase time given to 
US banks to adjust to these requirements is three years, beginning on January 1, 2013.  
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Under Basel III trust preferred stock are no longer eligible for Tier I capital treatment. 
However, the phase in period under Basel III is 10 years, beginning on January 1, 
2013, unlike the shorter phase in schedule outlined under the Collin Amendment.  
Despite the difference between the requirements set by the Dodd-Frank Act in US and 
the Basel III requirements, these regulatory measures attempt to impose higher capital 
requirements in an attempt to promote a safer and sound financial system.  
 
2.2 Related Literature  
 
The literature on capital adequacy requirements falls naturally into three parts. In the 
first place there are the proponents of capital adequacy adducing various arguments as 
to how capital adequacy may reduce risk in banking. In a second, much 
smaller, category are those banking experts who argue that capital adequacy is not 
effective in decreasing banking risk, and may even increase it. Finally, there is the 
very small number of studies that have examined this question empirically. In the first 
category are various studies coming principally from the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS).  
 
While the literature on capital adequacy is vast, until recently very little empirical 
evidence was available on the relationship of probability of banks default and capital 
adequacy. As surprising as this seems, the lack of literature on this topic is also 
confirmed in Barrell et.al. (2009) in which the authors attempt to estimate the benefits 
of capital adequacy in reducing banking crises.   Furthermore, King et al (2005) states 
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that even though since the 1990s the banking system has undergone fundamental 
changes, research into the causes of distress has significantly slowed.    
 
A large body of literature examines the role of capital requirements on risk taking. 
One of the arguments for imposing capital regulations is that it will provide banks 
with the incentives to take less risk. Repullo (2002) suggests that higher capital ratios 
mean that banks shareholders would incur higher capital losses in the event of default, 
and thus they reduce banks incentives for risk taking. His analysis makes use of a 
dynamic model of imperfect competition in which banks are assumed to have two 
investment strategies; invest in prudent assets or gambling assets.  He argues that 
capital regulation ensures the existence of a prudent equilibrium, because capital 
requirements do not affect banks’ charter value and restrains gambling investment by 
imposing higher equity losses to the bank shareholders in the event of default 
(Repullo 2002).  
 
Furlong and Keeley (1989) and Keeley and Furlong (1990) also examine the impact 
of capital requirement from a risk incentive perspective.  They employ a state-
preference model in which the option value of deposit insurance is taken into 
consideration.   This approach was first used by Merton (1977),  in a study in which 
he derived a formula used in the option pricing model, showing that deposit insurance 
can be viewed as a put option of the value on bank assets with an exercise price equal 
to the face value at maturity of banks debt i.e. bank deposits (Santos 2000).  Merton’s 
study also concerned the impact of deposit insurance and risk-taking incentives, and 
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suggests that regulators need to supervise both the risk of assets and leverage of 
insured value-maximising banks (Keeley and Furlong 1989). The importance of the 
studies conducted over the effect of deposit insurance and risk-taking can be thought 
of as the logic behind the decision of regulators to impose capital requirements.  As 
Keeley and Furlong (1989) state  ‘ Concern over the risk exposure of the federal 
deposit insurance system has been a major factor behind the increase in capital 
standards in banking in the 1980s’ (Keeley and Furlong 1989, pp. 883).   In response 
to the risk-incentives behaviour that deposit insurance brought about in banks, studies 
such as Merton (1977) called in the need for bank regulation, as explained above.  
This led to many studies focusing on the effect of capital requirements on bank risk-
taking.   
 
The theoretical and empirical evidence on whether increasing capital ratios lower risk 
taking is not conclusive.  For example, the studies of  Koehn and Santomero (1980), 
Kahane (1977), Kim and Santomero (1988)  using  a  mean-variance model, argue 
that higher capital ratios could in fact increase the risk of utility maximising banks.  
However, Keeley and Furlong  (1989) argue that once the option value of deposit 
insurance is taken into consideration, higher capital standards lowers bank risk 
incentives. They argue that this is because, the value of marginal value of deposit 
insurance option in relation to increasing asset risk declines as leverage declines.  
Therefore, restricting the leverage on banks should decrease risk incentives.  
Sheldon (1996), also used the Black-Scholes formula to examine the risk effect of 
capital adequacy regulation for several G-10 countries. He examines 219 banks from 
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a variety of countries over the period 1987 to 1994 to study the risk effect of the Basel 
I Accord.  With reference to the US his findings suggest that bank asset volatility 
increased as banks raised their capital ratios. The positive relationship between asset 
risk and capital ratios was found in banks for the period 1990-1992, reflecting the 
Basel Accord regulatory implementation. However, examining the period before the 
implementation of the capital requirements Sheldon’s findings are similar to the post-
regulation period. That is to say that bank asset volatility increased for both bank 
groups, those that raised capital ratios as subject to Basel regulation and those that 
didn’t prior to the capital regulation being in place.  However, in Japan he finds that 
the asset volatility and default probability of Japanese banks over the sample period 
fell, even though most banks increased their capital ratios. 
 
Montgomery (2005) also studies the risk incentive behaviour of Japanese banks for 
the period between 1982-1999.  The analysis looks at  how the impact of risk-based 
capital ratios affect portfolio risk adjustment for both domestic and international 
banks.  Similarly, to Sheldon (1996), the effects of capital requirements on banks 
portfolio decision is conducted by examining banks’ risk incentives,- as measured by 
the sensitivity of four different assets such as total assets, loans, corporate bonds and 
governments bonds-  prior to the Basel requirements and post- Basel requirements.  
The study concludes that the low capitalized international banks in the period post- 
Basel requirements greatly shifted towards holding less risky assets. More specifically 
these banks shifted their asset portfolio from the risk-weighted assets such as loans 
and corporate bonds to riskless assets such as government bonds.  This behaviour is 
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found only in the post-Basel period.  In terms of the domestic banks this effect is not 
found, so that the Basel capital requirements did not affect their asset portfolio.   
 
In contrast to these views Blum (1999) argues that capital requirements increase bank 
risk taking. He employs a discrete time model to study the intertemporal effect that 
the capital adequacy rules have on the behaviour of banks.  He argues that one of the 
effects of the capital requirements is a reduction in the expected profits, which 
reduces bank losses if it defaults. He argues that under binding capital requirements 
raising equity is excessively costly, and in a dynamic model the value of equity for a 
bank is more valuable tomorrow than today. In what follows, the only option left for 
banks to increase the amount of equity tomorrow would be to increase risk today.  
This way he argues the effect of capital requirements is opposite to what is perceived.  
Similarly, Gale (2010) argues that higher capital requirements will not necessary 
reduce the level of risk taking in the banking industry.  This conclusion is reached 
when the impact of capital requirements is analysed within a general equilibrium 
framework.  He argues that in a banking environment, which he calls it a ‘casino 
banking’, that is driven by target return on equity, rising capital requirements induce 
bank managers to take on additional risk to achieve their desired rate of return.  
 
Other studies, such as the one of Alfon et al (2004), are concerned with the impact 
that capital requirements has on the amount of capital a bank decides to hold.  The 
analysis looks at UK banks over the period of 1998-2003, and states that banks do 
hold buffer capital in addition to what is required.  The authors identify risk 
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management, market discipline and the regulatory environment as the main factors 
that influence the amount of capital held by banks. However, the regulatory 
requirements are the largest determinant affecting capital adequacy as opposed to the 
other considerations.  These findings are similar to Ediz  et al (1998) which study 
looks at the impact of capital requirements on the internal decisions of banks capital. 
The empirical evidence there suggests that the requirements strongly affect the 
amount of capital a bank would like to hold. In addition the paper states that banks 
adjust their capital ratios through the issue of equity rather than adjustment in balance 
sheet compositions.  These results, suggest that capital regulation can significantly 
influence bank decision making on equity issue rather than risk management.  
 
Some argue that the introduction of capital requirements was to blame for bringing on 
a credit crunch in countries like the US and Japan. Furfine(2000), examines the 
impact of changes to capital requirements on US banks.  The analyses examine the 
role the Basel Accord played on the credit crunch the US experienced in the 1990s.   
Banks responded to the risk based capital regulation by shifting their portfolios into 
government securities.   Banks reduced their commercial and industrial lending, and 
increased their investment in government securities.  This precipitated the credit 
crunch (Furfine 2000). During the same period the US also experienced a recession, 
suggesting that the decreased credit supply was the cause of the negative shock in the 
economy. However, a graphical representation of banks portfolio changes shows that 
the decreased supply was evident well before the start of the recession and well after 
the following US expansion had begun.  Supporting these findings, the author also 
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points to the previous recession that the US had experienced and states that the shift in 
bank portfolios was the reverse of that in the recession of the 1990’s.  In previous, 
economic contractions, commercial lending rose and investment in government 
securities either fell or remained fairly unchanged.  Taking into account the marginal 
costs banks incur as a result of regulation, the study examined the impact of 
implementing capital requirements on lending growth and capital ratios over the 
period of 1989-1997. The estimated results show that capital requirements played a 
role in explaining the decline in loan growth and the rise in capital ratios in the US.   
 
Similarly, many researchers have attributed to the credit crunch in the Japanese 
banking system to the introduction of capital adequacy regulations.  Montgomery 
(2001) takes the analysis further by investigating the relationship between risk-based 
capital ratios and lending, and how the credit supply might have had had an impact in 
the real  economy.  Therefore, the research is based on both at macro and micro level.  
Calculating the capital adequacy ratios from individual banks and using an 
instrumental variable estimation method the author provides evidence on the micro 
level of Japanese banks over the period of 1982-1999. The study takes into account 
the different requirements standards between international banks, which  under the 
Basel Accord are subject to an 8 percent capital ratio requirements, and domestic 
banks which are required to maintain a 4 percent MOF(Ministry Of Finance) ratio 
requirement.   There is some sort of agreement, in the Japanese banking system 
literature, that the new standards limited bank activity at an international level. A 
number of banks were forced to close their international branches so that they were 
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under the MOF regulation framework.  The analysis shows that stricter capital 
adequacy requirements greatly reduced bank lending in Japan in the early 1990’s 
most significantly in the case of international banks.  Evidence suggests that domestic 
banks that were under less strict capital requirements, responded rather less to the 
increased requirements in terms of  credit supply.   The macroeconomic analyses, 
suggest that the reduction in credit supply contributed negatively to the real economy 
resulting in the ‘lost decade’ the Japan has experienced.  
  
Martin’s (1977) econometric study testing for the determinants of banks failure is one 
of few that used a measure of capital to risk-weighted assets. The Basel 1 ratio 
requirement did not take effect until 1993, making it too early for it to be tested in his 
study. But even the ratio of capital to assets, unweighted for risk, appears significant: 
as capital adequacy rises, the probability of failure declines.  He constructs an early 
warning signal model estimating the probability of future bank failure as a function of 
variables taken from the current period’s balance sheet and income statement during a 
seven- year period during the 1970s.  
The approach, as termed by him- ex post empirical- in which a sample of failed banks 
were compared with those banks that did not fail. The dependent variable, a dummy 
variable, is the occurrence of bank failure. The independent variables are drawn from 
a set of 25 financial ratios which he classified them into four groups; (1) asset risk (2) 
liquidity; (3) capital adequacy; and (4) earnings.  In what became a standard approach 
he ran several different specifications in which variables are dropped or added to the 
model one at a time based on their individual significance and their contribution to the 
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overall fit of the model.  He finds that capital ratios- gross capital/risk asset ratio- 
liquidity measures and profitability were the most significant determinants of failure 
during that period. However, he states that the level of significance differs among 
periods. The overall quality of the equations was “best” in the later periods i.e. in 
1974 reflecting the development of the banking system after 1970. Because in the 
earlier period bank failure was infrequent, and the overall loan losses suggested that 
earnings and capital adequacy levels played a minor importance to the bank’s ability 
to survive. Bank failures were often associated with fraud and local economic trends 
which are difficult to obtain by examining bank financial statements whereas the 
recession-related asset problems are well reflected and were important in the later 
years.   In reference to the level of loan losses, prior to 1973, such losses were at a 
minimum.  However they greatly increased after that and badly affected the entire 
banking system. Therefore, he emphasised that the soundness criteria of banks varies 
over the business cycle. He concludes by stating that these findings are at variance 
with the literature on bank failure during the 1930s, which suggests that capital 
adequacy is little or not related to banks failure even under conditions of significant 
stress in the banking sector.  
 
The Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, along with the staff at the BIS engage in 
the research and study of international banking.  In August 2010 they published a 
paper which assesses the long-term economic and costs of strengthening capital and 
liquidity requirements, in terms of their impact on output.  The analysis is based on 
the assumption that banks have completed their transition phase to the new levels of 
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capital and liquidity.  Reducing the frequency of the banking crises has substantial 
benefits.  The analysis reports that a 1 percent point reduction in the probability of 
crises will gain around 0.2 percent of GDP per year, whereas when crises have long-
lasting effect, it will generate a benefit between 0.6 percent and 1.6 percent of GDP 
per year.  It is estimated that increasing capital ratios from 7 percent to 8 percent, with 
no change in liquid assets, reduces the probability of banking crises by one third ( e.g. 
from 4.6 percent to 3.0 percent).  The overall message conveyed is that benefits 
exceed the costs in the long run and ‘there is considerable room to tighten capital and 
liquidity requirements while still yielding positive benefits, measured in terms of 
output’  (BCBS, 2010d, pg. 28) 
 
 
Around the same period, the Macroeconomic Assessments Group (MAG) at the BIS 
presented a paper concerned with the need to phase in the new regulation in a manner 
that relates well to the ongoing economic recovery.   Higher capital standards affect 
the economy as banks increase their capital levels by increasing the cost of borrowing 
and reducing the supply of new loans. The MAG group used a two-step approach, in 
which the first step is to estimate the effect of higher capital standards on lending 
spreads and lending volumes using both statistical and accounting-based analyses. 
These estimates then, serve as inputs to the macroeconomic forecasting models which 
are used to assess the effect of changes to lending spreads and volumes on 
macroeconomic variables.  Banks behaviour when faced with tighter capital and 
liquidity standards depends also on the length of the period during which the 
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requirements are phased in.   When banks are allowed time to adjust to new 
requirements, they may respond differently, in that they have additional time to 
employ different strategies of capital raising such as retaining earnings, issuing 
equity, shifting liability composition, hence mitigating any adverse effect on 
aggregate activity.    Also the estimated impact transmitted from increased capital 
ratio could be offset by   other benefits associated with the new requirements. Because 
banks become more robust, they face lower debt funding cost and required ROE 
target. This in turn should reduce the need to either raise lending rates or limit the 
quantity of new loans.  Also other available sources of finance such as capital markets 
and retained earnings for non-financial corporations are likely to lessen the impact of 
changes in credit growth on economic activity (MAG 2010).  
 
Barrell et al (2009) employs   a multivariate logit model to relate the probability of 
bank default to a vector of explanatory variables. Their approach consists of pooled 
data on a number of crises from 14 OECD countries and focuses on capital adequacy 
as an indicator of banking crises. The authors then trace the impact of banking crises 
on the economy focusing on  the user cost of capital.  The dependent variable is 
defined in terms of observable stresses to a country’s banking system. Using a general 
to specific approach, the crisis prediction model reveals that unweighted capital 
adequacy and the liquidity ratio alongside real house price growth are the most 
important determinants of the probability of financial crises in the OECD countries. 
Using data for the period of 1970-2007, they predict that, given the levels of capital 
and liquidity in 2006, the probability of crises could have been reduced by more than 
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6 percentage points, if the level of capital and liquidity were increased by one 
percentage point (Barrell et al. 2009). 
 
King(2010), from the monetary and economic department of the BIS, examines  the 
loan pricing implication of higher capital requirements. While banks adjust to new 
requirements in various ways this paper is concerned with the possibility that banks 
seek to pass on the additional costs by raising the interest rates on loans to their 
borrowers.  Calculating a representative bank’s balance sheet and income statement 
using data for  6,844 banks from 13 OECD countries between 1993 - 2007, the study 
maps how changes in a bank’s capital structure, the composition of its assets and the 
measurement of risk-weighted assets(RWA),  affect the different components of net 
income using accounting relationships.  Measuring changes of a representative bank’s 
net income and shareholders’ equity associated with the new regulation standards, 
allows the author to calculate any increase in lending spreads required to realize a 
given return on equity (ROE).   Bank lending spread here is defined as ‘the spread 
between a bank’s cost of liabilities and the average rate charged on its loan portfolio’. 
The assumption here is that banks price their loans in such manner that they cover the 
marginal cost associated with loan production.  Also, assuming no change to other 
variables such as bank’s ROE or cost of debt, a 1 percentage point increase in the 
capital ratio can be offset by increasing the lending spreads by 15 basis points.    
Whether banks will be able to pass on these additional costs to consumers, King 
argues, amongst others, depends on the elasticity of the demand for loans.  However, 
if the ROE and cost of debt is allowed to decline by 10 basis points for each 1 
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percentage point increase in capital ratios, the increase in lending spreads is reduced 
to 13 basis points.   
 
King (2010) also points to the work of Elliot (2010) which by applying the same 
accounting principles using data for the US banking system he examines the changes 
of interest rates charged on loans when banks are faced with tighter capital 
requirements.  He assumes that the representative bank holds only loans, which are 
funded by equity, deposits and wholesale funding. Banks will charge an interest rates 
which ensures they receive their desired target ROE after taking care of other costs 
such as the cost of liabilities and other fixed costs. Elliot estimates that if the ratio of 
common equity required for a given loan is raised by 2 percent, assuming no other 
adjustments, then banks will increase lending spreads by 39 basis point in order to 
meet their target ROE of 15 percent.  However he argues, that if banks were to reduce 
their ROE to 14.5 percent this would make the required increase to fall to 9 basis 
point together the cost of liabilities to decrease by 10 basis points.  His proposition of 
a decline(not shown empirically) in ROE and the cost of liabilities are based on a 
modified Modigliani-Miller framework, which is based on the assumptions that the 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) does not change for different capital 
structure choice.  He concludes that banks could adjust to the new requirements by 
choosing a combination of actions that would mitigate the effects on pricing or 
availability of bank loans.  
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But these are studies of the impact of capital requirements in lending spreads and 
ROE, rather than on the likelihood of default, which the capital requirements are 
supposed to affect.  
 
Toporowski provides a theoretical argument, in which he states that rising capital 
adequacy requirements under conditions of inelastic equity capital supply, has the 
effect  of forcing non-financial firms into debt. Requiring banks to increase their 
capital reduces the amount of capital available to non-financial firms. When banks are 
faced with tighter capital regulation they have to adjust their capital accordingly.  
There are various ways in which banks adjust their required capital ratios.   Either one 
of them will have a negative impact in the capital market.  The higher the amount of 
capital held by banks, the lower the quantity available to nonfinancial firms seeking 
capital finance. Such firms  are left with no option other than to raise their needed 
capital through the issue of debt instruments. Hence, firms are forced to borrow more 
than planned, which in turn reduces future fixed capital investment. Toporowski 
argues that ‘enforced indebtedness’ increases the financial fragility of the economy.  
Firms instead of reducing the amount of debt held, now have debt in excess of what 
they planned which can be accommodated in two ways.  Firstly, companies can hold 
larger amounts of liquid assets. But this is not efficient since it means that the capital 
that firms have issued is being ‘wasted’ by being held as financial asset rather than 
being used to expand production or fixed capital.  Alternatively, firms could reduce 
their future fixed capital investment in order to be able to have those liquid assets.  
Therefore, the excess debt level being held by firm as a consequence of higher banks’ 
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capital regulation requirement reduces productive investment below what it would 
otherwise be.   The reduced productive investment then also reduces the cash flow of 
firms and their ability to service their debt.  Therefore, higher capital requirement that 
aims to circumvent banks unsoundness, encourage firms to reduce their productive 
investment in fixed capital in response to their increased indebtedness. Toporowski, 
notes that such reduction in is the key determinant in causing the real economy to 
enter in recession. Furthermore, as history reveals the case of 1930s or Japan after 
1992, excess debt can turn recession into economic stagnation and depression 
(Toporowski 2008, 2009). 
 
A theoretical contribution on the topic is provided by Martinez-Miera (2009), in 
which he argues that higher capital standards reduce both banks leverage and, for 
given asset risk, the probability of bank default. The analysis assumes that 
entrepreneurs respond differently to changes in loan rates in the presence of moral 
hazard between banks and entrepreneurs. As a starting point, the paper emphasizes 
the benefits of having higher capital requirements, the capital buffer effect.  When 
loan defaults are imperfectly correlated, the higher the capital requirements are, the 
higher is the ability of banks to absorb any losses that derive from non-performing 
loans, without undergoing failure. On the other hand, when the correlation is high a 
bank is unable to meet the demand of its depositors hence no buffer exists and the 
bank defaults.  As banks face higher capital requirements, they tend to charge higher 
loan rates to compensate the higher cost of capital imposed by higher regulatory 
standards. This is the risk-shifting effect, as entrepreneurs now face higher costs and 
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they shift their investment into riskier projects in a bid to have higher returns. As a 
consequence they are more prone to default on their loans and the bank is more likely 
to default as a higher fraction of its loans will default.  A different point of view is 
given to the margin effect as capital requirements are increased. Assuming that loan 
rates are increased the bank earns higher rents on the non-defaulting loans. This 
provides the buffer capital that serves as a cushion to absorb losses.  However if all 
projects default at the same time, that is when loan defaults are perfectly correlated, 
the probability of banks failure increases. By contrast, when the correlation is low, the 
effect of higher capital requirements is negative, that is the probability of default 
decreases.  The overall conclusion of the paper is ambiguous. The author also 
provides a numerical solution, which shows that the relationship between capital 
requirements and the probability of banks default is non-monotonic  (Martinez-Miera 
2009). 
 
A weakness in the current literature is the definition of capital adequacy.  Although it 
is supposed to be an approximate for the Basel definition of Tier one capital, 
researchers have adopted different measurements of capital ratios in their analyses as 
an approximate for the Basel Accord capital requirement ratio.   Barrell et al (2009), 
uses the unweighted capital- capital to loan ratio measures- in their analysis. 
Montgomery(2001), uses the book value of each banks’ net worth as reported in the 
annual ‘yukashoken hokokusho’8 as a proxy for Tier 1 capital ratio.  Capital adequacy 
is measured by various forms of the basic capital/asset ratio, with our without debt 
                                                        
8 Annual Securities Report 
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capital in the numerator in Martin’s (1977) study.  The BIS studies refer to the broad 
definition such as Tier one or total capital as the target ratio of tangible of tangible 
common equity to risk weighted assets, including voluntary capital buffer and not the 
required minimum level set by regulators.  
Estrella et al (2000), state that a good measure of capital adequacy should be strongly 
linked with bank failure. The study compares the effectiveness of different types of 
capital ratios in forecasting bank failure. As explained above, the calculations of 
bank’s capital adequacy ratios are somewhat complex and guided by a formula that 
complies within the Basel standards framework.  In contrast Estrella et al (2000) 
makes use of other accounting-based ratios, arguing that some of these ‘….ratios 
contain valuable information and virtually costless information, and therefore have a 
role in an overall framework for regulatory capital’ (pg 34). The empirical results 
show that that simple ratios, such as the leverage ratio and the ratio of capital to gross 
revenue,  perform just as well as risk-weighted ratio in predicting predict bank failure 
over one or two year time horizon.   However, the risk-weighted capital ratio 
predicting ability, defined as the ratio of tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets,  
improves beyond the one-or two-year horizon.    
    
The above literature review suggests   that bank risk is determined by the composition 
of a banks’ balance sheet.   By evaluating banks balance sheet and most importantly 
by measuring the weighted risk assets and setting up capital adequacy ratios in 
proportion to the riskiness of those assets, bank managers and regulators can reduce 
the level of riskiness, hence lower the probability of banks  default or insolvency. 
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However, as its discussed below, the case of banking in Japan over the last two 
decades suggests that bank risk may be linked to developments in the economy at 
large in ways other than bank-risk taking impacting on the ‘macroeconomy’ in which 
banks operates. The banking crises of Japan show that risks may be in banks’ balance 
sheet but the original source of bank risk comes from macroeconomic shocks.  These 
facts reflect the credit cycle literature inspired by Keynes 1913, that a stable economy 
is a necessary condition for low risk and adequate bank capital. In “How Far are 
Bankers Responsible for the Alternations of Crisis and Depression” written in 1913, 
Keynes puts forward a simple model illustrating how banks can induce fluctuations in 
the economy. The fluctuations are as a result of over-investment during economic 
booms and under-investment during recessions (Toporowski 2005). The simple idea 
is that banks hold ‘free resources’ which represent savings ‘of the community’ which 
are held in current account deposits with banks.  And it is these deposits that banks 
lend out for business investment.  However, savings are also held in the form of other 
financial assets held by the public.  When business investment has reached high 
levels, and most importantly when some of the investments undertaken by firms are 
not as profitable, banks realize that they need to arrange more  credit to support  
investment projects. Recall that savings of the community represents current accounts 
held with banks and the purchases of financial asset by the public. And when banks 
try to arrange finance by means of selling financial assets, to the public, the 
community’s savings will not be sufficient to sustain over-investment. Keynes states 
that it is then that banks realize that what they considered to be liquid assets have now 
become illiquid.  He then argues that this is bound to lower the quality of assets banks 
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hold (Kregel 1992).  Naturally then banks respond to this by reducing lending and 
increasing interest rates. It is this process, Keynes argues, that causes banking 
difficulty and subsequently a crisis.  
 
Taking macroeconomic conditions into perspective in the regulatory framework has 
been a growing concern of many observers in the wake of the latest financial crisis.  A 
common consensus from a wide range of researchers is that the regulatory framework 
needs to shift away from the microprudential approach to macroprudential regulation  
(Kashyap et al 2010).  However, Crockett 2000; Kashyap and Stein 2004, Borio 2003 
and others have highlighted the need to focus more on a macroprudential regulation 
before the crisis erupted.  More recently, Kashyap at al 2010, Borio 2011, and Tarullo 
2014, have contributed to the literature in favour of macroprudential regulation. A 
microprudential approach is largely focused in preventing the failure of banks at the 
individual level. In contrast macroprudential regulation concerns the financial system 
as a whole. Kashyap et al (2010) state that microprudential regulation is based on 
partial-equilibrium conception whereas macroprudential  ‘ recognizes the   
importance of general-equilibrium effects, and seeks to safeguard the financial system 
as a whole’ (pg 1).  
 
Tarrulo (2014) argues that macroprudential needs to be combined with the current 
capital and liquidity requirements, which are largely based on microeconomic 
foundations.  He suggests four main propositions that should be incorporated in the 
regulatory framework for large financial institutions.  He proposes that 
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macroprudential regulations should dominate in the regulatory and supervisory 
framework for these firms.  This is because large financial institutions are prone to 
common stresses because of their interconnections with each other and thus they 
cannot be considered in isolation from the rest of the financial system.  The second 
proposition concerns resiliency, which should be the central in the macroprudential 
regulation.  He claims that macroprudential capital requirements are just as important 
as the microprudential approach which requires individual banks to hold capital in 
able to increase its ability to withstand any losses. He refers to the stress test 
conducted over 19 largest bank holding companies as an important starting point 
towards macroprudential orientation.   Stress tests can be used as a forward-looking 
assessment of future potential looses under stipulated adverse economic conditions.  
For example he suggests that these test should incorporate particular risk factors to the 
financial system, such as house prices,  as well as adverse economic conditions, such 
unemployment. This approach is bound to lower the level of distress and the 
probability of failure for large financial institutions.  The stress test was conducted in 
February 2010 on banks with assets worth more than $100 billion. The test aimed to 
evaluate the financial position of these banks, to ensure that they had adequate capital 
buffer to withstand any losses and to maintain lending even under more severe 
economic conditions.  Each bank’s capital was assessed using a two-year ahead 
hypothetical adverse scenario.  The degree of stress for each bank was determined by 
assuming possible losses accruing on risky loans, assets and trades in the next two 
years. The level of stress was then used to determine the capital buffer position for 
each bank, i.e. whether a particular bank needs to increase the capital level or not.  
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As a third proposition, Farullo argues that time-varying measures will play a limited 
role at a macroprudential perspective. In the arguments of countercyclical regulatory 
tools, such as attempting to restrain any rapid credit extensions or asset prices and 
relax those restraints under weak economic conditions, he highlights some of the 
difficulties regulators might face in order for these tools to be effective at the 
international level.  Some of the issues concern the question of having the right 
measure of excess or systematic risks, a suitable agency in taking macroprudential 
decisions, the speed of these measures to take effect after their implementation, and 
the right calibration of measures which would target any excesses without affecting 
the availability of credit in the economy.   
 
The last point made by Farullo is related to the structural vulnerability that results 
from short-term wholesale funding. He states that large firms that substantially rely on 
short-term wholesale funding should be subject to higher capital and liquidity ratios.   
 
Kashyap et al (2010) also advocate macroprudential regulation.  Their study discusses 
the potential problems associated with the microprudential approach that could lead to 
more unnecessary problems that would harm the economy. For example, when a bank 
choses to adjust its regulatory capital ratios by means of changing the composition of 
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the assets in the denominator9, thereby shrinking the assets this could have 
implications for the economy if a large fraction of banks are in the same position. 
Therefore when banks simultaneously attempt to raise their capital ratios by reducing 
lending this is bound to harm the economy.  To overcome the social costs related to 
excessive balance-sheet shrinkage they propose a set of macroprudential tools.   
Among others, time-varying capital requirements are proposed as a macroprudental 
tool in response to the balance-sheet shrinkage. They suggest that banks should be 
required to hold higher capital ratios in good time than in bad times. This way, in the 
event of unexpected or unpredicted shock banks could rely on their buffer capital 
without having to shrink their balance sheets significantly. They refer to a study 
conducted by Kashyap and Stein (2004), which show that time-varying capital 
requirements are the optimal scheme in a model where the objective of a social 
planner is to both protect the deposit insurance funds and maintain credit creations 
during economic downturns.  A further point in Kashyap et al. (2010) is that in bad 
times, the market may play a more important role that capital requirements. That is 
because, when banks have a large proportion of risky assets in their balance sheet, and 
hence a shortage of capital, it is highly likely that the market would provide funds to 
these banks.  Therefore, the capital regulatory ratios in good times must be 
significantly higher than the market-imposed standard in times when risks are 
believed to be more prevalent.    
 
                                                        
9 Regulatory bodies are not concerned how an individual bank achieves its capital 
requirements standards, i.e. a bank could meet the capital regulatory standards by 
changes in the numerator or denominator.  
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Capie and Wood (2013), suggest that bank regulation is not necessary if governments 
do not underwrite banks. Based on the evidence that the UK banking history reveals 
they argue that banks should be left to choose their own capital ratios.  They indicate 
that at the end of the 19th century capital ratios of UK banks averaged at around 10-12 
percent amongst all banks, declining from the 15 percent level held in the mid 1870s. 
In the First World War period UK banks capital ratios fell to around 7 percent. This is 
argued to have been due to the high volume of government bonds banks held in their 
portfolios and therefore they adjusted their capital ratios in accordance to the riskiness 
of their assets.  This was also evident during the Second World War period.  As banks 
increased their holdings of gilts and their capital ratios fell to around 3 percent.  The 
authors argue that if these capital ratios were to be converted in the requirements of 
the Basel Accord they would be subsequently higher so that they would reflect the 
quality of the assets banks held at the time. For example they argue that during the 
1920, that is immediately after the First World War, risk-weighted assets as reflected 
the Basel rules, would indicate capital ratios of the order of 14 percent.  The capital 
ratios of banks during the 1960s, which were around 4-5 percent, according to  the 
Basel requirements should have been  around 13 percent. The authors then argue 
against the current regulatory framework set by the Basel capital requirements as well 
as the Volker rule which separates investment banking activities from retail banking.   
The rationale behind this argument rests upon the evidence provided by the history of 
the British banking. In addition they argue that these rules that emphasise the 
importance of banks to avoid failure could be misleading. This is because banks 
should be left to fail in an orderly fashion. Once banks face the possibility of failure 
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they would take responsibility for their actions, and thus they would be the best 
judges in deciding their needed capital ratios.   In such a system banks would have to 
be sensible in choosing capital ratios to reflect the riskiness of their assets since 
failure in doing so would compromise their survival in the banking business.   
 
Kuritzkes and Scott (2009) argue that capital regulation is not sufficient to prevent 
bank failures, and it needs to be complemented with more effective market discipline.  
They argue that the insufficiency of the minimum capital regulation  to prevent bank 
failure was  reflected in the high capital ratios banks held prior to the 2007-08 crisis.   
The evidence suggests that prior to the crisis of 2007-08 the top 20 US banks had 
capital ratios around 11.7 percent, well above of the minimum capital requirements.  
However, this was followed by the largest bank failures since the Great Depression. 
The article argues that when capital requirements and banks risk-taking are 
imperfectly correlated, the regulatory capital constraints could lead banks to seek 
higher returns on the additional capital.  Also, higher capital requirements could push 
banks into the unregulated banking sector, a phenomenon that became evident in the 
crisis.  They argue that market expectations would play a more important role than the 
Basel capital requirements.  
 
Admati and Hellwig’s latest book, ‘The Bankers’ New Clothes’,  argues that the best 
way to achieve a safer and healthier financial system is to require banks to hold much 
higher equity levels.  The proposed equity levels are at least between 20-30 percent of 
their total assets.  They argue that rising equity levels would not reduce lending as 
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perceived by many.  This is because listed banks can raise money by issuing new 
shares, and if the funds raised are used to make loans then higher equity levels would 
increase lending rather than curb it. For banks not listed on the stock exchange, the 
alternative option is to reinvest their earnings.  Even though there would be a 
transition problem for this category of banks, after some time their lending would be 
the same as before.  
  
The distinct feature of this proposition is that it its a clear departure from the Basel 
capital requirements. The later, with reference to Basel III capital requirements, 
require banks to hold at least 7 percent of their risk-weighted assets, whereas Admati 
and Hellwig proposed equity levels  related to banks’ total assets. They criticise the 
Basel approach and argue that this in turn has substantially reduced banks’ equity to 
total assets.  The main message of this book is that reducing banks reliance on 
borrowing, banks could become healthier by reinvesting their profits and raising 
equity in the capital markets, like any other company does. This  would lead to a safer 
and healthier banking sector  ‘..better able to support the economy’ (Admati and 
Hellwig 2013, pg. xi).  However, to claim that higher equity levels, achieved by 
issuing new shares do not impose any costs to the society could be misleading.  As 
argued, one of the implications of forcing banks to hold higher capital ratios by the 
issue of new capital is the crowding out of capital issues by non-financial 
corporations. This would then reduce their productive investment, damaging the 
economy. This is the core message of the capital market inflation theory of 
Toporowski.  
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The other misleading message that the Admati and Hellwig analysis conveys is the 
claim that when banks hold more equity then shareholders will bear the risks rather 
than creditors and taxpayers, and thus ruling out any imposed-cost to the society as a 
result of increasing equity levels.  Banks’ shareholders are mainly pension funds, 
insurance companies and intermediaries holding society’s long-term savings.  Thus, 
to claim that when shareholder are left bearing the risks of the activities undertaken 
by banks, then no losses are transmitted to ordinary people is misleading since banks’ 
shareholders are ordinary people of the society.  
 
This argument is highlighted also by Coppola (2013), which contributes to the capital 
requirements literature by showing that there is no difference between equity and 
debt. She claims that both equity and debt are claims on a bank’s assets, when it fails, 
or its income, when it is a going concern. When a bank fails the only real difference 
between a depositor,  a bondholder and a shareholder is the seniority of their claims.  
She build a hypothetical scenario showing that if for example a bank’s Tier I capital 
ratio, which comprises shareholders fund and retained earnings, is 3 percent, and if a 
bank suffers losses and it has to write down 3 percent of its assets then the 
shareholders funds are wiped out. If losses increase, junior bondholders are next in 
line. Once a bank declares that it is in financial distress or failed, junior bondholders 
are liable to have their bonds converted to equity, hence becoming ordinary 
shareholders. When and if the bank recovers then they can enjoy dividend payments. 
However, there is the possibility that their funds would be wiped out, as happened in 
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the case of the Dutch bank SNS Reaal. As it turned out their investment was saved 
when the Dutch government took over their claims when rescuing the bank.  
Nevertheless, the point here is that if the government would have not rescued the 
bank, junior bondholders together with shareholders funds would have been wiped 
out.  The next scenario is if losses are of a larger magnitude, thus affecting senior 
debt, which includes bondholders, wholesale lenders and depositors.  All senior debt 
holders are ranked pari passu in the proportion to their claim. That said, secured debt 
is ranked senior to unsecured debt, so that when banks have issued   debt or borrowed 
money using its asset as collateral, those creditors are ranked senior to depositors.  
When, however, the assets used as collateral turn out to be worthless, the debt is 
actually unsecured.  Coppola argues that this hypothetical capital structure shows that 
when a bank is failing, whether the investment is in the form of equity or debt is in 
fact irrelevant.  The seniority of the claim is what matters.  In this respect she argues 
that losses incurred would be the same if the bank has 3 percent or 15 percent equity. 
Thus, higher equity levels do not reduce the likelihood of failure, instead it increases 
the likelihood that creditors will receive their money back. She concludes by noting 
that her argument does not necessarily advocates debt financing as oppose to equity, 
since heavy reliance on debt could be a potential threat not only for banks but for 
corporations too.  But the focus of her analysis is to show that increasing equity level 
does not make banks safer.  
 
Gorton (2012) similarly argues that, even though capital requirements do to have an 
important role in affecting banks insolvency, higher capital levels are not enough to 
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prevent runs.  ‘There is almost no evidence that links capital to bank failure’, Gorton 
writes.  Looking at banks failure from a historical prospective, he argues that a cash 
shortage and the inability to sell assets, hence not able to convert them into cash, is 
the key source of triggering bank failures. He suggests that instead of focusing on 
capital requirements as the key solution to systemic events, liquidity should play a far 
more important role.  That crisis is about cash is a view commonly understood by US 
bank regulatory bodies in the period between 1934 till the 1980s, which mainly 
focused on bank examination and not capital requirements, as exemplified in the 
writings of Tynan Smith and Raymond Hengren of the FDIC:  
‘Capital is not the sole answer…..to the problem of keeping a bank’s doors open. 
Regardless of the size of a bank’s capital, it will continue to function as a going 
concern only so long as it has on hand or can obtain cash to meet the claims of 
depositors…..Whenever banks are faced with heavy withdraws of deposits, either 
because of general economic crisis or local or regional situation, the essential 
problem is one of liquidity rather than of capital. …..The equity ratio has 
relatively little bearing on the ability of a bank to obtain cash when it is needed 
‘(1947, 557, quoted in Gordon 2012, pg 152) 
 
Wray (2006) considers the then new approach of capital requirements set by Basel II 
and their ability to reduce banking risk.   He argues that capital or risk-weighted 
capital are not good indicators of the probability of bank failure. Instead, second after 
the international macro environment in which banks operate, the return on assets or 
equity is a more important factor than the capital ratios advocated by regulators.  This 
is because a bank, which yields higher returns on assets, is in a better position to 
withstand unforeseen losses.  Furthermore, financial institutions that enjoy higher 
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returns can easily issue more equity bringing capital to desirable levels.  He refers to a 
study conducted by the Dolbeare and Barnd (1931)10 of the Florida banks balance 
sheets for the period 1922-28 and concluded that banks that failed had higher capital 
ratios than those that did not (cf Wray 2006; Kregel 2007).    Wray (2006) notes that 
the capital requirements imposed on banks not only do not help in preventing risk 
incentives but could actually increase it.  Borrowing Minsky’s (1986) argument, he 
states that in competitive markets well-capitalized banks will seek to finds way to 
achieve higher returns, in order to increase returns on equity.  Any attempt for banks 
to seek higher returns would lead to more risk taking.  Similarly, Tymoigne (2010) 
argues that in order to show that capital buffers are not sufficient to prevent financial 
fragility,  it is necessary to analyse the return on equity.   He argues that in good 
economic conditions, i.e. when the economy is expanding, the rate of return tends to 
fall, as equity extracts some of the profit and because the growth rate of profit has a 
tendency to fall in saturated markets.  Therefore, to compensate for the declining 
return on equity, financial institutions are bound to find new ways to counter for such 
decline, by either increasing the leverage ratio or return on assets11.  Tymoigne, notes 
that both these practices, increasing leverage and return on assets, are achieved by 
financial innovations.  This way, any restraints placed on the leverage ratio and asset 
                                                        
10 Even though Wray (2006), refers to this study in relation to Kregel (2007) paper, in 
which he argues that from a historical perspective higher capital ratios do not show 
any evidence of  providing better protection loss (cf Wray 2006).  Kregel (2007) 
shows in more details the study conducted by Dolbeare and Barnd (1931). 
11 Tymoigne(2010), shows that both the leverage ratio, which is the ratio of assets to 
equity, and the rate of return on assets, which is the ratio of profits to assets, are two 
components of the return on equity, the ratio of profit to equity.    
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quality would be evaded, as banks and other financial institutions create new financial 
products in search for maintaining their return on equity.  So unless financial 
innovations are regulated, capital and liquidity buffers will be useless to prevent 
financial stability.    
 
Campbell and Minsky’s (1987) study is focused on the then new regulatory standards 
associated with the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation during the 
1980s, which were followed with the implementations of Basel I (see chapter 1).  
They argue that the proposed reforms of deposit insurance, such as capital 
requirements were likely to increase financial instability.   The critical component of 
Basel I in their arguments is that it does not account for systematic risk. They write: 
 
  ‘ All the proposed reforms raise operating expenses or reduce profits of banks that 
examiners find to be a higher risk class. Raising the operating costs of banks who, 
because of changes in systemic conditions, have become riskier will only make those 
institutions more vulnerable to failure. Risk-related premiums or risk-adjusted capital 
requirements would be pro-cyclical, worsening the conditions of banks just when 
other operating costs are rising and profits are being squeezed.  If implemented at all, 
risk-related premiums should be adjusted downward for systemic conditions even as 
they are raised for the presumed riskier institutions’ ( pg. 258).    
 
Therefore in this respect, increasing capital requirement contributes to financial 
fragility. For Minsky an important source of banking stability is the expected and 
actual cash flows.  One major loophole in the regulatory framework Minsky argued 
was that instability of banks and other financial institutions was (and still is) 
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commonly associated with runs and defaults. However, he argued that in order to 
better describe ‘ ….the instability of an “economy with banking”….’ it is imperative 
to assess the root causes of the run and assess the structure of balance sheet, payment 
obligations and position-making activities of banks.  These suggestions are also found 
in Minsky’s earlier writings.  Minsky has always emphasised the important role of 
liquidity in banks. As Gorton (2012) explains from the time the deposit insurance was 
introduced until the 1980s bank regulatory main weapon for stability was bank 
examination.  And it is within this framework that Minsky (1967, 1975a) builds an 
argument and suggests a cash flow-oriented bank examination approach in order to 
assess the liquidity of a bank. His proposed framework is  forward looking, by means 
of estimating the present value of cash flows of banks. He argues that the position 
making of banks is of dominant importance in evaluating their liquidity needs. To put 
it simply, Minsky states that ‘banks generate cash and a need for cash’ over a period 
of time.  In order to determine whether a bank is liquid or not it is necessary to 
evaluate its position making activities.  Therefore, the way by which a bank would 
obtain liquidity is mainly determined by the assets held on the balance sheet, which 
would be converted into cash, and the markets in which it would conduct such 
transactions. Therefore, banks’ liquidity, and thus its viability and future profitability 
depend on the markets. Put simply it is the normal functioning of the financial 
markets that would determine the ability of banks to convert assets into cash.  
Therefore, for Minsky liquidity is a characteristic of markets rather than intrinsic to 
particular assets.  As he states ‘the liquidity of an institution cannot be measured by 
assigning universal predetermined liquidity quotients to assets and similar liquidity 
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requirement factors to liabilities: the liquidity quotients and requirements are system-
determined variables’ (Minsky 1975a, pg.154).  In this respect, a “point in time” 
balance sheet approaches, upon which the Basel Accords are based, can be considered 
ineffective in promoting financial stability.   
 
Tymoigne (2010) also explains that the reason that the Basel capital requirements 
have not been successful in delivering what they are designed to do, that is to 
maintain financial stability by means of lowering risk incentives is not only because ‘ 
the mathematical models failed to recognize the economic risks, it is that the 
underlying economic principles also failed’ (2010, pg. 3).  He notes that Basel II 
Accord, together with other Acts associated with financial deregulation process in the 
US, are based on a free-market approach, in which risk management, self-regulation 
and market discipline became the core tools aiming to achieve financial stability.  
 
Kashyap et al. (2010), illustrates the fundamental principles guiding the 
microprudential regulation.  As already explained above in 1934 the FDIC provided 
deposit insurance, and hence these government-insured deposits are the main source 
of finance for banks.  Within a Diamond and Dybvig(1983) framework, deposit 
insurance is presupposed to prevent banks runs. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argue 
that one of main function of banks is to provide liquidity services. This on the other 
hand makes them prone to runs.  This is because the liquidation value of banks’ assets 
needs to be lower than the value of liquid liabilities, such as deposits, in order for a 
bank to be liquid (Santos 2000). The bank run model developed by Diamond and 
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Dybvig (1983) suggests that depositors’ decision to withdraw their savings is also 
influenced by the expectations of what other depositors are doing. So if they expect 
other depositors to withdraw their funds they would quickly rush to the bank in order 
to secure what little liquidity it has. In this way, once a run starts it will bring down 
even a healthy bank. They argue that the most effective policy tool to prevent bank 
runs is government deposit insurance.  However, deposit insurance is subject to moral 
hazard problems as well as places taxpayers’ money at the disposal of such insurance.  
Therefore, capital requirements are seen as a way to mitigate both these problems.  
 
2.3 Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has presented background information on the origin and development of 
the Basel Accords as well as the related literature. As evident, most of the discussion 
on bank capital requirements tends to ignore the effects of varying capital 
requirements on the way in which the system works as a whole and, hence, on the 
way in which the economy generates the cash flows necessary for setting committed 
financial obligations.  The exceptions are those theories based on the supposed effects 
of capital costs, which, however, ignore the cash flow generation, which is central to 
the theories associated with Minsky and Toporowski.  
 
The research in this thesis attempts to fill in the gap in the current literature by 
examining the role of capital adequacy regulation on the probability of default of 
banks using an economic theory-based approach.  As stated, the underlying theory of 
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this analysis is the capital market inflation theory, presented in the next chapter, 
which looks at the system as a whole and thus makes it possible to analyse the role of 
the Basel capital requirements on the real economy. This way, this thesis does not 
only provide an analysis of the impact that such regulation has on banks’ probability 
of default but also looks at the effects on the functioning of the capital markets in 
providing funds to non-financial corporate sector.  
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Chapter 3. The Theory of Capital Market Inflation  
 
This chapter provides empirical evidence on capital market inflation theory applied to 
both US and Japan.  In the subsequent chapters of this thesis the probability of bank 
default for both countries under consideration will be analysed using the capital 
market inflation theoretical framework. As a first step to this analysis, this chapter 
empirically validates this theory.  The chapter starts by giving a detailed explanation 
of the theoretical aspects of the capital market inflation theory. It then provides the 
methodological approach of the empirical work.  Using data for the US capital market 
for the period 1964-2010, the results provide evidence supporting the capital market 
inflation theory, presented in section 3.2. By contrast, the regression results for the 
Japanese capital market, for the period 1980-2010, provide no evidence in support of 
this theory. However, taking into account various factors associated with the structure 
of the Japanese capital market and the government intervention in such market the 
results imply that government purchases offset private sector outflows of credit from 
the capital market. Thus, the capital market inflation theory may still be valid for this 
case.    
 
3.1 Post Keynesian Approaches  
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A good economic model is said to make sharp and clear predictions that are consistent 
with reality.  It is on the grounds of this statement that the capital market inflation 
theory stands in the current literature as a study of the capital market and unique in 
that the theory considers the issues of banks’ capital requirements. While the literature 
on capital adequacy is vast, it is apparent that the literature largely fails to address the 
impact of these requirements on banks and the financial market as a whole.  The 
available studies attempt to analyse and predict the relationship of banks and capital  
requirements, based on intuition and/or judgement on banks activity and behaviour. 
These intuitions are derived from a perfect foresight and representative agent 
perspective.  This approach views the representative agent in isolation from other 
agents and the rest of the economy as a whole and because of this it falls into a fallacy 
of composition.  The study of capital markets in the traditional theory of finance is 
conducted within a general equilibrium framework, in which the underlying 
assumptions are based on Walrasian general equilibrium in which savings and 
investment in the market for loanable funds are brought into equilibrium by the price 
of finance (a price mechanism).  Thus, market equilibrium is achieved when the 
supply of finance (by rentiers) and the demand for securities intersect at a given price. 
In the event of market disequilibrium, the tatonnement process will establish a new 
general equilibrium by means of Walrasian auctioneers adjusting prices in accordance 
to the demand and supply conditions. This approach considers the functioning of 
capital market in isolation from the rest of the economy except where changes in a 
market affect other markets by means of establishing a new general equilibrium. By 
contrast, capital market inflation theory suggests that the demand and supply of 
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capital are usually unequal and this has profound implications for the structure of the 
capital market, which in turn affects the rest of the economy.  
The market disequilibrium is also reflected in other various theories, Keynesian 
theories, post-Keynesian theories, financialisation theories all of which try to look at 
the system as a whole, but none of them considers the issues of capital adequacy12. 
But Toporowski’s capital market theory does.   
 
The key element of Keynes’ argument is that the market mechanism fails to restore 
equilibrium due to expectations under uncertainty.  He acknowledged that the 
economy could be out of equilibrium for a significant time, since price mechanism, 
i.e. wages in the labor markets or interest rates in the money markets, could not reach 
an equilibrium in which supply is equal to demand.  In contrast to the neoclassical 
economists, who presuppose that it is the price mechanism that brings about 
equilibrium, he argues that, because of uncertainty, investors form expectations about 
the future that could lead to excessive valuation of financial assets. He argued that it 
is the expectations that give a rise to stock prices that induce investment. This forms 
the basic argument of the nonequlibrium approach relating finance and investment 
that Keynes put forward in his writings. This approach could also be explained in 
terms of excessive borrowing, in accordance with the expectations of future stock 
prices, that is undertaken during a boom. However, when the boom ends, the need to 
                                                        
12 Exceptions are  Minsky, Kregel, Tymoigne and Wray, as explained in the previous 
chapter, who argue against capital regulation as  sufficient and effective tool to 
promote financial stability. However, none of them provide a framework that analyse 
the impact of such regulation on the rest of the economy.  
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liquidate comes into the picture and this in turn reduces investments.  In other words, 
Keynes provides a framework in which expectations lead to over indebtedness that 
make an economy unstable by reducing investment. The issue of indebtedness was 
not new in the literature when Keynes formed his theory. Fisher’s view on 
indebtedness and the consequences it has on the economy were illustrated in a paper 
Fisher published in 1933, ‘The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions’.  
Fisher’s contribution to the literature in arguing that a capitalist economy is always 
out of equilibrium are perhaps best expressed in his own words in which he states ‘ it 
is absurd to assume that, for any long period of time, the variables in the economic 
organization, or any part of them, will “stay put”, in perfect equilibrium, as to assume 
that the Atlantic Ocean can never be without a wave’ (Fisher 1933, pp. 339).   The 
central element to his argument is the level of debt in the economy is the main cause 
of disequlibrium as opposed to Keynes’ emphasis on expectations.   
 
The ideas put forward by Keynes have served as the basic foundation of other 
economic theories, most notably associated with post-Keynesian economists. For 
example Minksy’ financial instability hypothesis (1975b,1986)  “is an interpretation 
of the substance of Keynes’s ‘General Theory’ “(Minsky  1992, pg.1).  Toporowski 
(2005) states that ‘ Minsky may be said to have started where Keynes left off, with the 
flow of finance to investment. Thus Minsky developed a balance sheet approach to 
the relationship between the financial markets and business that extended Keynes’s 
analysis’ (2005, pg. 143).  Minsky, like Keynes and Fisher, acknowledged that the 
economy might experience periods of disequilibrium.  Indeed for him, a stabilizing 
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economy was destabilizing.  Behind such a short, yet powerful, statement rests the 
explanation of how a stable economy can be destabilizing.  He identifies three types 
of financial positions in the financial structure of a capitalist economy that can lead to 
insolvent debt: hedge, speculative and Ponzi finance. Hedge financing refers to those 
positions in which cash flows can fulfil contractual payments obligations, i.e. interest 
and principal payments.  Speculative finance is when cash flows can cover interest 
payments but not principal payments.  Thus speculative financing may need to be 
rolled over in order to pay back the original debt i.e. the issue of new debt in order to 
repay the maturing debt (Minsky 1992).   Ponzi finance refers to those financial 
postures in which cash flows cannot cover neither interest or principal payments.   
Borrowers need to borrow or sell the assets in order to meet interest payments.  In this 
type of finance, borrowers are heavily dependent on rising asset prices which allows 
them to keep refinancing their debt (Knell 2012). It is the speculative and the ponzi 
financing which poses real threats to the economy. It is this way  Minsky showed how 
the financial sector mattered in the functioning of the real economy, by inducing 
business cycles which are not exogenous shocks but a characteristic of it. In other 
words, he argued that in periods of economic prosperity, ‘capitalist economies tend to 
move from a financial structure dominated by hedge finance units to a structure in 
which there is a large weight to units engaged in speculative and Ponzi finance’ 
(Minsky 1992, pg. 8).   
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More recently there has been a growing literature on the financialisation theories in 
which the central element in the explaining market disequlibrium is the ever-
expanding role of the financial markets in the economy (see below).   
 
Minsky’s theory does acknowledge the dynamic of an economy in which the financial 
sectors plays a pivotal role. But it is largely based on a bank credit model rather than a 
capital market model. Therefore Toporowski’s theory provides a framework in which 
capital requirements are incorporated into the analysis, better suited to the purpose of 
this thesis.  
 
This chapter empirically evaluates the capital market inflation theory applied to both 
the US and Japanese capital markets. The demand and supply for equity capital is 
derived using data from the flow of funds account for the period 1964-2010 in the 
case of US, and 1980-2010 in the case of Japan.  The supply of capital represents 
purchases of corporate equity by households, institutional investors and rest of the 
world. Demand is derived from combining non-financial sector issues of corporate 
equity with those of the financial sector.  The regression results for the US capital 
market supports the capital market inflation theory, that the price level of securities is 
determined by the inflow of funds into capital markets in non-linear positive 
relationship.  However, when applied to the Japanese capital market the results 
provide no evidence that supports the theory. It is argued that various factors 
associated with the structure of the Japanese capital market could be important in 
explaining such results. Amongst other factors this thesis identifies government 
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intervention, as a measure of stock purchases by the central bank, as an important 
factor in an attempt to empirically evaluate the validity of the theory of capital market 
inflation in Japan.  For this purpose the impact of stock purchases of Japan’s central 
bank on the Nikkei 225 stock price index, for the period between 2002-2011, is 
empirically evaluated. The results indicate that these purchases, or government 
intervention, do have an impact on stock prices.  This implies that central bank stock 
purchases offset private sector outflows from the capital market. Therefore, the capital 
market inflation theory still holds.  
 
3.2 The capital market inflation theory  
 
The theory of capital market inflation brings an insight of how capital markets 
actually operate and identifies the critical effect that its activities have on the 
economy.  The capital market brings together the supply and demand for equity 
capital: supply being from households and funds operating on behalf of households 
(pension schemes, mutual and investment funds) and demand represents the financial 
and non-financial businesses, which issue equity capital.  The inflows in the capital 
markets will circulate around its participants, the initial money put into the market 
will be turned over more than once, until is taken out by government in forms such as 
issuing bonds, and corporations by means of them issuing stock.  The balance is a net 
excess inflow, which will continue to circulate within the market until it is taken out 
by additional stock issue or investors’ sale. If the initial transaction was a sale, the 
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exchange will continue until the liquidity will be replaced by purchasing securities in 
the market.     
The excess net inflow determines the value of turnover in stock and liquidity in the 
capital market. It also provides a margin of liquidity that allows the market to absorb 
to some degree the net sales by investors. In other words, when investors sell stock, 
the market is kept stable not by lowering prices to attract buyers, but using the past 
accumulation of net excess inflow to purchase the excess stock that investors have put 
on sale.  The implication of this is that demand and supply of equity are not usually in 
equilibrium but are usually unequal and balanced by net inflows or outflows of credit 
into the capital market. Hence, stock markets crash not because they were not in 
equilibrium but because their disequilibrium has not been sufficient to accumulate 
enough inflow to accommodate the desired net level of stock sales.   
 
The capital market inflation theory suggests that it is the net excess inflow that 
determines the price level of securities. In other words stock prices increase with the 
inflow of excess liquidity into the capital market. This contradicts the conventional 
finance theories, which are based on the belief that the price of securities reflects the 
estimated future stream of income derived from holding those securities.  These 
theories, which analyse asset markets within a general equilibrium framework, 
presuppose that the law of demand and supply for financial assets holds in the same 
way as for other ordinary products.  Evidence in support of this belief is practically 
non-existent even though theories, such as the market efficient hypothesis, have 
dominated the financial literature since the 1970s.  Stiglitz (2000) identifies the 
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difference between the financial and capital markets and other markets for goods and 
services and argues that the conventional neoclassical model fails to recognise this 
difference13. An article by the Economist also supports the argument against the 
presupposed belief of efficient markets arguing,  ‘ Financial markets do not operate in 
the same way as those for other goods and products. When the price of a television set 
or software package goes up, demand for it generally falls. When the price of a 
financial asset rises, demand generally increases ‘ (The Economist 2012).  And it is 
precisely this that Toporowski’s theory predicts. When the inflow of funds increases 
and circulates around in the market for a lengthy time before is taken out by 
government issuing bonds or companies issuing stock, the price of securities rises.  
This describes the process of capital market inflation.  When the price of securities 
rises, demand will increase even more, as investors are attracted by additional returns 
of capital gains.  However, not all securities rise equally or proportionally.  Short term 
securities and bonds, usually will have to be repaid at par value on their maturity date.  
Therefore, these securities are not likely to capture much capital gain, because the 
amount that the holder will receive on maturity is predetermined.  In contrast, shares 
or common stock, have no guaranteed repayment value. Capital gains are therefore 
more likely to be sustained.   This will increase investors’ preference for equities, in 
prospect of capital gains (Toporowski 2000).  
 
                                                        
13 The argument Stiglitz raises is related to the capital market liberalization that is 
based on the neoclassical model, which do not address the difference between the 
financial market and the markets for other ordinary goods.  
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An increase in stock prices is supposed to reduce the yield on stock. But this 
reduction is offset by returns, additional to dividend and interest, of capital gain. An 
excess speculative demand for stock impacts most directly on the balance sheet 
operations of companies.   Companies find that they can issue equity at lower 
earnings per share and at a lower cost because of capital gains, which is paid by 
buyers in the equity market.  Therefore companies are inclined to issue equity to 
repay bank borrowing so that they substitute debt with equity finance.  Because of this 
disintermediation, banks lose their best and safest borrowers; the borrowings of large 
corporations, and banks have been forced to lend to less financially secure borrowers, 
carrying greater risks.   
  
Furthermore, as companies find issuing stock a cheaper and a more profitable activity, 
this will tend to discourage productive investment.  If and when the possibilities of 
repaying debt have been exhausted, companies are inclined to search in other possible 
ventures to further increase their profits. And one way of achieving this, and what has 
been a characteristic of corporate finance since the 1980s, is by acquiring or merging 
with other companies.  These can be held and sold later at a higher price if the market 
continues to inflate. In fact, lower levels of productive investment in most advanced 
economies such as the UK and US are now well documented and many scholars have 
attempted to address the reasons behind such outcome.  In particular, financialisation 
theories argue that the decline in fixed capital investment, and thus the decline of 
economic activity, is a consequence of firm’s management deviation from the 
principle ‘retain and reinvest’ to  ‘downsize and distribute’.   In effect this is saying 
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that firms’ management main priority has become ‘shareholder value maximisation’ 
(Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000). Similarly Hein (2011) argues that the decline in 
fixed capital formation is a result of increased dividends payout and buyback shares, 
in search for maintaining high stock prices, thus shareholder value.  Hence, 
shareholder value was kept at the expense of having lower liquidity levels, which, on 
the other hand halted fixed capital investment.  Financialisation is a recent term, 
which gained popularity in the aftermath of the 2007-08 financial crises. Even though 
there is no set definition for the term ‘financialisation’ it is generally understood to 
mean a rise in the activities of banking and financial markets that dominate capitalists 
economies in relation to production.  For example Epstein (2005) refers to 
financialisation as ‘ the increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, 
financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and 
international economies’ (Epstein 2005 pg. 3).  
 
Even though the financialisation theories and the capital market inflation theory share 
a common view that a rise in financial activities has undermined the productive 
investment of the non-financial corporations there are major differences in explaining 
the reasons of such phenomenon.  As argued above, when capital markets are inflated 
the outcome is higher stock prices. Thus, it is the credit inflow into the capital market 
by its participants that contributes in maintaining shareholder value, without 
necessary draining out firms liquidity or value of the industry( Toporowski 2012). 
This is in contrast to the arguments raised by some of the financialisaton theories, 
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which suggest that shareholder value is maintained at the expense of lower liquidity 
levels in firms.   
 
Under conditions of capital market inflation, in which firms find equity issuance a 
cheaper and more profitable activity, firms tend to be overcapitalised-  that is a 
situation in which firms issue equity in excess of what is needed to conduct their 
productive operations.  Overcapitalisation then allows firms to use the excess capital 
to purchase short-term financial assets, thus increasing the liquidity of their balance 
sheet. Such assets could then be used as collateral for short-term borrowing, or 
balance sheet restructuring, such as merger and takeover activity.  However, the latter 
activities could be profitable only if inflation in capital market is (and remains) an on-
going process.   Prior to the financial crisis many firms, such as General Electric 
through its subsidiary GE Capital, have used their financial assets in this way to 
sustain their profits growth rates, when it was not possible to do so from industrial 
activities .In addition, overcapitalisation allows firms to expand their commercial 
activities by increasing leverage.  Therefore, firms are able to grow much quicker, 
especially in activities such as acquiring other companies, rather than by means of 
production (Toporowski 2012). 
 
Actual overcapitalisation emerged in US with the rise of institutional investor: mainly 
pension funds and insurance companies.   The concentration of savings in long-term 
financial institution led to the process of capital market inflation illustrated above.  
Pension funds and insurance companies dominate the capital market. Pilbeam (2010) 
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notes that the dominance of institutional investors in stockmarkets in countries such 
as UK and US has imposed different demands from the traditional investors. So in 
effect this means that because of the rise of the institutional investor since the 1970s 
and 1980s the demand for stocks in the capital markets has increased.  These 
suggestions provide the foundation on the assumption of the capital market inflation 
theory, which argues that it is the excess demand of institutional investors, i.e. 
pension funds, which, to some extent, radically change the balance sheet operations of 
corporations (as argued above). The important role that institutional investors play in 
the US capital markets is also documented by Mizuno (2010). He argues that since the 
1970s their holding of corporate stock has steadily increased. For example, in 1987 
US institutional investors held around 46.6 percent of the total stock of US largest 
1000 corporations. By 2000, the proportion of their stock holdings reached 61.4 
percent of total stock increasing to 76.4 percent by 2007 (Mizuno 2010). So it is the 
institutional investors’ flow of funds of particular interest as it has a critical effect on 
the functioning of the market and the activates of businesses. 
 
In the neo-classical theory of market equilibrium, a reduction in the price is supposed 
to increase demand for a commodity or asset. But if the capital market is deflating, 
lower prices will not evoke additional buying. High dividend yields on the one hand 
will be offset by prospective capital-losses, thus failing to elicit sufficient repurchases 
or redemptions of stock by companies to provide an inflow of funds that will balance 
the outflows.  Toporowski argues that it is in this way that capital market inflation and 
deflation reinforce the inelastic demand and supply in the long-term stock market.   
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Thus the demand and supply of equity capital are not usually equal, and the price 
mechanism does not bring them into equilibrium as suggested in the general 
equilibrium models.  The capital market enters a process of inflation or deflation, 
depending on whether there is excess demand or excess supply in the market.   
Companies’ demand for finance is determined by the size and nature of business and 
circumstances.  More precisely, in the case of pension funds, demand for equity will 
depend on its maturity, and in case of banks its determined to some extend on their 
capital requirements.   Furthermore, under conditions of inelastic demand for equity 
capital by banks nonfinancial companies could be forced into debt thus discouraging 
their investments and limiting their cash flow.  Pension funds do not need to issue 
capital. They will buy equity in proportion to the inflow of pension contributions and 
the maturity structure of their liabilities and the regulations affecting their business. 
Banks in the US and UK are not allowed to hold equity as assets, but issue equity to 
raise capital. Insurance companies also issue capital, but the demand for capital assets 
is also determined by the structure of their liabilities and regulation.  
 
Requiring banks to increase their capital, therefore, reduces the amount of capital 
available to non-financial firms. When banks are faced with tighter capital regulation 
they have to adjust their capital accordingly.  There are various ways in which banks 
adjust their required capital ratios.   Either one of them will have a negative impact in 
the capital market. The first one is by issuing more equity capital reducing the amount 
of equity capital available to non-financial firms. The second one is by reducing their 
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lending in relation to existing equity. The second reduces the amount of bank 
borrowing outstanding, and the size of bank balance sheet. In turn this reduces the 
amount of (bank) credit money in the economy, forcing companies to borrow from 
each other or issue debt securities.  
 
The higher the amount of capital held by bank, the lower the quantity available to 
nonfinancial intermediaries in the market. Therefore, they are left with no option 
other than to raise their needed capital through the issue of debt instruments. Hence, 
firms maybe forced to borrow more than planned, which in turn reduces future fixed 
capital investment.  Securitization is a way, which allows banks to raise capital ratios 
and shift balance sheet composition toward less risky asset.   The sale of loan-backed 
bonds to other financial intermediaries reduces the amount of capital available to 
firms in the market.  This is another way in which companies are forced into more 
debt.  Toporowski argues that enforced indebtedness increases the financial fragility 
of the economy.  Firms that planned to issue equity to reduce the amount of debt held, 
now have debt in excess of what they planned.  This can be accommodated in two 
ways.  Firstly, companies can hold larger amounts of liquid assets. But this is not 
efficient since it means that the capital that firms have issued is being ‘wasted’ by 
being held as financial asset rather than being used to expand production or fixed 
capital.  Alternatively, firms could reduce their future fixed capital investment in 
order to be able to have those liquid assets.  Therefore, the excess debt level being 
held by firms as a consequence of higher banks’ capital regulation requirement 
reduces productive investment below what it would otherwise be.   The reduced 
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productive investment also reduces the cash flow of firms and their ability to service 
their debt.  Therefore, higher capital requirement that aims to circumvent banks 
unsoundness, encourage firms to reduce their productive investment in fixed capital in 
response to their increased indebtedness. Toporowski notes that such reduction in 
fixed investment  is the key determinant in causing the real economy to enter in 
recession. Furthermore, as history reveals the case of 1930s or Japan after 1992, 
excess debt can turn recession into economic stagnation and depression (Toporowski 
2008, 2009). 
 
3.3 Empirical analysis: the case of US  
3.3.1 Methodology and results  
 
As argued above, the general equilibrium systems have dominated the theory of 
finance.  The efficient market hypothesis, associated with Eugene Fama, has perhaps 
been the most influential theory in finance since the 1970s.  Under the efficient 
market hypothesis the demand and supply for financial assets is the same as for other 
goods and services in market for ordinary goods, and thus financial asset prices are set 
through the market mechanism. Stock price movements are examined under the 
assumption that they reflect all available information, thus markets are perfect.  The 
assumption that asset prices incorporate all available information implies that they 
follow a random walk. This assumption is a property of the weak form market 
efficiency, which suggests that it is impossible to predict future prices using past 
historical asset prices. The simple asset-pricing model that Fama and other 
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economists have used to test the market efficiency hypothesis is used (relies in the 
fundamentals) of within the no-arbitrage pricing model14 framework. The simple asset 
pricing model implies that the price of a stock is equal to the expected present value 
of future cash flows i.e. dividends (Shabani and Toporowski 2014a).   
 
Therefore, the efficient market hypothesis assumes that the value of a stock always 
reverts sooner or later to the net present value of future earning. This is contrast to the 
capital market inflation theory employed in this research. The distinction is that the 
capital market inflation theory suggests that the value of a stock is determined by the 
net inflows in the capital market. The two theories may not be incompatible if net 
inflows are determined by future expected earnings but the capital market inflation 
theory suggests that net inflows are predicated upon current liquidity requirements 
rather than expected future earnings.  
 
In the efficient market hypothesis the assumption of no-arbitrage rules out the 
possibility of a ‘bubble’. Within such framework Fama and other economists have 
conducted numerous studies in an attempt to examine the behaviour of stock returns.  
For example, in collaboration with Fisher, Jensen and Roll, Fama (1969) studied the 
adjustment of stock prices to new information, such as a stock split announcement.  
Using the ‘market model15’ approach-which is similar to the capital asset pricing 
                                                        
14 This assumption for the simple asset-pricing model is needed to ensure equilibrium. 
Therefore in a competitive market the return on two risk free assets must be the same.   
15 The so- called ‘market model’ associated with Sharpe (1964) suggests that a stock 
price movement is linear to the market movement. That is when the market increases 
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model (CAPM), they show that relevant news, in this case the stock split 
announcements, is fully incorporated into share prices, supporting the market 
efficiency hypothesis. Within this line of reasoning, when the announcement of the 
stock split reached the market, stock prices rose to a new fundamental value, in 
accordance with the news. However, after the announcement date stocks continued to 
trade at the new equilibrium price, therefore they did not exhibit any excess returns.   
 
The CAPM16 approach, which was independently developed by Sharpe (1964), 
Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966), focuses on the relationship between the risk and 
return on a financial asset that is used to determine the price of that asset. The beta 
coefficient, which is a measure of volatility of an asset or portfolio in relation to the 
market as a whole, is key in determining the price of a security. For example, a 
security with a high beta is said to have a lower demand by investors, therefore the 
price for that security will be lower. Whereas a security with low beta, will command 
a higher price and subsequently this will push its rate of return to be lower than the 
average market rate of return (Pilbeam 2010).  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
then stock prices will also increase. The model states that expected returns E(Ri) are 
given by E(Ri)=αi + βiE(Rm), where E(Rm) is the expected return on the market as a 
whole, αi is a constant factor which varies across securities and βi is the security’s beta 
that captures the sensitivity of the return on security i to the market return (Pilbeam 
2010).  
16 The major difference between the CAPM and the market model is that the former 
model imposes an additional restriction on the α coefficient, that is  α is equal to (1-βi) 
times the return on the risky free asset ( Economic Science Prize Committee of Royal 
Swedish Academy of Science 2013) 
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The literature has long used ideas derived from physics, such as random walk and 
Brownian motion models etc, to build statistical models used to analyse financial 
markets.  In most recent years the kinetic models have also been employed to study 
the behaviour of stock prices. The use of this model is advantageous to researchers as 
it allows building a statistical system with many interacting particles (Maldarella and 
Pareschi 2010). Hsu and Lin (2002) refer to the connections between some of the laws 
of physic and stock markets as ‘wonderful and astonishing’.   Using these 
connections, they employ both the kinetic and kinematic theories to derive two 
equations-the motion and the work-energy equation- to analyse the behaviour of stock 
prices. Their work is based on the principles of dynamics in physics, i.e. the kinematic 
and kinetics, which focus on bodies in motion under the action of forces. In such the 
kinematics are concerned with mathematically describing the state of motion such 
velocity, position and acceleration. On the other hand kinetic theories are used to 
study the effects of forces on the motion of bodies.  They argue that the relationship 
between external force and acceleration for bodies in the same as the relationship 
between excess demand and stock price changes. They refer to the conventional view 
that treats the supply and demand for financial assets the same way as for any other 
goods and services. This way, they argue that under condition of excess demand 
prices will go up and vice versa. This statement serves them as a foundation to study 
the behaviour of Taiwan Stock Exchange price index, for the period between 1989-
1998, using both the ordinary least square (OLS) and generalized autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity  (GARCH) approach.  They conclude that a unit 
increase in excess demand, calculated as units of buy orders minus units of sale 
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orders, increases the TSE index by 0.00034 points. However they argue that these 
results do not violate the market efficiency hypothesis, as changes in excess demand 
are assumed to be deterministic. Also because the empirical results revealed some 
small predictable error for the equation of motion, which implies that stock prices are 
predictable, they argue this is due to the rather long time interval between the 
purchase and sale orders. They recommend a shorter period between these two 
transactions should be used to induce a fair market (Hsu and Lin 2002).  
 
As argued the present value models rule out the presence of stock market bubbles in a 
no-arbitrage opportunity market. Behavioural economists are amongst others in 
criticizing this approach, providing empirical evidence against the simple asset 
pricing model and arguing in support of  stock markets exhibiting repeated 
speculative bubbles. Amongst others the work of Robert Shiller17 stands out in the 
literature in providing empirical evidence against the market efficiency hypothesis 
and in supporting the ‘bubble’ phenomena. His explanations of repeated speculative 
bubbles evident in the US stock market since the 1870s, comes from the assumption 
that investors are irrational, as opposed to rational as argued by the efficient market 
hypothesis. He links this irrationality with physiological human factors that influence 
the decision of investors to invest. He argues that when information of a particular 
investment i.e. investment in the stock market,  is perceived profitable, and this 
information circulates around the market through word-of-mouth or the media, 
                                                        
17 For which Shiller, along Eugene Fama and Lars Peter Hansen, was awarded the 
2013 Nobel Prize of Economics(for more details see Shabani and Toporowski 2014a) 
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investor’s demand of that particular investment, prices will increase. This in turn can 
again initiate further excitement for investment, increasing prices further more 
(Shabani and Toporowski 2014a).  When this process is repeated for a number of 
times will lead to a speculative bubble which Shiller defines as ‘ an unsustainable 
increase in prices brought on by investors’ buying behaviour rather than by genuine, 
fundamental information about value’(Shiller 2000 pg. 5).   
 
Guided by the assumptions of the present value model researchers use the expected 
future cash flows and the discount rate as two main factor effecting stock prices.  
However many studies have also incorporated macroeconomic variables in analysing 
stock price behaviour. Kalyanaraman and Tuwajri (2014) argue that any 
macroeconomic variable that affect the two decisive variables of the present value 
model-the discount rate and the expected future dividends- also affect stock prices.  
Taulbee (2001) studies the impact of unemployment, real GDP and Fisher Effect on 
S&P 500 within the rational expectations hypothesis framework18.  Using the 
generalized least square (GLS) method on monthly data for the period between 
January 1972 and August 1999, the results imply that real GDP and unemployment 
play a significant role in explaining changes in the S&P 500 index. Empirical 
evidence suggests that real GDP is strongly and positively related to S&P 500 index, 
whereas unemployment rate negatively influences the stock price index. On the other 
                                                        
18 As stated above this approach has dominated the theory of finance, and this 
dominance is reflected in the statement of this author in which he notes ‘Like other 
research on the stock market, this study will use the rational expectation 
hypothesis…’(Taulbee 2001, pg. 91) 
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hand the Fisher effect was not found to be significant for the period under 
consideration in this study (Taulbee 2001).  
 
This thesis provides a new approach in estimating stock price movements, as 
represented by the S&P 500 stock index. Using the capital market inflation theory 
framework the independent variables are derived from the flow of funds accounts and  
no other independent variables are used, rather than those associated with the theory 
used to build the model to be estimated.  However, that does not imply that this 
analysis rules out any impact of the macroeconomic variables on stock prices. In 
contrast it assumes that these effects, i.e. GDP and interest rates are captured in the 
data that represents the inflows and outflows of the capital market. Whereas the 
equilibrium theories are concerned with determining equilibrium values for stock 
prices, the theory of capital market inflation explains not only the price level but also 
the financial flows in the market that bring about that price level.  
 
The empirical analysis, therefore, uses the flow of funds accounts obtained form the 
Federal Reserve database, and S&P 500 composite from DataStream, for the period 
between 1964-2010.   
 
The main purpose of this empirical analysis is to derive/calculate the supply and 
demand for capital in the market. The supply of funds for equity financing represents 
purchases of corporate equity from households, institutions and rest of the world. The 
calculations used the following categories of capital suppliers:  
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 Household purchases of corporate equity contain increases in holdings by mutual 
funds, closed-end funds, change-traded funds, broke and dealers and funding 
corporations.  
 Institutional investors’ represent purchases of corporate equity by property-casualty 
insurance companies, life insurance companies, private pension funds, state and local 
government retirement funds and federal government retirement funds.  
 Rest of the world, is derived from subtracting net purchases of corporate equity from 
net issues to better determine its’ flows in the market. 
 
Demand for new equity is derived from combining non-financial sector issues of 
corporate equity with that of the financial sector.  
 
As a first step in the analysis the inflow contributions of institutions   in the capital 
market are analysed.  The correlation between these contributions and the stock prices 
is calculated in order to establish their relationship (Figure 3.3.1-1 shows the increase 
in the purchases of corporate equity by US institutional investors and the S&P 500 
composite price index).  Data on S&P 500 composite, price index, is obtained for the 
period between 1964-2010, from DataStream.  It is worth noting here, that this span 
period is chosen for the analyses, because the S&P 500 composite price index was 
only available from 1964 onward.  The correlation between the S&P 500 stock price 
index and institutional investors purchases of corporate equity is -0.015. That is 
consistent with the view that the demand for securities in the capital market by 
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institutions depends on their contributions or premiums minus current liabilities 
determined by the maturity structure of all liabilities.  
 
Furthermore, the correlation between the non-financial sector issues and the financial 
sector issues reveals a negative correlation of -0.46. This inverse relationship between 
them, highlights the argument raised above that as banks raise more capital reduces 
the amount available for firms, hence they are forced to indebtedness.  
 
Figure 3.3.1-1 S&P 500 Composite Index and US Institutional Investors  
 
 
To analyse empirically the role of the net excess inflows in the capital market the 
following function is estimated:  
 
p=f(S-D)      (3.1) 
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Where: p represents a change in stock prices; S is the supply of equity capital and D 
is the demand for equity capital, hence (S-D) represents the excess supply (or 
purchases) in the capital market.  
 
Before estimating the above equation, it is useful to investigate the linear casual 
relationship between changes in stock prices and the excess supply of funds. In order 
to do so the Granger causality test is carried out. Granger’s (1969) definition of 
causality is ‘a variable Yt is said to Granger-cause Xt, if Xt can be predicted with 
greater accuracy by using past values of the Yt variable rather than rather than not 
using such past values’ ( Asteriou and Hall 2007).  This means that the test uses past 
values of the depended variable and the independent variable to determine the 
causality relationship between them.   
 
The test requires both variables to be stationary.  In order to test for stationary the 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF), KPSS and Philips-Perron (PP) tests are used to 
detect whether the log level price index and net inflows data are of a stationary form. 
The results(shown in Appendix 1, Tables A1-2, A1-3, and A1-4)  indicate that the 
series is non-stationary so the difference-stationary procedure is used to remove the 
trend. The results for the first difference unit root test show that the series no longer 
contains a unit root. Hence, the first difference of log price index is stationary and the 
series used is said to be integrated of order 1, I (0).  The same stationary tests are used 
for the net inflows data. As shown in Tables A1-5, A1-6 and A1-7, (shown in 
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Appendix 1), the ADF suggests that net inflow data is I(1) however PP and  KPSS 
both indicate I(0). The weight of the evidence indicates that net inflows data are said 
to be I(0). Because both series are I(0), suggesting that they are not cointegrated, their 
short-term relationship is examined.  
 
As in Tas and Togay (2011), the first-difference of logarithm of stock price index is 
used in the Granger causality test.  The results, 19 shown in Table 3.1.1-1, indicate that 
the excess supply of funds does Granger-cause the change in the stock prices and not 
vice versa.  
 
Table 3.3.1-1 Granger Causality  
 Observations F-Statistics Probability  
Excess supply does not 
Granger Cause Prices 
44 5.04214 0.01128* Reject 
H0 
Prices does not Granger 
Cause Excess supply 
44 0.02556 0.97478 Accept 
H0 
1) * Significant casual relationship at the 1% significance level 
2) H0 denotes the null hypothesis 
 
The capital market inflation theory suggests that the demand for equity (or the supply 
of funds for equity capital) is relatively price inelastic. This means that in periods of 
market inflation, the price of long-term securities increases, and the subsequent 
capital gains attract speculative funds into the market.  This in turn increases the 
demand for equity further (Toporowski 2010).  This assumption indicates that the 
relationship between stock prices and excess supply may not be linear.  In order to 
                                                        
19Different lag length was used for the pairwise Granger causality test and the results 
yield the same causality direction (See Table A1-8, A1-9, A1-10 in Appedix 1) .  
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determine whether their relationship is indeed linear or nonlinear the Ramsey reset 
test was used20. The test uses various powers of fitted values of the dependent variable 
as proxies for the squared independent variable, to capture any possible non-linear 
relationship. This suggests testing for functional form misspecification the following 
equation is estimated:  
  
∆𝑝 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2(𝑆 − 𝐷) + 𝛿1?̂?
2 + 𝛿2?̂?
3 + 𝜀   (3.2) 
 
The result of the test are shown  below: 
 
Table 3.3.1-2 Ramsey Reset Test 
Ramsey RESET Test:   
          
F-statistic 3.381462     Probability 0.043486 
Log likelihood ratio 6.867831     Probability 0.032260 
          
 
 
The p-value associated with the F-statistics, 0.04, is smaller than the 5 percent 
significance level; hence the null hypothesis of correct specification is rejected, 
concluding that the model is misspecified. 
                                                        
20 Even though the Ramsey Reset test is used to detect nonlinearity, it does not give 
any indication of the most appropriate nonlinear model that could be used.  
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To fully recognise the presence of the problem, the following quadratic model was 
estimated:  
  
∆𝑃𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2(𝑆 − 𝐷)𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑆 − 𝐷)𝑡
2 + 𝜇𝑡   (3.3) 
 
In effect, what this regression implies is that the change in price depends on the 
excess supply of capital, but it does so in a quadratic fashion.   This relationship 
supports the argument of the capital market inflation theory in that the demand for 
equity (or the supply of funds for equity capital) is relatively price inelastic. This 
means that in periods of market inflation, the price of long-term securities increases, 
and the subsequent capital gains attract speculative funds into the market. This in turn 
increases the demand for equity further (Toporowski 2010). In this way the market 
price becomes very responsive to changes in credit inflows into the market.   
 
The results of the regression output are presented below:   
 
Table 3.3.1-3 Regression Results for S&P 500 
Variable Coefficient  Standard Error Prob. Value Expected Sign 
Constant 0.066081* 0.0240 0.0088  
SD 0.005255 0.0026 0.0543 Positive 
SD2 1.80E-05** 9.85E-06 0.0745 Positive 
* Denotes significance at  5 percent level or better; ** Denotes significance at  10 percent  
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level or better. Adjusted R-Square 0.045 
 
The estimated equation21 reveals a positive relationship between the two variables 
indicating an upward function.  Because both, (𝑆 − 𝐷)  and  (𝑆 − 𝐷)2 have a positive 
sign, increases in excess supply always have a positive and increasing effect on stock 
price.  The estimated coefficients are very small albeit significant.  In order to 
calculate the increasing marginal effect of excess supply of capital on change in stock 
prices the following approximation is used: 
 
Δ?̂? = (?̂?2 + 2?̂?3 (𝑆 − 𝐷)) ∆(𝑆 − 𝐷),     
 𝑠𝑜  
∆𝑝
∆(𝑆−?̂?)
≈ ?̂?2 + 2?̂?3(𝑆 − 𝐷)    (3.4)  
   
This approximation indicates that the slope and the relationship between excess 
supply of capital and stock price index depends on the value of the excess supply of 
capital. Thus, the first $1b of excess supply of capital, i.e. demand for new equity 
issues, increases stock price index by around 0.5255 percent. As the inflow of equity 
capital increases by a further $1b, stock index prices increases by about 
0.00526+1.80E-05($1b)=0.5291%. Even though the effect is rather small, because of 
the upward function a bigger value of the excess supply will lead to a higher 
                                                        
21 The tests carried out, confirmed that the model does not suffer from 
heteroskedasticy and autocorrelation.  Furthermore, the residuals are normally 
distributed (See Appendix 1).  
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percentage change in stock prices. Taking the upper quartile value of highest value of 
excess inflow of £20.361b the increase of excess inflow to £21.361b increases price 
by around 0.6 percent.  
 
Even though the results represent a small change in the price of stock, it is apparent 
that the higher the value of net inflows the higher the increase in stock prices, setting 
of an inflationary price dynamic as predicted by the capital market inflation theory.  
 
3.4 Capital market Inflation theory applied to the Japanese capital market  
 
Following the same methodology as above, this section applies the capital market 
inflation to the Japan capital market.  Data is derived from the flow of funds accounts 
for the period of 1980-201022.   
Data on the Nikkei 225 price index is obtained for the period between 1980-2010, 
from DataStream.   
 
Before presenting the empirical analysis conducted over the Japanese stock market, it 
is necessary to provide an overview of the structure and regulation of the country’s 
                                                        
22 Due to changes in accounting standards in Japan’s flow of funds, data is available from 1980 
onwards.  These changes, which took place in July 1999, included not only the changes in the base 
year, from 1968 System of National Accounts (SNA) to the 1993 SNA, but also restructuring of the 
economic sectors in the flow of funds accounts. For example in the flow of funds accounts using the 
1968 SNA the household sector was included in the personal sector, which also combined health 
insurance cooperatives, mutual aid cooperatives and nonprofits organization. This makes it difficult to 
consolidate the data from the new accounting standards to the data using the old accounting standards.   
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capital market, which has been quite different from the US capital market, prior 1990s 
and to a certain extent still remains so.  The characteristics of the structure and the 
regulatory framework of the Japanese equity market are also important as they could 
limit the ability of the model to fully explain the Japanese stock price movements 
within a capital market inflation theory framework.  
 
As will be explained in Chapter 6 of this thesis, the Japanese finance sector is known 
to have been bank -centered, in which banks have had special relationship with their 
main customers. This contrasts with the US financial system which is market-
orientated, and in which the capital markets play a vital role in providing finance.  
 
Japanese capital markets have not always been underdeveloped, in the sense that 
banks dominated financing, despite having one of the largest equity markets in the 
worlds, based on total value.  Prior to the 1930s the Japanese financial system shared 
similar characteristics to the postwar US financial system (Hoshi and Kashyap 2001). 
The shared feature was the role of the capital market, particularly equity financing, as 
opposed to bond and bank financing, in providing finance to industries.   Even up 
until the 1940s equity financing remained an important source of finance. Allen 
(1996) states that during the period 1931-1940, equity issuance provided 31.70 
percent of funds, with bonds and loans from private financial institution playing a 
smaller role in financing, providing 4.3 percent and 27.3 percent, respectively. 
However during this period retained earnings was the major source of funding 
providing 37 percent of funds (Allen 1996).  
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A more recent study conducted by Shabani and Toporowski (2014b), calculates the 
net sources of finance for Japanese corporate investment in the period between 1994-
2012, using the flow of funds accounts23.  Their analysis shows that internal funds 
have remained the most important source of finance for Japanese corporations during 
the period under consideration. On the other hand bank finance during the period was 
negative, implying that bank finance has experienced net repayments of debt rather 
than new funds for investments.  Japanese corporations use of equity finance for 
physical investment was positive and increased steadily until 2005, but has since 
declined turning negative. This suggests that after 2005 the Japanese non-financial 
corporate sector has bought back shares and equity. Whereas the evidence on bond 
markets do not seem to have been a significant source in providing finance to 
Japanese corporations.  The overall conclusion of this study could be taken to provide 
some evidence that Japan is no longer a bank-based system (Shabani and Toporowski 
2014b) 
 
Changes in the structure of the Japanese finance system have their roots in the 
financial crises that the country experienced during the 1920s.  Japan experienced 
three crises during this decade, in 1920, 1923 and a more severe crisis in 1927.  In 
response to the 1927 crisis a new banking law was implemented which marked the 
beginning of the heavily regulated financial system, that was in place until the Big 
                                                        
23 The study employs the same methodology used by Corbett and Jenkinson 
(1994,1997) to calculate the sources of finance for physical investment.  
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Bang reforms in mid 1990s. During the 1930s the Japanese government became 
heavily involved in the financial system by means of controlling the allocation of 
resources, controlling which assets and liabilities should financial institutions write 
off, restricting shareholders’ rights, etc (Allen 1996; Hoshi and Kashyap 2001). The 
changes in the regulatory and involvement of the governmental the financial system, 
which strengthened banks’ power, led to the creation of the main bank system that has 
been in place since the early 1950s.  In such system banks have special relationship 
with their clients, i.e. firms, in which banks not only are the main debt and equity 
holders but also intervene, by means of reducing interest rates, refinancing debt etc., 
when client firms are in financial distress (Allen 1996).  The shape of the financial 
system in Japan took a different direction from the US.  Like Japan, the US radically 
changed the regulatory framework of the financial system in the aftermath of the 
1930’s crisis. However, in contrast to Japan, the US authorities focused on promoting 
a market-oriented financial system. Banks became subject to tighter regulation in an 
attempt to prevent banking crisis, with less market intervention.  In the US financial 
innovation, especially since the 1979s and 1980s, has been key in strengthening 
market orientation.  But securitisation in Japan did not evolve as it did in the US. The 
value of total securitised assets in Japan, at its peak reached just below 2 percent of 
GDP, whereas in US in 2007 the value of securitised mortgages was nearly 25 percent 
of GDP (The Economist 2011c) (see Chapter 4 for a more detail discussion on the 
wide range of financial products innovation that has characterised the US financial 
system since the 1970s).    
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Apart from the main bank system that emerged in the 1950s, the so-called keiretsu24,  
which are corporate groups organised around a main bank, is another unique feature 
that has characterised the Japanese industrial structure. The main Japanese keiretsu, 
known as horizontal25 keiretsu, were Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Dai-ichi 
Kangyo and Sanwa. Within such structures, member firms were closely linked to each 
other through cross-shareholding often anchored by commercial banks.   Cross-
shareholding is the practice by which firms hold each other’s stock.  It is worth noting 
here that cross-shareholding was not only conducted by firms belonging to the same 
industrial group but also between suppliers and costumers as well as between 
creditors and borrowers (Scher 2001).  Perhaps the most important relationship for 
this research is the bank-corporations cross-shareholding, which is further analysed 
below.  
 
The main shareholders of the Japanese banks prior to financial deregulation, that 
started in stages during 1980s and culminated in 1996 with the introduction of Big 
Bang which was fully implemented in 2001, were insurance companies and corporate 
borrowers.  Both the double gearing process that had characterised the special 
relationship between banks and insurance companies, and the cross-shareholding 
system, that characterised the relationship between banks and corporations, could be 
                                                        
24 Up until the 1960s, the business groups that characterized the Japanese economy 
were known as Zaibatsu. During the occupation period the zaibatsu groups were 
dissolved. However, with the occupation ending, some of the major former zaibatsu 
were reformed again into groups now called keiretsu.   
25 There are two types of keiretsu: horizontal keiretsu, and vertical keiretsu. The 
former is a group of enterprises whereas the latter refer to the supply chain dominated 
by a single company. A typical example of a vertical keiretsu is Toyota Corporation 
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contributing factors in explaining why the capital market inflation theory may not 
hold in Japan.   
The double gearing process in simpler terms is best described as the process by which 
these two types of institution provide each other with capital (Fukao 2003).  Japanese 
banks issued large amounts of subordinated debt to insurance companies, thus 
boosting their Tier II capital. On the other hand, the cash they raised from such 
issuance was then used to purchase subordinated debt that insurance companies 
issued. Furthermore the money raised by insurance companies was used to finance the 
purchase of subordinated debt that banks issued in the first place (Hoshi and Kashyap 
2004).  Even though the double gearing to some extent declined during 2000-2001, in 
the aftermath of the collapse of Chiyoda26, Kyoei and Tokyo Life, in 2001 it still 
remained at significantly high levels.   For example, as of March 2001, the amount of 
bank stocks of the seven Japanese insurance companies totalled to 5.4 trillion yen, and 
bank subordinated debt amounted to 5.1 trillion yen. On the other hand the amount of 
subordinated debts and the surplus notes of these seven insurance companies held by 
Japanese banks were, 1.2 trillion yen and trillion yen, respectively (Fukao 2003).   
 
Cross-shareholding, a process in which banks and corporations hold each other stock, 
has also declined since the 1990s.  Cross-shareholding between corporations and 
banks in Japan not only helped them maintain a strong long-term business 
relationship but also positively influenced stock prices (Nagayasu 2003).  One reason 
                                                        
26 Tokai Bank suffered 74 billion in losses as a consequence of the failure of Chiyoda 
Life in October 2000   
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for the decline in cross-shareholding during the 1990s was the deregulation of the 
financial market, which allowed corporations to access the capital market to raise 
finance, independently of their ‘main’ bank.  However, Kanaya and Woo (2001), note 
that by 2001 Japanese corporate borrowers accounted for half of the total outstanding 
shares of banks.  
 
In 1996, after the burst of the bubble in 1990, the Japanese government introduced the 
so-called Big Bang reforms as a major step towards financial deregulation.  Even 
though now the country’s financial and capital markets bear some comparison with 
the US, the banking system still accounts for the majority of the financial system 
assets.  In  2010 Japanese investors holdings of financial assets amounted to a total of 
$27 trillion, second highest in the world after the US. However, only 10 percent of the 
total is invested in equities. Furthermore, Japanese households still prefer to hold their 
wealth in bank deposits. Some 80 percent of household wealth is kept in bank 
deposits, with government bonds accounting for 10 percent and investment trust and 
other, accounting for 6 percent (McKinsey & Company 2011).  
 
3.4.1 Empirical Results-the case of Japan  
 
As a first step in the analysis on the Japan the inflow contributions of institutions in 
the capital market are analysed.  The correlation between these contributions and the 
stock prices is calculated in order to establish their relationship.  As in the case of US, 
the data used in the empirical analysis are obtained from the flow of funds accounts 
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available from the Bank of Japan. However, because of the difference in the flow of 
funds accounts between the two countries the following sectors were used to derive 
the demand and supply for equity capital in the Japanese capital market: 
 
 Institutional investors’ represent purchases of shares and other equity by insurance 
companies, including life non-life insurance and mutual aid insurance, and pension 
funds, including corporate pensions and other pensions 
 Household purchases of shares and other equity include purchases of investment 
trusts and financial broker dealers  
 Rest of the world represents only the net purchases of shares and other equity27  
 
The correlation coefficient between institutional investors and Nikkei 225 stock price 
index is positive at 0.43. This rather strong positive correlation does not support the 
empirical predictions of the capital market inflation theory outlined above. The 
positive correlation between Japanese institutional investor and Nikkei 225 stock 
price index gives the first hint that the capital market inflation theory may not hold for 
the Japanese capital market.  The structure and regulation of the Japanese capital and 
financial markets, explained above, may be factors that contribute to the empirical 
evidence not supporting the capital market inflation theory in Japan. There also 
various factors that could explain such inconsistences. For example, the Japanese 
                                                        
27 Contrary to the flow of funds data used for the US, the Japanese flow of funds 
accounts does not provide data on the net issues of shares and other equities for the 
rest of the world sector. Therefore only their purchases are taken into account in 
constructing the database for analyzing the capital market inflation theory with 
reference to Japan.  
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pension fund managers such as trust banks and insurance companies until 1998, were 
subject to the 5:3:2 rule, which restricted stock holdings to 30 percent or less, 50 
percent had to be invested in secured bonds or loans and 20 percent in the real estate 
market. One reason that these restrictions were in place was to make pension funds 
investment less risky as well to promote portfolio composition homogeneity 
(Weinstein 1997).  
 
In order to test the capital market inflation theory applied to the Japanese capital 
market the same methodology as in the case of US is used. Hence, the Nikkei 225 
stock price index is estimated as a function of excess supply for equity capital: 
p=f(S-D).   
As in the case of US, the causality relationship between net inflows and stock price 
changes is determined using the Granger causality test is used.  As explained above, 
the causality test requires both variables to be stationary. The stationary tests 
conducted (ADF, PP, and KPSS shown in Appendix 2 ) revel that both variables are  
I(0).  Table 3.4.1-1 shows the results of the Granger causality test of the first 
difference of logarithm of Nikkei 225 stock price index and excess supply. As evident 
the results of the test indicate that there is no causal relationship between these two 
variables28. 
 
 
                                                        
28 The pairwise Granger causality test was also conducted with 2 lags and 4 lags( see 
Appendix 2, Tables A2-11 and A2-12.  
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Table 3.4.1-1 Granger causality- Japanese net inflows and Nikkei 225 price index  
 Observations F-Statistics Probability  
Excess supply does not 
Granger Cause Prices 
28 0.38135 0.68717 Accept 
H0 
Prices does not Granger 
Cause Excess supply 
28 1.95528 0.16435 Accept 
H0 
 
Given that both variables are integrated of order 0, I(0), their  short-term relationship 
is examined and the following equation29 was estimated using the OLS method:  
 
∆𝑃𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2(𝑆 − 𝐷) + 𝜇𝑡   (3.5)  
 
The results of the estimated regression are presented in Table 3.4.1-2 
 
Table 3.4.1-2  Regression Results for Nikkei 225 
Variable Coefficient  Standard Error Prob. Value Expected Sign 
Constant 0.021 0.0539 0.699 - 
Excess Supply -1.41E-08 7.58E-07 0.886 Positive 
 
The sign of the coefficient of the excess supply of capital is negative but not 
statistically significant. This implies that the excess supply of capital does not have 
any statistical predictive power in determining Japanese stock prices.  The results 
                                                        
29 In contrast to the quadratic equation estimated for the US capital market here a 
linear regression is estimated.  The results of the Ramsey Reset test indicate that the 
model is not misspecified therefore a lineal regression is estimated (See Appendix 2, 
Table A2-2).  
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provide no evidence that the data fits in well with the model. However as argued this 
could be for a variety of reasons associated with the characteristics of the Japanese 
capital market.   
 
Another restriction in the capital markets, that could be an added factor in explaining 
the above empirical results, is concerned with public new equity issuance. An initially 
voluntary rule imposed by the large securities companies in 1973 became a formal 
rule for Japan Securities Dealers Association in 1992, and was abolished in 1996.  
Under this rule companies were subject to strict rules in relation to their first stock 
issuance to the public.  In such they had to satisfy the following conditions: 1) the 
issuer company dividends had to be over 5 yen per stock in the previous year, 2) its 
ordinary profit had to be over 10 yen per stock in the previous year, and 3) its 
ordinary profits were expected to increase after the new stock issuance (Hirota 1999).   
The other potential factor that could be a great contributor in explaining the poor 
performance of the model to illustrate the capital market inflation theory in Japan is 
the so-called price keeping operations conducted by the Japanese government.  
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Figure 3.4.1-1 Nikkei 225 Stock Price Index and Japanese Institutional Investors  
 
 
 
As will be discussed in more details in Chapter 6, the stock market crash in the early 
1990s caused massive disruptions in the country’s economy.  The Japanese stock 
market reached its peak in 1989, with Nikkei 225 marking 39,915 (Figure 3.4.1-1), a 
massive increase from the lowest level of 1,020 in 1965. However, in 1990, with 
stock prices declining the Tokyo stock exchange lost 1 trillion yen.  This year marked 
the burst of the so-called asset bubble.  By 1992, the stock market had lost another 1 
trillion yen as the Nikkei 225 dropped to below 20,000, thus falling nearly 50 percent 
from its peak in 1989 (Tabb 1995). With asset and land prices declining, the Japanese 
government took different measures to keep stock prices to a certain desirable level 
(Narita 2002).  The so-called price keeping operations involved the purchases of 
equity by the Japanese government. These are believed to have started in 1992 
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(Nagayasu 2003).  Estimates show that on November 19, 1992, the Japanese 
government purchased about 10 million stocks (Narita 2002).  By early 1993, the 
amount of the purchases of stocks and bonds by the Japanese government amounted 
to one third of all purchases in the market (Tabb 1995). Furthermore, the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF), to a certain degree restricted stock selling, whilst encouraging state-
controlled pension funds to spend large amount of money in purchasing stock in order 
to boost prices (Tabb 1995).  Another informal measure undertaken by the MOF in an 
attempt to stop stock prices declining even further, was the request issued to the main 
brokers to provide the MOF with the names of the big sellers. Once the news of this 
request was spread in the market it is believed to have temporarily increased stock 
prices (Tabb 1995).  
 
It is worth noting here that the term ‘price keeping operations’ was a term coined by 
the media and not only it was not used by the Japanese government officials but such 
operations have also been denied as a practice conducted by them. Therefore the date 
in which price keeping operations started or ended still remains unclear (Narita 2002).  
Nagayasu (2003) studies the Japanese stock market within the efficient market 
hypothesis. Amongst other reasons, the price keeping operations -that is the purchases 
of stocks by the Japanese government- is listed as one factor for limiting the 
significance of the efficient market hypothesis when applied to Japan. The analysis 
provides a graphical representation of the monthly Nikkei stock price movements and 
the government purchases of stocks for the period 1992-2002. The arguments 
provided in Narita (2002) regarding the uncertainty of when exactly did this 
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operations started, are also supported in Nagayasu (2003). He states that ‘ it is 
generally believed that these operations were initiated in 1992 and were frequently 
conducted around the month of March when equity prices had declined earlier in the 
year’ (Nagayasu 2003, pg. 10).   He argues that the results of the graphical 
representation of monthly Nikkei data are insufficient to reach a bold conclusion on 
whether price keeping operations could indeed explain stock price movements over 
this period.  Nevertheless, he suggests that the data shows numerous occasions, 
especially in the early years, in which the direction or the rate of falling equity prices 
changed or slowed in March. 
 
This thesis takes a further step in examining the impact of the price keeping 
operations on the Japanese stock market.  Using time series data for the period 
between 2002-2011, the change in Nikkei 225 price index is estimated as a function 
of the government’s stock purchases and commercial banks purchases.  
Data for the Nikkei 225 price index is obtained for Datastream, whereas the purchases 
of the government and commercial banks from the flow of funds account available 
from the Bank of Japan.  Due to data limitation the following regression is run for the 
period 2002-201130: 
 
∆𝑃𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠 𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑡 +
𝛽4 𝑝𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡            (3.6)  
                                                        
30 Data available for the Japanese central bank net purchases of shares and other 
equities (assets) is available only for the year 1994, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2002-2011. 
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The estimated output is presented below: 
 
Table 3.4.1-3 Japanese central banks purchases of equities  
Variable Coefficient Standard Error  Prob. Value 
Constant -0.093 0.088 0.340 
Commercial 
Banks purchases  
-1.90E-06 7.321E-06 0.805 
Central Bank at 
time t 
-8.869E-05** 2.51E-05 0.018 
Central Bank 
purchases at  
time t-1 
5.02E-05** 1.40E-05 0.016 
*Denotes significance at the 1 percent level; ** Denotes significance at  5 
percent  level or better. Adjusted R-square 0.615 
 
 
The result of the regression reveal that the coefficient of central bank purchases of 
shares and other equities at t-1 is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level.  So that 100 million yen purchases of shares and equities from the Bank of 
Japan increases stock prices by 0.0005 percentage points. Whereas the coefficient 
associated with the purchases of shares and other equities of commercial banks is 
negative but not statistically significant. Similarly the purchases of central bank at 
time t also are also not statistically significant31.  
 
The results provide evidence that the government’s intervention, as a measure of 
stock purchases by the central bank, do have an impact on the Japanese stock prices. 
                                                        
31 The results and the tests carried out are shown in Appendix 2  
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Therefore, these findings provide an additional and important factor that could 
explain why the regression results obtained above show no support of the capital 
market inflation theory when applied to the Japanese capital market. Furthermore the 
empirical results of the relationship between government intervention and stock price 
movements suggests that these purchases offset private sector outflows of credit from 
the capital market. So that capital market inflation theory may  still hold.  
 
3.5 Concluding Remarks  
 
This chapter has developed a simple model to illustrate the capital market inflation 
theory applied to both the US and Japan capital markets.  The model is composed by 
deriving the demand and supply of capital in the market using flow of funds data for 
the period 1964-2010 in the case of US and 1980-2010 for Japan. Even though the 
same methodology is used in both countries the estimating regressions differ to reflect 
the data properties for each country. Therefore, the US capital market data indicates 
that the excess supply of capital has a non-linear relationship with stock prices, 
whereas in the case of Japan a liner model was estimated, as statistical tests provided 
no evidence, i.e. Ramsey Rest test, of a non-linear relationship.  The estimating 
results also differ for both countries considered in this analysis. In the case of US, 
estimating a quadratic relationship, the results support the capital market inflation 
theory in that the price level of long-term securities depends on the inflow of equity 
capital into the market. In the case of Japan the model fails to provide any evidence 
supporting the theory. It has been argued that there are various factors associated with 
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the structure and regulation of the Japanese capital market that could be contributing 
factors for such results. Furthermore, due to data limitations the time span for the 
Japanese capital market is rather short which could limit the ability of the model to 
explain stock price movement within a capital market inflation theory.  
The empirical evidence on the US capital market is sufficient to validate the 
assumptions of the capital market inflation theory. The implications of this validation 
are of great importance not only because it provides a framework to better understand 
the functioning of the capital markets, but also it provides a basic foundation to 
conduct an examination of the impact of the capital adequacy regulation on banks 
probability of default.  
 
As argued in Chapter 2 the literature on capital adequacy regulation provides no link 
between economic theory and regulatory framework. Capital adequacy regulation is 
rather based on intuitions and rule of thumb. Another implication of the empirical 
evidence provided in this thesis in supporting the capital market inflation theory is 
that it contributes to the asset pricing theory literature by taking into account market  
disequilibrium.  This original contribution is in contrast to the conventional view of 
finance that fails to address the real functioning of the capital markets and the role it 
plays in the economy. And it is this linkage that further work in this thesis will 
attempt to examine, by using the capital market inflation theory to evaluate not only 
the effectiveness of the Basel capital requirements but also the impact that such 
regulation has on the business activities of the non-financial sector and thus on the 
rest of the economy.  
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3.6 Data Appendix  
 
 
 
 
Table  3.6 –1  US Flow of Funds Data, used in Chapter 3 
HH  Households 
INS  Institutional Investors 
ROW  Rest of the World  
NFC  Non Financial Corporate sector  
FS  Financial Sector  
SD                      Excess inflows (Supply-Demand) 
S&P                   S&P 500 Composite price Index 
 
 
HH Inst ROW Supply NFC FS Demand 
S&P 
Price  SD 
1964 -6142 7693 -503 1048 1145 7 1152 75.5 -104 
1965 -9805 9593 -699 -911 -28 -706 -734 84.23 -177 
1966 -8298 10169 -290 1581 1259 374 1633 92.26 -52 
1967 -12611 13407 606 1402 2397 -765 1632 80.55 -230 
1968 -17202 16223 1612 633 -159 1055 896 95.36 -263 
1969 -14366 18114 1044 4792 3406 1632 5038 103.99 -246 
1970 -4797 9310 495 5008 5694 -336 5358 93 -350 
1971 -5125 18572 663 14110 11435 3146 14581 91.15 -471 
1972 -12416 22519 2845 12948 10922 2652 13574 102.09 -626 
1973 -3184 13162 3049 13027 7883 5568 13451 120.17 -424 
1974 -495 5803 758 6066 4097 2177 6274 98.89 -208 
1975 -6605 11238 3974 8607 9908 -1130 8778 70.71 -171 
1976 -1560 13403 504 12347 10524 1921 12445 90.9 -98 
1977 -10254 14049 916 4711 2727 2385 5112 105.7 -401 
1978 -11754 14226 1671 4143 -101 4352 4251 93.52 -108 
1979 -25664 21117 5 -4542 -7836 3246 -4590 98.58 48 
1980 -15479 26085 1866 12472 10375 1549 11924 106.52 548 
1981 -43898 29787 4616 -9495 -13450 3310 -10140 136.34 645 
1982 -29241 33993 2287 7039 1900 4674 6574 122.74 465 
1983 -11552 33393 1313 23154 20000 3472 23472 141.35 -318 
1984 -67627 -652 -4303 -72582 -78975 6164 -72811 166.78 229 
1985 -117602 42775 761 -74066 -84500 10452 -74048 163.68 -18 
1986 -98142 8769 16745 -72628 -84975 14707 -70268 210.88 -2360 
1987 -120623 40987 17155 -62481 -75500 14868 -60632 246.45 -1849 
1988 -135363 29860 -3979 -109482 -129500 22906 -106594 255.94 -2888 
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Figure 3.6-2 Japanese flow of funds  
 
HH  Households 
INS  Institutional Investors 
ROW  Rest of the World  
NFC  Non Financial Corporate sector  
FS  Financial Sector  
Nikkei 225      NIKKEI 225 stock price index  
SD                     Excess inflows (Supply-Demand) 
 
 
 
1989 -111009 -2243 -8615 -121867 -124150 3613 -120537 279.43 -1330 
1990 -39701 10812 -24140 -53029 -63000 6683 -56317 355.67 3288 
1991 -1301 68098 -26889 39908 18250 22265 40515 321 -607 
1992 86318 29773 -49857 66234 27000 40204 67204 419.35 -970 
1993 8896 113142 -53002 69036 21300 51119 72419 435.38 -3383 
1994 -41841 68013 -59575 -33403 -44900 9877 -35023 466.89 1620 
1995 22867 -41351 -61958 -80442 -58330 -7216 -65546 460.71 -14896 
1996 32551 -31688 -86319 -85456 -47325 -21250 -68575 617.69 -16881 
1997 -56129.3 -62332 -4409 
-
122870.3 -77375 -27937.7 
-
105312.7 748.03 -17557.6 
1998 
-
153445.1 21401 -73961 
-
206005.1 -215537 3536.4 
-
212000.6 975.04 5995.5 
1999 -11440.6 -67050 -9835 -88325.6 -110368 1681.4 
-
108686.6 1228.1 20361 
2000 
-
392275.3 191296 92993 
-
107986.3 -118204 17069.6 
-
101134.4 1399.42 -6851.9 
2001 
-
331428.2 290570 25153 -15705.2 -48125 39872.8 -8252.2 1333.34 -7453 
2002 -76771 82969 37481 43679 -16245 71536 55291 1172.51 -11612 
2003 62426 92466 -112792 42100 -39599 66074 26475 908.59 15625 
2004 -22192 83174 -59770 1212 -122683 118308 -4375 1108.48 5587 
2005 -150149 19139 -129757 -260767 -341829 78469 -263360 1188.05 2593 
2006 -380266 -76553 -41107 -497926 -565697 59484 -506213 1273.46 8287 
2007 -573591 -107507 70694 -610404 -786825 178580 -608245 1418.34 -2159 
2008 -43125 -75066 143682 25491 -335960 637594 301634 1411.63 -276143 
2009 225296 -153096 129507 201707 -64568 314202 249634 931.8 -47927 
2010 -40352.8 
-
106956.2 73763 -73546 -277956 190114 -87842 1132.99 14296 
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NFC FS Inst HH ROW 
NIKKEI 
225  Supply Demand SD 
1980 28608 6819 3580 865 11007 6560.16 15452 35427 -19975 
1981 36709 9333 7296 6910 418 7137.59 14624 46042 -31418 
1982 52844 6898 9707 8242 4764 7697.6 22713 59742 -37029 
1983 22657 7926 8958 -5516 6377 8120.51 9819 30583 -20764 
1984 24983 7803 10453 1539 -14046 9961.25 -2054 32786 -34840 
1985 74333 9773 15323 10196 -7095 11558.06 18424 84106 -65682 
1986 32420 10011 37045 -9704 -44291 13053.79 -16950 42431 -59381 
1987 83727 24387 46373 25407 -59734 18936.76 12046 108114 -96068 
1988 131447 37262 46984 4492 2835 22790.5 54311 168709 -114398 
1989 99657 50469 50619 2666 -37141 30209.54 16144 150126 -133982 
1990 78400 13424 14053 21281 25911 38274.76 61245 91824 -30579 
1991 71038 9669 19930 7333 44871 24069.18 72134 80707 -8573 
1992 46216 7298 12207 8913 4412 23801.18 25532 53514 -27982 
1993 69888 16807 12585 13088 42630 16782.88 68303 86695 -18392 
1994 69487 19640 3799 13227 14395 17881.99 31421 89127 -57706 
1995 53964 12250 -6178 2252 26279 19519.46 22353 66214 -43861 
1996 61067 18018 33960 -862 34192 20669.03 67290 79085 -11795 
1997 48437 33114 27763 10593 42926 19446 81282 81551 -269 
1998 49492 96149 26356 16981 32111 14896.4 75448 145641 -70193 
1999 86970 27458 3296 25235 119583 13468.46 148114 114428 33686 
2000 67710 17936 60692 -16272 680 18168.27 45100 85646 -40546 
2001 17332 119910 16857 -14652 10668 13867.61 12873 137242 -124369 
2002 21456 120234 7896 -15 2263 10871.49 10144 141690 -131546 
2003 15850 49517 -83181 -24358 148933 8713.33 41394 65367 -23973 
2004 64560 -2517 -22495 12529 96170 10813.99 86204 62043 24161 
2005 24598 5854 -33311 -19688 159862 11492.26 106863 30452 76411 
2006 25998 -23592 -1355 -35178 82869 16428.21 46336 2406 43930 
2007 85266 74979 12908 -4988 -5243 17091.59 2677 160245 -157568 
2008 -22123 31638 20454 20671 -60085 14691.41 -18960 9515 -28475 
2009 34258 60797 2979 -6574 86272 9080.84 82677 95055 -12378 
2010 -3939 2732 -2572 1570 35208 10731.45 34206 -1207 35413 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  135 
 
 
Figure3.6-3   Central bank purchases  
 
 
CB             Shares and other equities/Central Bank 
Banks       Shares and other equities/ Commercial Banks  
 
 
CB Banks  
1992 0 1754 
1993 0 -2680 
1994 200 25199 
1995 0 13973 
1996 2000 1983 
1997 0 6251 
1998 -200 3239 
1999 -800 -30544 
2000 0 -31443 
2001 0 56243 
2002 11680 15938 
2003 7807 -24751 
2004 738 -9908 
2005 -255 -8284 
2006 -4120 -1913 
2007 -6247 8062 
2008 -2092 -22114 
2009 2741 -10094 
2010 765 -95 
2011 -548 -8015 
2012 -1253 -8689 
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Chapter 4. Shadow Banking  
 
The results presented in chapter 3 indicate that under conditions of capital market 
inflation firms may be overcapitalised. This has major implications for the 
functioning of the capital market.  With respect to banks, overcapitalisation, arising 
from the imposed Basel capital requirements, increases the riskiness of their assets, as 
it crowds out available capital.  This chapter argues that by creating a complex and 
opaque shadow banking system banks were able to achieve and maintain a reported 
overcapitalisation by means of shifting risky assets off balance sheet.   The aim of 
integrating the shadow banking system in the analysis of capital adequacy regulation 
therefore is twofold: firstly, explaining the activities of shadow banks and the 
interconnections with traditional banks helps to illustrate the process by which banks 
were able to remove risk off balance sheet and report overcapitalisation; and, 
secondly, the creation of the shadow banking system not only serves as a cosmetic 
manicure for risk in balance sheet but also increases the vulnerability of banks, as 
revealed in the latest global financial crisis.   
 
4.1 Overcapitalisation 
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The research in this thesis identifies mainly two processes associated with 
overcapitalisation of companies, that has been a rising phenomenon since the 1980s. 
The first process is the capital market inflation, which is a generalized phenomenon 
reflected in the flow of funds accounts, suggesting that overcapitalisation of the 
financial institution or banks, in general increases the riskiness of their assets.   
The phenomenon of overcapitalisation is associated with the rise of institutional 
investors, such as pension funds and insurance companies, since the 1970s and 1980s.  
The accumulation of savings into financial institutions holding long-term financial 
assets led to the process of capital market inflation, explained in chapter 3, which 
provided higher capital gains from holding shares or common stock.  The realised 
capital gains are obtained by stock buyers from the market rather the company that 
originally issued the stock. This process made equity finance a cheaper and alternative 
form of finance, which gave companies an incentive to overcapitalise.  
 
Overcapitalisation is defined as ‘ the issue of equity or common stock in excess of 
what is required for the productive and commercial activities of a firm’ (Toporowski 
2012).  Overcapitalised companies use the excessive raised capital to purchase short- 
term liquid assets, thus, increasing the liquidity of their balance sheet.  Such assets 
could then be used as collateral for short-term borrowing, or balance sheet 
restructuring, such as merger and takeover activity.  However, the latter activities 
could be profitable only if inflation in capital market is (and remains) an on-going 
process (ibid).   
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Karwowski and Shabani (2013) analyse the financial operation of US major non-
financial firms for the period between 1994-2012. Using the argument raised by 
Toporowski, the paper defines overcapitalisation ‘as a situation in which firms hold 
liquidity in excess of what would be needed for productive operations’ (Karwowski 
and Shabani 2013).  Through a balance sheet examination the results indicate that a 
large proportion of the firms in the sample, which are a part of the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average, are indeed overcapitalised.   Their study also provides evidence 
that the identified overcapitalized firms have increasingly engaged in financial 
investment.   
 
The second process suggests a different mechanism in that overcapitalisation of a 
given bank is also achieved by removing its’ bad assets off balance sheet and their 
replacement by superior assets. Such assets may have become available through the 
general overcapitalisation of the financial system (more particularly banks).  One way 
by which banks were able to remove toxic assets off their balance sheet was to 
transfer such assets into the shadow banking system. The argument here is that banks 
are reporting overcapitalisation rather than being actually over-capitalised.  On this 
note it is important to stress the differences between absolute and reported 
overcapitalisation.   The former refers to a situation in which a bank has far more 
capital than it needs to conduct it business, where as the latter refers to the process of 
reporting overcapitalisation because part of the balance sheet is hidden in the shadow 
banking system. This distinction between absolute and recorded overcapitalisation 
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becomes evident in the discussion here on shadow banking system and its 
interconnections with the traditional banking system.  
 
 
4.2 Creation of the Shadow Banking System 
 
The term ‘shadow banking system’ is relatively new in the finance and banking 
vocabulary.  The financial crisis that unfolded in the summer of 2007, has led many 
economists and researchers to look into the causes of such catastrophic event.   Their 
findings shed some light on the shadow banking system. Even though such a system 
(or some of the activities such as securitization) was not newly created but rather had 
existed for some time prior to the crisis, the operations and interconnections with the 
traditional banking sector grew tremendously to a scale that was relatively unknown 
by many, including the regulatory bodies.   
 
Paul McCulley was the first to coin the shadow banking system term in 2007.   
He defined the shadow banking system as  ‘ the whole alphabet soup of levered up 
non-bank investment conduits, vehicles, and structures’ (McCulley 2007). Since then, 
the literature provides different definition of the shadow banking system. The 
following are some examples: 
 
 FSB (2013b)- ‘ credit intermediation involving entities and activities (fully or 
partially)  outside the regular banking system’ .  
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 Adrian and Ashcraft (2012b) – ‘ a web of specialized financial institutions that 
channel funding from savers to investors through a range of securitization and secured 
funding techniques’ 
  Mehrling et al (2013)- ‘Money market funding of capital market lending-this may or 
may not include banks’  
 Gorton (2010)- ‘ a combination of the repo market and the necessary collateral, 
including securitization debt’  
 
This research does not aim to provide a set definition of shadow banking and does not 
aim to explain in depth the activities undertaken within the system, but instead will 
illustrate how the creation of it allowed banks to move some risky assets off their 
balance sheets.   
 
Shadow banks conduct similar activities to traditional banks, by means of engaging in 
credit intermediation, maturity and liquidity transformation. However shadow banks 
are not subject to the same regulation as traditional banks. Therefore shadow banks do 
not have access to liquidity backstops or deposit insurance like traditional banks. In 
fact, a common reason given in the literature to explain the extensive engagement of 
banks in the shadow banking system is to escape regulation, in particular capital 
requirements ( FSB 2012; Gorton 2010; Adrian and Ashcraft 2012a; Pilbeam 2010, 
etc).  
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In its simplest form the traditional banking approach has been the same since its 
beginnings.  Banks accept deposits and use them to make loans. These loans 
previously were kept in the banks’ balance sheet till maturity. This has been known as  
‘originate and hold’ model. However, as the banking system has evolved in the last 30 
years banks have move toward the ‘originate to distribute’ model (Pozsar et al 2012).  
This model is best described as a securitization- based credit intermediation process, 
explained below.  
 
Over the years the market of the shadow banking system grew to become bigger than 
the tradition banking system. As of 2007 the liabilities of the U.S. shadow banking 
system amounted to $22 trillion whereas, the liabilities of the traditional banking 
system around $14 trillion (Pozsar et al 2010).  Because the entities that form the 
shadow banking system are not regulated and hence are not required to report to 
regulators, it is difficult to have a precise estimate of its size.  Given the lack of 
transparency of the activities and the opaqueness of the scale of the shadow banking, 
Tyson and Shabani (2013) employ a new methodology in an attempt to estimate the 
size of UK shadow banking system. The approach makes use of the equal 
compensation, which includes both salary and bonuses, to revenue ratio practice 
applied by investment banks in all global locations. The ratio disclosed in UK 
subsidiary financial statements is assumed to reflect true economic activity in the 
location.  This assumption is based on the fact that the amount of bonuses given, 
calculated as a percentage of revenues, is obtained from internal management 
accounts, which use economically correct revenue figures.  By contrast the revenue 
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and assets figures disclosed in the financial statement are likely to be distorted by 
accounting, tax and regulatory arbitrage.  The asset, revenues and bonuses ratios are 
calculated using the global accounts, and are then applied to the bonus figure for the 
UK’ subsidiaries to imply total UK assets.  The figures obtained from each individual 
bank included in the selected sample of banks used are summed to give an estimate of 
UK off-balance sheet assets of investment banks held in special purpose vehicles 
(SPVs).  Using five- year average maturity, the level of off balance sheet assets is 
estimated to be around  $546 billion or 26 percent of on-balance sheet assets.  When 
combined with the estimated UK’s hedge fund assets of £390 billion, (FSB 2011), the 
estimated assets of the UK shadow banking system amounts to over £900 billion 
(Tyson and Shabani 2013).  
 
The creation of the shadow banking system comes in parallel with financial 
innovation. One the main innovations of the last few decades that has increased 
phenomenally and is recognised as a key activity within the shadow banking system is 
securitization. Adrian and Ashcraft (2012a) state that securitization as a financial 
process has been around since the 1920s but has proliferated in the last 30 years.  
Similarly, Pozsar et al (2010), postulate that the shadow banking system was born 
some 80 years ago and associate its’ birth with the creation of the government-
sponsored enterprises (GSE).  Fannie Mae was the first GSE created by president 
Roosevelt as part of the New Deal program in response to the large number of 
mortgage defaults during the Great Depression. The main purpose of Fannie Mae was 
to provide sufficient and stable funds to mortgage banks in financing housing. In 
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other words it was creating liquidity in the mortgage market, by means of purchasing 
banks’ mortgage loans, thus providing banks funds to make new loans.  
 
Fannie Mae was privatized in 1968, and another GSE, Freddie Mac was created in 
1970. The two GSEs continued to perform the purpose of their design to buy from 
banks, or any other lender, mortgage loans, package them together as bonds, 
guarantee them against default, and sell these securities to investors.  In its simplest 
form this process is known as securitization (CBO 2010).   
 
Following in the footsteps of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, banks got involved in 
securitization. In a more detail form the process of securitization involves grouping a 
variety of assets that generate cash flows, and create a marketable security.  The cash 
flows act as a guaranty for the security. In other words, securitization transforms 
illiquid assets such as loans and mortgages, into liquid assets, such as asset-backed 
security (ABS). However, loans and mortgages are just an example of the assets  
pooled by commercial banks. Other assets, include, credit cards receivables, 
automobile loans, students loans etc.  But the common characteristic of all these 
assets is that they generate a cash flow, and these are the cash flows of ABS that 
investors purchase.  
 
Securitization was taken a step further by financial institutions, by entering into 
another process known as re-securitization.  In effect this means securitizing a 
security that has already been securitized before.  These new securities are known as 
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collateralized debt obligations (CDO).  For example, banks would set up a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV) or special purpose entity (SPE) and sell them the cash flows of 
the pool of assets they have packed together.  The SPV then slices the pool of cash 
flows of the assets into different tranches.  These tranches have different risk and 
returns: the senior tranches are rated AAA, carry lower risk and thus pay the highest 
interest rates; the mezzanine tranches are rated AA to BB, and are risker than senior 
tranches; and equity tranches, which are no rated, carry the greatest risk and attract 
the highest yield. The process does not end there, but it continues in creating other 
securities that are backed by CDO tranches, known as CDO2.  The process continues 
in creating CDO3 and so forth. Different securities are used as collateral in the 
creation of CDOs. When the CDO is formed from packaging loans, is known as 
collateralized loan obligation (CLO). Similarly a collateralized bond obligation 
(CBO) is created by pooling bonds.  When the collateral of the CDO is ABS is known 
as ABS CDO.  
 
The first CDO issuance was in 1987 by Drexel Burnham Lambert for the Imperial 
Savings Association (Adrian and Ashcraft 2012a) and grew to become one of the 
most important activities in modern banking.  One of the main advantages of issuing 
CDOs by banks is freeing up capital that would have been required to hold if these 
loans were kept on their balance sheet (Pilbeam 2010).   
 
Also by creating the SPVs banks were able to eliminate some financial risk.   The 
SPV is a legal entity set up by another company (the sponsor), a bank in this case, that 
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raise funds to purchase the assets by issuing securities to investors in the capital 
markets. The SPVs were created for no other purpose than to conduct these 
transactions and they do not to make any business decisions.   The entity has no 
employees and no physical location and for these reasons is often known as a ‘robotic 
entity’.  The SPV has another important feature, in that the way it is created allows it 
to be bankruptcy remote. That means that in the event of insolvency of the sponsor 
bank the SPV will not be affected because its assets are in some way isolated from the 
sponsors’ balance sheet.  On the other hand in the event of write-downs of assets that 
were transferred from the sponsor bank, the SPV is liable to incur the losses.  
Therefore, this is a way reducing the financial risk of the sponsor bank (Pilbeam 
2010).  
 
According to data published by Lehman Brothers (as cited in Gorton 2010 pg 105), 
asset backed commercial paper conduits (ABCPs); special investment vehicles (SIVs) 
and SIV-Lites were amongst the main holders of the triple A CDOs tranches.  ABCPs 
are a form of SPV that are created by large commercial banks, funded through the 
issuance of asset backed commercial paper (ABCP).  These conduits were originally 
set up by banks to provide trade receivables financing to their customers.  However, 
over the years, in additional to trade receivables, other assets were pooled and used as 
collateral, such as student loans, auto loans, credit cards and other various financial 
assets.  Similarly, an SIV is an off-balance-sheet vehicle and like ABCPs is 
bankruptcy remote.  SIV issue commercial paper (CP) and medium term notes (MTN) 
and ABCP, to fund the purchase of longer-term securities and structured product that 
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earn a higher yield (such as ABS and CDO). The first SIV was designed by Citigroup 
in 1988, with the purpose to profit from the spread between short- term and long-term 
interest rates (Pilbeam 2010). So in effect an SIV aims to capture the spread between 
the lower costs used to fund their liabilities, and higher returns obtained from their 
asset portfolio.  This way ABCPs and SIVs engaged and specialised in conducting 
liquidity and maturity transformation, just like a normal bank does, but as noted with 
different means of funding (unlike banks that are funded by deposits, shadow banks 
obtain funds through the wholesale money markets).  
 
Even though both SIVs and ABCPs are a form of SPV, they have different structures. 
One of the main differences is the liquidity support available to them in the event of a 
liquidity crisis.  The ABCPs has the advantage of receiving liquidity backstop 
provided from highly rated banks  (sponsors) as well as some form of credit 
enhancement, as additional support. The liquidity support covers 100 percent of their 
outstanding ABCPso that sponsors provide funds when the ABCPs is unable to roll 
over maturing issues.  This way ABCPs are linked to their sponsor banks. Because of 
this link, the credit rating that ABCPs receive on their issued commercial paper 
depends on the credit rating of the financial institution that provides the liquidity and 
credit support, whereas for an SIV the quality of its assets plays a major role on 
determining the credit rating it receives (Adrian and Ashcraft 2012a).  SIVs did not 
enjoy the same liquidity support as ABCPs. The guaranteed liquidity  provided by 
sponsor banks only covered a part, up to 20 percent of the outstanding ABCP (FDIC 
2013). Another major difference between the conduits and SIV is that the former is 
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funded only by means of issuing ABCP, whereas the latter is funded by means of 
issuing MTN and other short-term debt.   
 
A shared similarity amongst these vehicles, such as SIVs, SIV-Lites and ABCPs, is 
that even though they are bankruptcy remote they are not robotic.  They have a 
management team and assets are marked to market, unlike SPVs used in the process 
of securitization (Gorton 2010).  An important point is that these special purpose 
vehicles were often not part of the banks that created them, nor were their activities 
displayed on their originating bank’s balance sheet (Farhi et al 2009). In this way, 
banks were able to increase their balance sheet turnover and therefore extract the 
maximum value from their capital.  
 
Another way by which banks were able to reduce their risk was by creating credit 
default swaps (CDS).  CDSs were first created by JP Morgan and came to existence in 
the 1990s (Blinder 2013).  A CDS is a credit derivative that has the same features as 
an insurance contract.  So a contract is reached between two parties, where the seller 
party insures the buyer party against any losses arising from the default on a specific 
bond (Blinder 2013).  In return the buyer party will make regular payments to the 
seller party. The CDS market grew significantly in the years preceding the crisis. In 
2000 the amount of outstanding CDS was nearly $500 million, and by 2007 it 
amounted to nearly $62 trillion (Pilbeam 2010).  CDS were an important way in 
which banks and shadow banking entities improved the apparent quality of their 
assets.  
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Gorton (2010) argues that the activities in the shadow banking system also involve 
repurchase agreements.  A repurchase agreement (repo) refers to a transaction, which 
involves the sale of a security attached with the commitment of the seller to 
repurchase the security in the near future at a specified price. Effectively a repo is a 
short- term collateralized loan in which an investor32, with a large sum of money, that 
wants to invest for a short period of time and earn interest, but is reluctant to deposit 
in his bank given the limited deposit insurance, lends to firms and other borrowers in 
the repo market and receives securities as collateral (Gorton 2010).  The repo market 
is also a way in which holders of long-term securities can earn fee income by lending 
out their securities.  As the repo market evolved, in addition to the usual Treasury 
securities, it came to accept a wide range of securities, and structured products such as 
ABS and CDOs as collateral.  Gorton (2010) states that ‘ the shadow banking system, 
is, in fact, a real banking system’ (Gorton 2010 pg. 45).  He argues that collateral in 
the shadow banking system serves as a form of deposit insurance as opposed to the 
deposits in the traditional banking system33 that  are insured by the FDIC.  Depositors 
are institutions with large holdings of cash that opt to invest short term and realize a 
return in the form of interest, and lenders are firms that require funds to finance their 
business operations. So lenders and borrowers enter in a transaction, which is in effect 
repo.   A lender (for example a money market mutual fund  (MMMF)) lends a large 
                                                        
32 The term investor used here represents the main lenders in the repo market, such as 
institutional investors, pension funds, mutual funds, hedge funds, large corporations, 
etc.   
33 Insurance coverage by the FDIC prior to the crisis of up to $100, 000 per account 
has increased to $250,000 (FDIC 2010) 
Chapter 4. Shadow Banking  149 
sum of money to the borrower (for example an investment bank) and receives some 
sort of security as collateral.  The investment bank commits to repurchase the same 
(or similar) security at a later date for a specified price, and repays all the borrowed 
funds plus interest known as the repo rate.   
 
There are mainly two distinguished features of a repo agreement namely: 
rehypothecation and haircuts. Rehypothecation is the practise, which gives the holder 
of the collateral the right to use it in another transaction.  The process can be repeated, 
in which the third party that received the collateral can reuse it in another transaction 
and so on.  The implication of the same collateral being used in number of contracts, 
say over the course of one day, is that ‘the collateral has a money multiplier’ (Gorton 
and Metric 2012). The other feature of a repo agreement is the degree of 
overcollateralization, the difference between the market value of the security used as 
collateral and the amount of the loan backed by that security, known as the haircut.  
So if borrowed funds amount to $395 million and the collateral has the value of $400 
million, the haircut is 1.25 percent.  As explained, collateral in repo serves as 
insurance and a haircut further protects the buyers (the lender) against default by the 
seller (borrower).  It is worth noting here that the repo can either be used for 
borrowing and lending funds backed by collateral, or for borrowing and lending 
securities in exchange for cash.  Repos are short-term, usually overnight but most of 
them are rolled over on a daily basis. The repo market grew substantially in the last 
three decades and even though its size still remains opaque it is estimated to have had 
size of the traditional banking system at around $10 trillion (Gorton 2010). 
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The above illustration of a repo transaction conducted directly between the buyer and 
the seller of the repo, is known as bilateral repo. Another form of a repo transaction is 
known as a tri-party repo and it refers to the use of a third party, a clearing bank, that 
handles settlements and managements issues, such as settling the collateral in its own 
balance sheet, verifying the quality of the collateral and allocating collateral in a 
manner that satisfies the requirement of the lender in respect to eligibility and risk 
limitations (Copeland et al 2012).  In the US the clearing banks, that act as 
intermediaries in the tri-party repo transactions, are the Bank of New York Mellon 
and JP Morgan Chase (ibid).  
 
The repo market is a major source of funding for primary dealers, in which they use 
repos to finance their inventories of securities.  The normal operational practices in 
the tri-party repo market, involve the lender and borrower reaching a repo agreement 
at the start of the day (Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2010). Later on in the day, 
the clearing bank is notified and settles the agreement by simultaneously transferring 
cash to dealers (borrowers) and collateral to investors (lenders).  The following 
morning, the clearing bank unwinds the transaction, whereby, the clearing bank 
returns back the securities to dealers and cash back to investors.  The unwinding 
process is conducted each morning, even for non-maturing repos.   By the end of the 
business day new repos must be settled, in a process known as ‘rewind’. Because 
dealers must finance the securities during the day, that is the time between the 
unwound and rewind process, the clearing bank provides financing to dealers, secured 
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by a lien on dealers’ securities.  A study conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York (Copeland et al 2012) , suggests that the exposure of a clearing bank to a 
single dealer can routinely be more than $100 billion.  
 
Gorton (2010) and Gorton and Metric (2012) state that the repo market was the main 
source of funding for shadow banks or using their terminology ‘ securitized banking 
system’.   Their definition of securitized banking is associated with the securitization 
process in which banks transform illiquid assets, such as mortgages, and any other 
loans, into marketable securities that serve as repo collateral.  Gorton argues that a 
securitization bond, such as ABS and CDOs, that were created by banks and are used 
as collateral in the repo market provides a link between the traditional banking and 
the shadow banking.  
 
The above introduction of the shadow banking system is just the ‘tip of the iceberg’ in 
explaining the complex financial products and the financial chain that was created by 
banks and shadow banks. However, it is sufficient to meet the purpose here in 
illustrating the ways by which banks were able to shift the risky assets off their 
balance sheet and still be overcapitalised. Also, the information provided suffices to 
build on an argument that even though bank created products and ways to eliminate 
risk off their balance sheet, they also created an opaque and complex system that 
played a disruptive role at the heart of the financial crisis.   
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4.3 Shadow Banking and the crisis  
 
Since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007 much research and academic work is  
conducted in an attempt to pinpoint the roots of such crisis that had global 
implications.  A common element in the resulting analysis is the shadow banking 
system. As the crisis unfolded in the summer of 2007, causing massive disruptions in 
the financial system, not only banks experienced runs (see Chapter 5) but also the 
vehicles that these banks created, such as ABCPs and SIVs.  During the crisis the 
MMMF also experienced a run. The disruptions in the financial market halted 
securitization activity (Adrian and Ashcraft 2012b) and seized up the CP market and 
the repo market.  Following these events the US government came to the rescue by 
providing various liquidity facilities, not only for banks but also for those institutions 
that are considered as ‘shadow banks’ which are not regulated and hence are not 
eligible to government liquidity backstops.  
 
ABCPs and SIVs were the first to be hit at the onset of the crisis in 2007.  As 
explained above these vehicles borrowed short term in the money market and used 
those funds to invest in long -term illiquid assets, such as ABSs and CDOs.  
The collapse of the subprime mortgage market caused their assets to deteriorate in 
value.  Subsequently, there was an investors run on both ABCPs and SIVs creating 
difficulties for shadow bank entities.  By the end of 2007 the outstanding amount of 
ABCP had decreased by around 34 perccent from a peak earlier that year of 
approximately  $1.2 trillion. Similarly, the SIVs industry, with assets worth $400 
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billion in mid 2007, contracted in size with SIVs outstanding dropping by $100 
billion by December 2007 (Gorton 2010).   
Sponsor banks which were liable to provide liquidity support to these vehicles, came 
to the recue. However, because SIVs received limited liquidity support from their 
sponsors, unlike ABCPs, they had to fund their maturing SIVs notes mainly by selling 
their assets.  Given the deteriorated market conditions, the proceeds from such sales 
were not sufficient to refund investors in full (Bank of America 2011).  
 
Faced with these difficulties most sponsor banks provided support to their SIVs, even 
though they had no contractual responsibility to do so.  In December 2007, Citigroup 
announced the bailout of its seven SIVs, by consolidating $49 billion of assets onto its 
balance sheet.  Other banks such as HSBC and WestLB AG also bailed-out out their 
SIVs (Harrington and Hester 2007).  However, some SIVs were left to default, with 
investors being badly hurt by suffering massive losses.  As the crisis erupted further in 
2008 SIVs became unviable and by the end of the same year these entities ceased to 
exist.  In October 2008, Sigma Finance Corp, worth $27 billion, was the last SIV 
standing to cease operations (Davis and Sakoui 2008).     
 
Credit default swaps (CDS), which act as insurance against banks/companies defaults, 
had served banks well by making their investments look rather sound prior to the 
crisis. As investors used CDS to hedge against any potential losses, the banks’ 
investment were considered safe.  However, the use of CDS evolved beyond just 
hedging the risk on the purchased bonds.  Their use become similar to ‘gambling’, in 
Chapter 4. Shadow Banking  154 
the sense that bets would be placed on the perceived likelihood of bonds default 
(Blinder 2013). But, the purchase of insurance required no ownership of bonds or 
loans. This gambling use of CDS is known as “naked CDS”.  The use of naked CDS 
accounted for nearly 80 percent of the total CDS outstanding in 2008. This is one way 
by which product creativity in the financial system created more risk rather than 
eliminate it (ibid).  
 
When the crisis took off, it wiped out the value of securities that the insurers, such as 
American International Group (AIG), had guaranteed.  AIG was the largest derivative 
insurer, with a market capitalisation of $95.8 billion as of 2008 (Pilbeam 2010).  AIG 
offered insurance for a variety of products and in 1998 it offered credit protection in 
the form of CDS mainly on mortgage backed securities (MBS) and CDOs. However, 
the collapse of the subprime mortgage market caused a massive decline in the value 
of CDOs and MBS. Because AIG had a triple AAA credit rating it was not require to 
post collateral to its counterparties. This changed when the crisis unfolded: its CDS 
counterparties were demanding the firm to post collateral. This was the start of what 
became a storm that would bring down AIG.  In September 2008 the insurance giant 
was downgraded by all three major rating agencies.  Even though it managed to post 
some (billions of dollars) collateral with its counterparties, it was not enough to 
ensure its survival. Unable to raise sufficient funds to meet the further collateral calls 
from its counterparties the unregulated firm was nationalized, receiving a whopping 
$182 billion bailout money (Blinder 2013).  
 
Chapter 4. Shadow Banking  155 
Lehman brother’s collapse had some devastating effect on the financial sector 
bringing down with it other financial institutions. One of the financial institutions that 
followed suit was the oldest money market mutual fund (MMMF) the Reserve 
Primary Fund. The fund’s holding of Lehman’s CP, which amounted to $785 million 
in September 2008, became worthless following the failure of the investment bank.  
The first MMMF were created in 1971, by the Reserve Primary Fund, and had some 
special characteristic that made them relative safe. Their share price was always $1, 
which removed any speculation risk, as there are no possibilities of incurring capital 
gains, or looses.  They normally invested in short-term instruments, such as Treasury 
bills, thus their investments were considered to be safe. Amongst these securities, 
MMMF started to include in their portfolios CP, given their perceived low riskiness.  
However, when Lehman collapsed the firm’s CP, was practically worthless. This 
caused the Reserve to be the first fund and for the first time since 199434 to ‘break the 
buck’, meaning that the fund’s share declined by 3 cents from their $1 historical fixed 
value.  As a consequence the Reserve fund faced a large number of redemption 
requests from its’ investors.  The run followed suit on other money market mutual 
funds as investors confidence fell in the industry in the aftermath of the losses that 
Reserve suffered.  Mutual funds stopped purchasing CP, causing the price of these 
securities to drop substantially (Blinder 2013).    
 
                                                        
34 Community Bankers Mutual Fund was forced to break the buck, following the 
bankruptcy of Orange County California in 1994 (Gullapalli et al 2008) and (Condon 
2008)  
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In response to a distressed CP market, on September 19, 2008, the Fed created the 
Asset Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility 
(AMLF). The introduction of AMLF aimed to provide support to MMMF to meet 
their investors’ requests for redemption as well as to provide liquidity in the ABCP 
market (Federal Reserve 2008).  AMLF allowed the Fed to provide low rate 
nonrecourse loans35 to banks and other financial institutions in order for them to 
purchase high quality ABCP from MMMF.  However, money markets and ABCP 
markets needed further assistance to battle the severe disruptions as the financial 
crisis culminated. On October 2008, the Fed established the Commercial Paper 
Funding Facility (CPFF) to address the problems in the CP market that were causing 
major financing difficulties for US companies. The CP market is vital to US 
corporations since it provides the necessary funds to meet any short term mismatch 
that arise between payments and receivables. When the CP market dried up, as 
MMMF and other investors stopped buying CP and no longer wished to refinance 
maturing paper, some of the countries largest companies faced problems in meeting 
their financial obligations.  In order to stabilize the market the Fed created a SPV, that 
was funded by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and used the funds to 
purchase CP from eligible issuers. The CPFF was closed on 1 February 2010 once the 
commercial market become stable (Federal Reserve 2010).  
 
                                                        
35 Nonrecourse loans are loans that are secured by collateral. However in the event of 
default the lender is liable to seize only the collateral on the loans and cannot go after 
any other assets that the borrower may possess.  
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During the crisis, apart from the ABCP and MMMF markets, there was also a run on 
the repurchase agreement (repo) market. As explained in above lending in the repo 
market is conducted with collateral. Gorton (2010) argues that securities used as 
collateral in repo transactions before the crisis were ‘information insensitive’. That is, 
the value of these securities is known and is immune to adverse selection (Gorton and 
Metric 2009).  However these perceived information insensitive securities quickly 
turned information sensitive as the crisis unfolded.  The collateral serves as protection 
for lenders, in that in the event of the borrower defaulting the securities used as 
collateral can than be sold so that the lender gets his cash investment back.  If market 
conditions are good then the investor will get back the full amount as reflected in the 
value of collateral. However, when market conditions have deteriorated the collateral 
might have lost value and hence the investor will not be able to get the full amount 
back.  Hence he will make a loss. And this is how the debt issued by banks quickly 
became information sensitive as investors became nervous about the underlying value 
of the collateral as indicated by the increased haircuts. Prior to the crisis usually there 
were no haircuts involved in a repo transaction. But this changed during the crisis as 
haircuts substantially rose.  Gorton (2010) documents this increase and refers to them 
as being analogous to withdrawals of deposits in the traditional banking system.  He 
argues that these withdrawals would trigger a run on banks, as it did in the previous 
US banking crisis, prior to the creation of deposit insurance, and the increase in 
haircuts triggers a run on the repo market.  Gorton’s extensive research on the topic 
suggests that it was the run on the repo market that triggered the financial crisis (see 
for example Gorton 2010, Gorton and Metric 2009, 2010, 2012).   
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In relation to the tri-party repo market the clearing banks are exposed to the same 
risks as the ones that investors face in the above illustration in the bilateral repo 
agreements.  If dealers are to default than the clearing bank is left with the collateral 
in the books, and if the value of the collateral is wiped out or substantially reduced, 
than the clearing bank will suffer major losses.  However, clearing banks are not 
under any contractual obligation to unwind the repo transaction.  Lenders became 
aware of the fact that clearing banks could potentially decide not to unwind trades and 
hence they could be left holding the collateral that needs to be sold. However a quick 
sale would cause asset prices to crumble under liquidity pressure.  This could 
potentially deepen the problems in the market.   
 
In fact during the crisis lenders, worried about dealers financial health, decided not to 
roll over the repos, thus they withdrew financing from dealers, despite the collateral 
provided by them.  In other cases lenders decided to increase haircuts on collateral to 
protect themselves against any potential losses arising from a lost value of the 
securities held as collateral.   
 
The liquidity strains in the repo market caused a lot of financial distress for many 
dealers.  For some the consequences were fatal, such as in the case of Lehman 
Brothers and Bear Sterns which both failed in 2008. Acknowledging the problems in 
the tri-party repo market which were growing rapidly, the Federal Reserve initiated 
the creation of the Primarily Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), ‘to help restore the 
orderly functioning of the market and to prevent the spillover of distress to other 
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financial firms’  (Adrian et al 2009, pg 1).  The PDCF was established on March 16, 
2008, on the same day of the announcement that JP Morgan was to acquire Bear 
Sterns (Blinder 2013). Under PDCF, The Federal Reserve Bank of New York was 
able to provide funds to primary dealers in exchange for collateral through clearing 
banks.  So, dealers notified the clearing banks of the overnight funding they needed, 
usually by the end of the business day. Once the collateral was received and verified 
by the clearing banks the Fed of New York was informed. Upon this notification, in 
regards to the loan amount requested and the collateral pledged, the Fed transferred 
the funds to the clearing banks to provide credit to dealers (Adrian et al 2009).  In 
effect the Fed of New York was providing liquidity backstop to primary dealers, that 
were not eligible, prior to the creation of PDCF.  On September 14, 2008, when 
Lehman Brothers was just hours away from bankruptcy, the Fed expanded the use of 
the PDCF by accepting a wider range of securities as collateral against the loans it 
provided.  The expansion of the PDCF was in response to concerns that a possible 
collapse of Lehman Brothers could spread the risk to other financial institutions. Once 
the market conditions improved the PDCF funds were no longer used and the facility 
expired in February 201036.   
 
4.4 Regulation of Shadow Banking  
 
As explained in chapter 2, in response to the latest financial crisis regulation of the  
                                                        
36 Federal Reserve of New York, http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pdcf.html 
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banking system has undergone major changes.  Basel III introduced new regulatory 
measures for banks, which also address the activities in the shadow banking system.  
Under the Basel III reforms bans are subject to two liquidity standards: Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio (LCR) and Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). Also, in relation to the 
new capital requirements standards the credit conversion factor is increased from zero 
percent to 20 percent for commitments with an original maturity of one year or less 
that are unconditionally cancellable (FDIC 2012). 
 
As argued above, banks were able to shift assets off balance sheet by means of 
creating an SPV, such as ABCP and SIVs.  In terms of the capital regulation, the 
shifting of assets to the SPVs, were treated as sales by regulation and banks were 
required to hold risk-based capital only against their contractual exposure to SPVs 
(Tarullo 2013).  
 
The crisis shed light on the loopholes in the regulatory framework that gave banks an 
incentive to transfer assets into the shadow banking system that allowed them to 
adjust their capital requirements at more favourable terms. In 2009 The Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), issued Financial Accounting Standards No. 166 
and 167 to amend the accounting rules of certain structured finance transactions 
involving SPVs.    
 
The new accounting standards apply to all companies, not just financial institutions, 
and it requires them to consolidate those SPVs in which it has control over the most 
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significant activities of these entities as well as when the company has the right to 
receive benefits or the obligation to absorb losses from such legal entities (FASB 
2009).  
 
Prior to these changes, banks were required to consolidate the assets and liabilities of 
ABCP conduits37, but were not required to hold risk based and leverage capital 
against these assets.   Under the new accounting standards, banking agencies require 
banks not only to hold capital against the consolidated assets of their sponsored SPVs, 
but also as well as against consolidated securitization transactions (Adrian and 
Ashcraft 2012b).  Therefore within this new regulatory framework banks ought to 
hold higher capital ratios than previously.   
 
The problem in the tri-party repo market during the crisis shed light on the role that 
clearing banks play on this market. The difficulties of many dealers during the 
financial crisis revealed that clearing banks not only act as agent but are also the 
largest creditors in the tri-party repo market. Dealers were heavily dependent on 
clearing banks to provide intraday credit to fund their securities. In order to reduce 
such dependence the Federal Reserve has undertaken steps, and since 2013 the 
amount of intraday credit provided by clearing banks has reduced from 100 percent to 
30 percent and it aims to further reduce it to 10 percent by the end of 2014 (Tarullo 
2013). Furthermore, the daily unwind process has moved from 8:30 in the morning to 
                                                        
37 Following the failure of Enron, which had sponsored over 3000 off-balance sheet 
SPVs (Gorton and Souleles 2006) , the asset and liabilities of ABCP conduits were 
required to be consolidated onto balance sheet.  
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3:30 in the afternoon. This reduces the hours of risk that clearing banks are exposed 
to, leaving cash investors to hold the risk of the trades during the day.  Clearing banks 
still provide credit to dealer between the new time of unwinding 3.30 pm till the time 
when new trades are settled (Adrian and Ashcraft 2012 a).   
 
However, it is argued that these changes are far from accounting for the systematic 
risks associated in the tri-party repo market. The fact that clearing banks still provide 
finance to dealers and are exposed to risks, and the use of structure products as 
collateral are amongst the most concerned issues raised in the literature (See for 
example Adrian and Ashcraft 2012a and Tarullo 2013). In respect to Basel III 
reforms, some argue that not only will it not help in stabilizing the financial markets 
but it could also increase the size of the shadow banking system. For example, Baur 
and Wackerbeck (2013), argue that Basel III has placed traditional banks under more 
tight regulation in comparison to shadow banks. This then could lead to financial 
institutions to engage more in shadow banking activities. This is likely to be more 
profitable for both investors and financial firms due to benefits arising from escaping 
the costs associated with the increased capital and liquidity regulatory measures. This 
argument goes hand-in-hand with the suggestions given by Gorton and Metric (2010), 
which argue that, amongst other reasons, the regulatory costs are a factor that induced 
banks to move their assets off balance sheet.  They refer to the evidence provided by 
Keeley(1988) arguing that when the  capital requirements were first imposed in the 
U.S.,  banks with low capital ratios grew relative slower than banks with high capital 
ratios. Gorton and Metric (2010), then suggests that if banks are obliged to hold 
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capital ratios to meet the imposed regulatory requirements and when charter value is 
low,  ‘bank capital will exit the regulated bank industry’ (Gorton 2010 pg 274).  And 
off balance sheet securitization is a way to such exit.  
 
4.5 Concluding remarks  
 
The creation of the shadow banking system and its interconnections with the 
traditional banking system presented in this chapter illustrates neatly how banks were 
able to record overcapitalisation without necessary being well-capitalised.  Also the 
discussion of this chapter shows clearly how the shadow banking system serves as a 
cosmetic manicure for risk in reported balance sheets, at the same time are 
concentrating risk in the shadow banking system.    
 
The main purpose of the discussion on this chapter is to provide a reinforcing 
argument against capital requirements.   The root of this argument stems from the 
common held view that one reason explaining the rapid growth of the shadow 
banking system is associated with capital regulation. Such a system allows banks  to 
escape regulation, in particular capital requirements.  The implication here is that 
imposing higher capital requirements on banks may induce complex risk taking, by 
means of creating opaque financial products and a complex shadow banking system. 
The consequences of such activities were revealed in the latest global financial crisis, 
by increasing the vulnerability of the banking system.   
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However the above argument can best be applied only to the US banking sector, as 
opposed to the Japanese banking sector, in which shadow banking has not been 
significant.  In addition this thesis aims to provide an explicit argument, by 
empirically examining the impact of capital adequacy regulation on the probabilities 
of default of US and Japanese banks, which is presented in the following two 
chapters.  
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Chapter 5. Capital Adequacy Regulation and Probability of 
default of U.S. banks   
 
Chapter 4 presented a detailed discussion of the creation of the shadow banking 
system, which served banks as way to shift toxic assets off balance sheet and record 
overcapitalisation.  As argued, both the overcapitalisation of banks and the creation of 
shadow banks, together with the innovation of complex financial securities, can be 
attributed to the capital adequacy regulations set by the Basel Committee. 
Subsequently, banks’ vulnerability increased, as evident in the 2007-2009 global 
financial crisis. This chapter further examines empirically the consequences of the 
Basel capital adequacy regulation on the probabilities of default of US banks, using 
the capital market inflation theory, presented in chapter 3.  The chapter gives an 
overview of the US banking sector and a detailed discussion of the difficulties faced 
during the crisis. Section 5.3 explains the methodology used in estimating the 
probability of default of US banks for the period 2007-2009.   The results, presented 
in section 5.4 imply that the higher the Tier I capital ratios the higher the probability 
of default, whereas the higher the unweighted risk capital ratio the lower the 
probability of default. It is argued that the current risk-weighted capital ratio 
requirements only take into account the risk of insolvency ignoring the risk of 
illiquidity in the capital market. Section 5.5 discusses the implications of these results 
on the system as a whole.  
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5.1 The probability of U.S. banks default  
 
The significance of banking sector instability is now a well-documented phenomenon 
in the international financial crisis.  Even though signs of an impeding perfect storm 
that was about to hit the world economy appeared in late 2006 and early 2007, it was  
the 7th  August 2007 that marked the start of the crisis.  The ensuing credit crunch 
caused the collapse of stock markets across the globe, the failure of some of the oldest 
and largest financial institutions that threatened the stability of foreign markets. Even 
though governments in the most advanced and wealthiest countries came to the rescue 
by bailing out banks and other financial institutions the scars that are embedded in the 
economy have yet to heal.  
 
One of the warning signs that became apparent in the US banking sector as early as  
April 2007 was when New Century Financial filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection.  The company was reported to have been a victim of the deteriorated 
housing market conditions (Stempel 2007). Other signs followed when Bear Stearns’ 
investors learned that their funds invested in two of the firm’s hedge funds had little 
value, if any (BBC News 2009).   
 
However, it was on August 7 that made governments around the world realize that the 
early signs of an imminent financial crisis were to become reality, and that it would 
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wreak havoc on some of the biggest global banks.  On that day, French bank BNP 
Paribas froze withdrawals out of the banks’ three mortgage funds, since it was unable 
to value fairly some of their assets. Earlier that year, the Bank of England had refused 
to provide financial support to one the country’s main savings institutions, Northern 
Rock.  Following this, the bank experienced a run on its deposits, making it the first 
British bank run since 1866 (Blinder 2013). Government efforts to save the institution 
proved unsuccessful and on February 2008 it was nationalised. In the same year, the 
Swiss government had to refinance UBS bank, the largest in the country and one of 
the biggest financial institutions in the world.   IndyMac bank was seized by Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in June 2008, making it at the time one of the 
major collapses in US history. According to reports, the bank failed due to a run by 
depositors, which drained the liquidity of the Californian mortgage lender.  
However, September 2008 was the time when the US witnessed some of the most 
catastrophic events in the country’s financial system.  AIG, the world largest insurer, 
had been bailed out by the US government along with Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, 
America’s two biggest mortgage lenders. Merrill Lynch was taken over by Bank of 
America. During the same period, Lehman Brothers became the first of the  ‘too big 
to fail’ banks to file   for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.  
Following that, the giant mortgage lender, Washington Mutual was closed down by 
regulators and sold to JP Morgan Chase.  Over in Europe, the insurance giant Fortis 
survived by becoming partly nationalised and Dexia was the second Belgium bank to 
be rescued by its government.  The latter, considered to be the world’s largest lender 
to local governments at the time, became insolvent as a consequence of its US 
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operations losses. RBS, not only the biggest bank in the UK but also with the bigger 
loan book than any bank in the world with asset worth £1 trillion, had to be refinanced 
by the British government.  The British mortgage lender Bradford & Bingley was 
nationalised in the same year.   In May 2010, the Spanish central bank seized control 
over CajaSur, one of the biggest savings banks in the country making it the second 
Spanish bank failure since the start of the financial crisis.  
 
The financial turmoil provides evidence that banking collapses could occur on a 
massive scale despite the fact that banks were deemed to be too big to fail, well 
regulated and well capitalized. Conventional wisdom holds that banks should have 
high capital ratios that can sustain unanticipated losses.  However the facts provided 
above cast questions over the effectiveness of this theory.   In a bid to establish the 
accuracy of this conventional theory as a remedy to these failures, this chapter 
provides empirical evidence on the relationship between banks capital adequacy ratios 
and the probability of default.  The analysis in this section departs from the capital 
market inflation theory put forward in Chapter 3, arguing that rising bank capital 
requirements makes them more prone to failure. As previously explained, in 
conditions of capital market inflation firms tend to be overcapitalised.  The 
implications of overcapitalisation provide a foundation to examine the consequences 
of bank overcapitalisation issues.  Bank overcapitalisation is seen as a result of capital 
adequacy regulation set by the Basel Committee. The capital market inflation theory 
suggests that under conditions of inelastic equity capital supply, rising capital 
adequacy regulation is a way of forcing non-financial firms into debt. The higher the 
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amount of capital held by banks, the lower the quantity available to nonfinancial 
intermediaries in the market. Therefore, they are left with no option other than to raise 
their needed capital through the issue of debt instruments.  The excess debt levels 
being held by firms as a consequence of higher banks’ capital regulation requirement 
reduces productive investment below what it would otherwise be.  The reduced 
productive investment also reduces the cash flow of firms and their ability to service 
their debt. Therefore, higher capital requirements that aims to avoid banks 
unsoundness, encourage firms to reduce their productive investment in fixed capital in 
response to their increased indebtedness. Implicitly, excessive firms’ indebtedness 
causes a decline in the quality of bank assets, thus increasing their probability of 
default.  
 
This thesis employs a logit model to estimate the probability of bank default on a 
pooled cross sectional data for US, over the period 2007-2009. Two models are 
estimated: a simple logit model using Tier 1 capital ratios and the size of banks 
dummy as explanatory variables to predict the probability of bank failure and a 
multivariate logit model adding three additional financial variables as proxies for 
profitability, asset quality and liquidity. Both models yield results that are in 
accordance to the hypothesis of this research that the higher the capital ratios the 
higher the probability of default.  
 
5.2 The financial crisis and the U.S. economy 
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During the first decade of the 21st century the US economy went from a period known 
as  ‘The Great Moderation’ to a period dubbed  ‘The Great Recession’.  The former 
refers to a substantial decline in macroeconomic volatility that characterised the US 
economy since the 1980s. The reduced volatility led to widespread perception that 
business cycles were a thing of the past. However, 2007 was the start of the worst 
financial crisis since the Great Depression in the 1930s. Following the burst of the 
housing bubble, the prices of mortgage related securities fell substantially, prompting 
huge losses for banks and other financial institutions.  For some institutions the 
inability to withstand these losses ended their existence. Others survived due to 
massive government provision of new capital or were bought by other institutions. 
The crisis that unfolded in dimensions beyond what anyone had anticipated, also 
severely hit the non-financial corporate sectors. As credit markets froze, the stock 
market collapsed, numerous businesses closed down, and with  rising unemployment, 
the US economy entered into deep recession.  
 
The burst of the housing bubble is commonly considered to have triggered the 
financial crisis and the subsequent recession that started in December 2007.  The 
property market started to show signs of vulnerability in 2006 and 2007, and the rates 
of default and late repayment by mortgage holders started to rise significantly 
(Murphy and Webel 2008).  As a consequence the value of mortgage related 
securities asset started to fall, with some having no value at all.  The ensuing bank 
losses had devastating effects on some of the biggest financial institutions and 
brought distress to the whole financial system.   
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Losses in the housing market placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two U.S. 
biggest mortgage refinancing companies, under strain, threatening their survival. The 
government-sponsored enterprises, but owned by shareholders, were created in 1938 
and 1970, respectively, to provide sufficient funds to mortgage banks in financing 
housing and to keep liquid the market on which mortgage loans could be traded. By 
2008 their combined loans were a total of  $5.5 trillion (Pilbeam 2010).  In the 
aftermath of the financial crisis, the US government injected capital totalling $140 
billion in an attempt to prevent their collapse.  However, the bailout proved not to be 
enough to ensure their survival.   In September 2008 the two mortgage giants were 
placed under government conservatorship.  
 
The crisis culminated on September 15, 2008, when Lehman Brothers filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.  One of oldest companies of Wall Street, which 
had survived the Civil War, the Panic of 1907, and the 1929 stock market crash, was 
unable to continue its operations in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008.  After 
running into great financial difficulties, following its heavily exposure both mortgage- 
related securities and commercial real estate, the US government refused to rescue the 
158 year old firm.  Much that followed in the crisis is related to Lehman’s collapse. 
The impact of its demise was so severe that for many it defines the start of the 
recession the US economy experienced. As will be explained below, after Lehman’s 
collapse some of the biggest financial corporations nearly followed suit, but were 
however rescued by the government.  
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In response to the financial meltdown, the Emergency Stabilization Act was enacted 
on 3 October 2008. The legislation created the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP), which allowed the Department of Treasury to guarantee or purchase up to 
$700 billion of toxic assets from troubled financial institutions. On October 13, the 
Treasury secretary Hank Paulson gathered the main nine US banks and offered them 
each a share of the TARP funds.  Banks participation seemed to have been non-
negotiable at that point, in order to avoid exposure of some banks to the market. In 
other words, if all banks receive bailout funds, the market would not be able to 
distinguish bad banks from good banks.  Therefore, it was decided that $25 billion 
would go to Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase; $15 billion for Bank of America; $10 
billion for Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley; $3 billion for Bank of 
New York Mellon and $2 billion for State Street Corporation.  A further $45 billion 
of TARP money was provided to Citigroup and Bank of America in the months that 
followed (see below).  
 
In the face of the severe financial distress that the US was experiencing, in February 
2010 the US Treasury launched the so-called ‘stress test’ for the largest 19 US bank 
holding companies with assets worth more than $100 billion. The test aimed to 
evaluate the financial position of these banks,  to ensure that they had adequate capital 
buffer to withstand any losses and to maintain lending even under more severe 
economic conditions.  Each bank’s capital was assessed using a two-year ahead 
hypothetical adverse scenario.  The degree of stress for each bank was determined by 
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assuming possible losses accruing on risky loans, assets and trades in the next two 
years. The level of stress was then used to determine the capital buffer position for 
each bank, i.e. whether a particular bank needs to increase the capital level or not.  
The US Treasury offered capital infusions to those banks that could not raise capital 
by themselves, under the Capital Assistance Programme (Marshall 2009). The results 
of the stress test were published in May 2009, and revealed that 10 out of the 19 
banks needed to raise a further  $74.6 billion in capital in order to withstand any 
potential losses. In particular, the test indicated that Bank of America needed to raise 
as much as $39.9 billion in capital. The other banks with the most significant capital 
shortage were: Wells Fargo with $13.7 billion; Citigroup with $5.5 billion and 
Morgan Stanley with $1.8 billion.  All banks announced plans that would adjust the 
capital level that would be in accordance to the stress test (Guha et al 2009).  
 
There have been many suggested factors that caused the financial crisis. Whilst one 
factor alone cannot explain the devastating impact, it is commonly believed that the 
crisis had multiple causes.  Bankers are often blamed for their reckless behaviour 
taking too much risk and innovating complex financial instruments but also credit 
agencies and regulators bare some responsibility too.  
 
The repeal of Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 has received much attention as one of the 
main causes that led to the financial meltdown. The Act was enacted in 1933, in 
response to the large number of bank failure during the Great Depression. Preceding 
the 1929 stock market crash banks engaged in risky operations through underwriting 
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securities.  Their main source of funds used for speculative trading was consumers’ 
deposits. When the stock market crashed, these deposits were wiped out. As a result 
the Glass-Steagall Act came into effect in 1933, separating the activities of deposit-
taking banks from investment banks.  The main purpose of this Act was to make 
depositors money safer by restricting any connection with the risky activities of 
investment banks and created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to 
avoid future bank runs (Johnson and Kwak 2010). Commercial banks were under the 
protections of the government but subject to tight regulation. The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) was to become the regulatory body for investment 
banks.  
 
The Banking Act also enacted regulation Q, which granted power to the Federal 
Reserve (Fed) to set interest rate ceilings on savings accounts of banks. During the 
1960s the Act was amended to include also savings and loans (S&L) institutions in 
addition to commercial banks.  However, the 1970s high inflation placed banks under 
major difficulties.  High inflation leads to high interest rates and because bank loans 
were subject to Regulation Q, they were losing money on their fixed rate mortgage 
loans.  Also, depositors shifted their funds from banks and savings and loans 
institutions towards money market funds and Treasury Bills that offered higher rates.  
As a consequence, in the early 1980s the saving and loan industry become insolvent. 
The impact was milder for banks as they were not exposed to mortgages like the 
savings and loans institutions.  
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In the aftermath of the problems faced by the savings and loan industry, the 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 was enacted.  
This Act is viewed as the first step towards the deregulation of the US financial 
market.   Amongst other changes in the regulatory structure for the banking sector and 
S&L industry, the Act removed the Fed’s Regulation Q enabling banks to be 
competitive by providing higher interest rates on their deposits. Two years later in 
1982, the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act was implemented.  The Acts 
allowed S&L institutions to engage in other risky lending activities rather than 
concentrating just on mortgage lending.  The regulation changes were placed with the 
aim to circumvent problems in the S&L industry. But as it turned out these legislative 
actions did nothing but exacerbate the crisis (FDIC 1997). The S&L crisis, led to over 
2000-bank failure between 1985 and 1992, and a further 534 failed in 1989.  
 
In 1988, the Basel Accord introduced international capital requirements for 
commercial banks.  Basel I was implemented in January 1993 and all US deposit 
taking banks became subject to the risk-based capital requirements. In order to meet 
the capital requirements banks had to adjust their loan portfolios. This resulted in 
reduced commercial lending and increased  holdings of government securities. This 
adjustment was accompanied with the recession of 1990-91.  Many suggested that the 
credit crunch the US was experiencing was due to the newly introduced capital 
requirements.  Whilst others viewed the effect of capital requirements as temporary, 
ruling out any long-term effect (Furfine 2000).  
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In 2004, Basel II Accord was introduced. The required capital remained the same as 
Basel I but Basel II allowed some banks to use their own risk management models to 
calculate regulatory capital requirements.  The Accord was implemented in stages in 
2006 but the US authorities adopted the agreement in 2007 (Pilbeam 2010). 
 
In a response to the financial crisis of 2007-2009, the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision introduced new regulation standards, known as Basel III, in 2010. Under 
the new framework banks are required to hold higher capital ratios in an attempt to 
achieve and maintain financial stability. However as stated in chapter 3 the regulatory 
framework for capital adequacy requirements set by the Basel Committee provides no 
justified economic model nor does it provide a set amount of capital that is sufficient 
to protect banks or the banking sector as a whole.  
 
Kuritzkes and Scott (2009) state that before the crisis, the average capital ratios held 
by the top 20 US banks was 11.7 per cent. The last reported capital ratios of the five 
large US banks38 that either failed or were government-force sold/merger during the 
crisis, ranged from 12.3 per cent to 16.1 per cent.  
 
Wachovia’s capital position showed no risk of an imminent failure, prior to its demise 
in 2008, as was that of Bear Sterns.   Prior to Bear Sterns’ collapse in March 2008, the 
chairman of the SEC, Christopher Cox, expressed no concerns about the capital levels 
of the firm, stating, “the firm had a capital cushion well above what is required to 
                                                        
38 Bear Sterns, Washington Mutual, Lehman Brothers, Wachovia and Merill Lunch  
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meet supervisory standards” (Norris 2008). Bearn Stearns was known for its heavy 
exposure to mortgage-backed securities, and in early March, there were rumours 
circulating that the investment bank was struggling. As investors lost confidence, the 
firm, which relied heavily in short-term financing such as repos, was unable to raise 
funds in the market.  The Fed came to the rescue by providing Bear Stearns a $13 
billion loan through JP Morgan. However, the loan was not sufficient to ensure the 
firms’ survival.  Two days later, JP Morgan acquired Bear Stearns for $10 a share.  
 
Following the announcement of the Basel III rules, the US government implemented 
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.  One element of 
this Act is the Volcker Rule, which in effect brings back, to some extent, the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933. The Volcker Rule prohibits commercial banks from engaging in 
proprietary trading.  That is trading undertaken by banks for their own profit rather 
than on behalf of their clients. Therefore commercial banks that are under the FDIC 
supervision are banned for proprietary trading, whereas those financial institutions 
that are allowed to, will not be liable to government rescue should they need to in the 
future.  Even though some have argued that these rules are likely to secure a safe 
financial system, this dissertation does not address the Volcker Rule but rather 
focuses on the impact of the Basel III capital requirements.  
 
5.3 Methodology   
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The most commonly used method for explaining and predicting financial crises are 
the early warning system models (EWS).  In the empirical literature, there are 
essentially two main methodological approaches for constructing EWS models: the 
parametric approach and the non-parametric approach.  The former approach is the 
probability model, such as logit or probit, using limited dependent variables 
estimation. The occurrence of a crisis, the dependent variable, is a binary variable, 
taking the value one or zero, is estimated as a function of one or more explanatory 
variables. The main difference between the logit and the probit model is that the latter 
model assumes the cumulative standard normal distribution whereas the logit model 
assumes the cumulative standard logistic distribution.   
 
EWS are used not only by academics and private researchers but also by banking 
regulatory and supervisory authorities.  In the US the evaluation of individual banks 
by the regulatory bodies is conducted by means of on-site examination and off-site 
surveillance systems (Cole and Gunther 1998).  The findings of the on-site 
examination determine the rating assigned to banks, based on its financial soundness 
and other regulatory criteria. The composite rating, known as CAMELS, is based on 
six criteria: capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earning ability, 
liquidity position and sensitivity to market risk39. In addition to these annually exams 
to assess bank performance the regulatory bodies have used off-site monitoring 
systems, or early warning systems.   
 
                                                        
39 Market risk component was added in 1996 
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The CAMELS financial ratios have been used in many empirical researches in 
predicting bank failure. Sinkey (1975), was the first to employ the statistical 
technique of Multivariate Discriminant Analysis (MDA) to study bank failure using 
various financial variables. His analysis examines 110 failed and 110 non-failed US 
commercial banks for the period between 1969-1972.   His study uses a variety of 
financial ratios in order to derive characteristics that distinguish between failed and 
non-failed banks in the sample period. The findings suggest that ratios employed to 
evaluate bank performance, such as liquidity, capital adequacy and efficiency, are 
statistically significant different between the two groups (failed and non-failed banks) 
(Sinkey 1975).  However, the ability of MDA approach to detect future bank failure is 
limited, since it only distinguishes between failed and non-failed banks.  Sinkey 
(1975) argues that his analysis ‘ represent(s) a preliminary input to the final goal of 
developing an early-warning system’ that can enable the prediction of future bank 
failure.   Martin (1977) was the first to employ a logit analysis to predict bank 
failures, and this method is the most commonly used in the literature in predicting 
bank failure (Aktas et al 2006).   
 
For the non-parametric approach mainly two models are used to predict financial 
crisis: trait recognition model (TRM) and the signal approach.  The latter approach, 
used to predict both banking and currency crisis involves monitoring the behaviour of 
a set of single indicators in periods proceeding and during the crisis. When the 
behaviour of a particular variable is assessed as unusual, relative to its normal 
behaviour, it is considered to be issuing a warning signal if it goes beyond a threshold 
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value.  This threshold value, which expresses an unusual behaviour in a quantitative 
manner, is then adjusted to obtain an outcome that balances Type I and Type II errors 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999). 
 
Davis and Karim (2008), compare the predictive efficiency of the multivariate logit 
model and the signal approach to predict banking crisis using a single dataset.  The 
analysis estimates the likelihood of a banking crisis as a function of a set of 
macroeconomic, institutional and financial variables. Using 105 countries for the 
period 1979-2003, their findings favour the multivariate logit model in terms of in-
sample predictive ability.  However, the signal approach may be more appropriate 
when estimating the probability of a banking crisis for a specific country. This is 
because using a common threshold value in the signal approach may not be optimal 
since  the relationship between the discrete variable (the threshold value) and the 
crisis probability is not smooth over the countries in the sample (Davis and Karim 
2008).  
 
The other non-parametric approach is the trait recognition model (TRM), a computer 
intensive method  which aims to identify systematic patterns in the data. This 
methodology can detect any irregular performance of the independent variables 
included in the model prior to failure/crisis. It stands out from other econometric 
models because  it does not make any assumptions about the distribution or 
independence of the predictor variables.  Another unique aspect of the TRM is that 
this technique attempts to exploit information from the interaction of variables.  The 
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TRM technique has gained popularity in the literature used in predicting bank failure 
(Jagtiani et al. 2000).   
 
When TRM is employed there are five steps used in the process of its construction: 1) 
the selection of cutpoints for each variable 2) the allocation of binary codes to each 
variable 3) constructing a trait matrix for each observation in the sample 4) using this 
trait matrix to identify good and bad traits and 5) set classification rules for voting 
matrix (for more detail see Kolari et al 2002).  The selections of the threshold value 
and the classification rules are subject to the judgment of the researcher.  The results 
depend to a large extend on these decisions which on the other hand could be a source 
of bias in the estimation (Gaytan and Johnson 2002).  
 
Kolari et al (2002) compare the predictive ability of the TRM and the logit model for 
large US commercial banks over the period between 1989-1992.  The authors 
estimate the probability of bank failure using both models on a sample containing 100 
large banks. Their predictive power was tested using the holdout sample consisting of 
50 US commercial banks.  Based on classification results the analysis shows that both 
models are able to accurately predict in-sample bank failures.  
 
However, the TRM performs better using both one and two year information prior to 
collapse, in the holdout sample.   Furthermore, the TRM allows the examination of 
interaction of different variables, which contain useful information not found on 
individual variables in predicting failures.  The importance of including variable 
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interactions when predicting bank failures is also highlighted by Jagtiani et al (2003).  
Their study tests the efficacy of EWS models in predicting inadequate capitalisation 
of US banks.  Using the equity to capital ratio as the dependent variable they employ 
both logit and TRM analysis to predict incipient financial distress in US commercial 
banks as revealed in declining levels of capital ratios.  Classifying banks as capital 
adequate or capital inadequate, they predict bank capital falling below a specified 
adequate level one period ahead.  The analysis is based on the assumption that capital 
serves as a financial cushion to a financial institution to absorb any unanticipated 
losses.  Therefore monitoring capital levels predicts the risk of a bank becoming 
insolvent and does not predict failure.  The results indicate that both of the EWS 
models perform well in predicting incipient capital deficiencies a year ahead.  
Therefore they argue that both models could be used in the supervisory process in 
monitoring bank capital levels.  
 
Inspired by the methodology used in studies conducted by Martin(1977) , Estrella et 
al (2000) and others, this research estimates the probability of banks default using  a 
logit model on a pooled cross sectional data set for the US  banks  over the period 
2007-2009.  Two models are estimated in this chapter; a simple logit model using Tier 
1 as the sole predictor for probability of default, and year dummies and bank size 
dummy variable and a multivariate logit model adding three other financial ratios as 
explanatory variables- net interest margin ratio; the ratio of liquid assets to deposits 
and short-term funding and the ratio of net charge-off to average gross loans.  
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Identifying that a particular bank has experienced a failure for which the dummy 
variable takes the value of one or zero otherwise. The probability that a failure will 
occur, P(𝑌𝑖𝑡=1), is assumed to be a function of a vector of n explanatory variables: 
 
𝑃(𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝐹(𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡) =  
e (𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡)
1+e (𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡)
          (5.1) 
 
where  𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the banking failure dummy variable for bank i at time t, 𝛽 is the vector of 
coefficients,  𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the vector of explanatory variables and 𝐹(𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡) is the cumulative 
logistic distribution.  When estimating limited dependent variable models the  
maximum likelihood method is vital .  Therefore, to obtain the actual parameter 
estimates the following log likelihood function is used:  
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑒 𝐿 = ∑ ∑ [(𝑌𝑖𝑡 loge 𝐹 (𝛽
′𝑋𝑖𝑡)) + (1 − 𝑌𝑖𝑡)𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑒(1 − 𝐹(𝛽
′𝑋𝑖𝑡))]
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑛
𝑖=0       (5.2) 
 
Because the probability curve of the logistic function has an S-shaped characteristic, 
the estimated coefficients do not indicate an increase in the probability of failure 
given a one-unit increase in one of the independent variables. Thus, the marginal 
effect of Xit on the failure probability is non-constant and is obtained by multiplying 
the probability of failure with the probability of non-failure and the coefficient 𝛽i 
(Davis and Karim 2008).   This means that the probability of failure depends on the 
initial values of the independent variables. Although the sign of the estimated 
coefficient is sufficient for determining an increase or decrease effect on the 
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probability of failure the magnitude varies in relation to the slope of the cumulative 
distribution function at 𝛽′𝑋𝑖𝑡  (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 1998).   
 
A key element in this model is the construction of the banking failure dummy 
variable, which is the dependent variable.  To establish which banks enter the 
category as failed, information was obtained from various sources.  The criteria that a 
bank is considered as failed would have had at least one of the four following 
conditions: 1) bank that failed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection; 2) was seized by 
the government or financial institutions; 3) merged with another bank; or 4) is still 
operating because of a government bailout which otherwise would not be. For bank 
regulatory target capital adequacy ratio the Tier 1 capital ratio is used, obtained from 
Bankscope database40. Other variables that are included in the multivariate logit 
model are various ratios that intend to determine banks soundness such as liquidity 
ratio, asset quality ratio and profitability ratio.  
 
5.3.1 Sample summary  
 
In the estimated logit models, pooled cross sectional data was used for a subsample of 
US major banks.  All banks are subject to the regulatory capital ratios, which intend to 
evaluate banks’ capital   strength.  Tier 1 capital was used as a measure of capital 
adequacy ratio. This is the ratio of a bank’s core equity capital to its total risk-
                                                        
40 Tier I capital ratio for Countrywide Financial Corporation for year 2007 is obtained 
from the company’s annual report, SEC filings, Form 10-k.  
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weighted assets. This ratio is considered to be a more reliable measure of the financial 
strength than other numbers used to evaluate a bank. 
 
According to the classification criteria outlined above, there were 18 bank failures out 
of 103 observations (see Table 5.3.1-1). The dummy variable takes the value of one 
for banks that have failed and the value zero if the bank has not failed.  A bank is 
defined as failed in a particular year, when it meets one of the above criteria, and its 
last reported financial ratios were in the previous year.  
 
Table 5.3.1-1: Banks used in the sample  
Failed Banks 
 
Non-failed Banks 
1 Downing Savings US Bancorp 
 
2 Washington Mutual Bank of New York Mellon 
3 Indymac Capital One 
 
4 Wachovia Corp BOKF NA 
 
5 Netbank BancWest Corporation 
6 Bank United Financial 
Corporation 
TD Bank Holding 
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7 National City Corporation PNC Financial Services Group 
8 LaSalle Bank Suntrust 
 
9 Guaranty Bank Valley National Bank 
10 Colonial Bancgroup, Inc US Bank National Association 
11 Countrywide Branch Banking and Trust 
Company 
12 PPF Bank and Trust Key Bank 
 
13 Citigroup HSBC 
 
14 United Commercial Bank Regions Financial Corporation 
15 Bank of America Corp Fifth Third Bancorp 
16 Chevy Chase Bank Wells Fargo 
 
17 Corus Bank Compass Bank 
 
18 AMTrust Huntington 
 
19  Morgan Stanley 
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20  JP Morgan Chase & Co 
Banks that failed during the 2007-2009 period are included in this research.  This 
period was chosen to reflect the large number of bank failures as well the massive 
government financial assistance that banks received to ensure their survival. 
According to the classification criteria, outlined above, there were 18 bank failures 
out of 103 observations, thus the frequency rate for bank failure is around 17 percent 
(Table 5.3.1-2).   The dummy variable takes the value of one for banks that have 
failed and the value zero for banks that have not failed.  A bank is defined as failed in 
a particular year, when it meets one of the above criteria, and its last reported Tier 1 
capital ratio and other ratios were in the previous year.  Due to data limitation, the 
model includes only 103 observations.   
 
Data limitation when analysing bank failures is a recognised obstacle in the literature. 
Aktas et al. (2006) argue that because of data limitation, their analysis was conducted 
over a six year period, 1997-2002, containing 42 observations out of which 19 were 
classified as failed banks and 23 successful. Similarly, Foreman (2002), using a logit 
model to predict the probability of bankruptcy of US firms in the telecommunication 
industry, limited his analysis to 77 observations. This is mainly because not all firms 
disclosed the detailed financial information needed for analysis.  The same problem 
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arises in the analysis of this research, as data for some banks41 that have failed during 
the period under consideration are not available from Bankscope database.  
 
 
Table-5.3.1-2  Sample Summary 
Year of 
failure/non-
failure 
Number of 
non-failed 
banks 
Number of 
failed banks 
% of banks 
that failed 
Total number 
of banks 
2007 36 2 0.05 38 
2008 27 10 0.27 37 
2009 22 6 0.21 28 
Total 85 18 0.17 103 
 
 
The dataset used in this study is a pooled cross-section between 2007 and 2009. An 
individual bank can appear as a separate observation in each sample year.  Data 
contains 103 observations, which includes 38 individual banks. Table 5.3.1-2 
provides the sample summary of the data used in the analysis.   
 
As can be seen from Table 5.3.1-2, in 2007 only two banks are classified as failure; 
namely Netbank and LaSalle Bank.  Netbank, which only operated as an online bank 
was closed by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) in September 2007, and the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was appointed the receiver.  The bank 
as of June 2007, had $2.5 billion in assets and $2.3 billion in total deposits.   ING 
                                                        
41 For example, there is no published data available for Tier I capital ratios for 
Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Sanderson State Bank, Goldman Sachs and other 
banks that failed during the period under consideration  
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Bank acquired  $1.5 billion in deposits and $724 million of Netbank assets (FDIC 
2007).   On the same month,  Bank of America Corp. announced its plans to acquire 
LaSalle Bank from ABN Amro North America Holding Co.  LaSalle at the time was 
one of the biggest US bank holding companies, and had more than $113 billion total 
assets.  
In 2008, 10 banks in the sample are identified as failures. They are the following:  
Washington Mutual, the third largest mortgage lender prior to the crisis, was seized 
by regulators on 26, September 2008.  The mortgage bank reported losses that 
amounted to $6.3 billion in three successive quarters of 2008, due to deterioration of 
the housing market conditions.  A few days prior to its demise, the bank’s credit 
rating was downgraded from BBB to BB.  Following the downgrade, Standard and 
Poor credit rating agency reported that ‘ the bank is operating with adequate capital 
positions from a regulatory perspective and has demonstrated funding resilience as the 
deposit franchise has remained stable’ (Levy 2008). However, Washington Mutual 
was suffering from a run on its deposits, losing up to 9 percent as of September 25, 
2008(Blinder 2013). On the very same day, the OTC and FDIC closed Washington 
Mutual and later sold it JP Morgan & Chase for $1.9 billion (FDIC 2008a).  
 
The decision to close Washington Mutual was in principle governed by the fear that 
the run would spread to other banks. However, two days following its closure, the 
regulatory bodies of the US banking system faced yet another possible imminent bank 
collapse, that of Wachovia.  The bank was the country’s fourth largest bank at the 
time with assets worth more than $800 billion(Alvarez 2010).  Similar to the fate of 
Chapter 5. Capital Adequacy Regulation and Probability of default of U.S. 
banks  
190 
Washington Mutual, Wachovia was facing a run on its deposits.  However, Blinder 
(2013) states that the run was rather ‘silent’, meaning that withdraws were conducted 
through computers rather than lining up at bank branches. Nevertheless, Wachovia 
liquidity was drying up, its stock price was declining sharply and the value of the 
banks’ 10-year bonds dropped by more than 60 percent.42  
At this point the prospects of Wachovia failing were close to being realised, and thus 
the bank was put in the market for sale.  Both Citigroup and Wells Fargo were 
interested in acquiring Wachovia, and submitted their proposals both requiring FDIC 
assistance, albeit different amounts.  Citigroup proposed a deal to regulators in which 
it offered to purchase Wachovia, in exchange for $2.1 billion in the bank’s stock.  
Citigroup was willing to cover the first $42 billion in losses from Wachovia’s loans, 
which amounted to about £316 billion, leaving the FDIC to cover any additional 
losses.   Wells Fargo on the other hand, initially,  offered to cover the first £2 billion 
losses from a much smaller asset pool, of £ 127 billion.  Based on these proposals, 
FDIC decided that Citigroup’s proposal was a better deal for them, since its estimated 
cost were minimal, whereas, the estimated cost the FDIC would have incurred under 
the Wells Fargo’s proposal were between £5.6 billion to $7.2 billion (Blinder 2013).  
Therefore, on 29 September 2008, the FDIC announced that Citigroup was to acquire 
the trouble Wachovia.  However, in a twist of events, the deal with Citigroup broke.  
Wells Fargo made a different proposition to the Fed. This time the bid to acquire 
Wachovia  did not require any federal assistance.  On October 3, Wachovia’s board 
                                                        
42 Blinder (2013) reports that the price of Wachovia’s 10-year bonds dropped form 73 
cent on the dollar to 29 cents   
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decided to accept Wells Fargo deal because it offered $6 per share more than 
Citigroup’s offer.   FDIC announced the agreement on the same day, which resulted 
in Citigroup’s stock dropping by 18 percent (Blinder 2013). The bank had already 
received $25 billion of TARP money in October but its financial position remained 
weak and needed further government assistance.  On 23 November 2008, it was 
announced that the Fed, FDIC and the Treasury had decided to inject a further $20 
billion into Citigroup.  The bailout was arranged under the conditions that the 
government would purchase $27 billion of preferred stock on which Citigroup was 
liable to pay an 8 per cent dividend. Furthermore, Citigroup would absorb the first 
$29 billion in losses on the $306 billion portfolio, plus 10 per cent on any potential 
losses.  The rest was left to the FDIC, the FED and the Treasury to absorb.   
 
Another bank that was still struggling for survival even after receiving $25 billion 
TARP funds in October 2008 was Bank of America Corporation, the saviour of 
Merrill Lynch.  In December 2008, the Fed and the Treasury were informed that Bank 
of America was in trouble due to the mounting losses of Merrill Lynch.  In mid 
January 2009, the bank received a further $20 billion of TARP money, on nearly the 
same condition as the Citigroup’s bailout.  CNN Money reports that regulators agreed 
to inject capital in return for preferred stock carrying an 8 per cent dividend (Goldman 
et al 2009).  However, the pool of toxic assets that were guaranteed by the 
government totalled $118 billion, a much smaller amount of Citigroup’s pool of 
portfolio assets.  Bank of America was liable to absorb the first $10 billion and a 
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further 10 per cent on any additional losses, leaving the Treasury and the FDIC to 
absorb the rest.  
 
The demise of IndyMac in 2008 was considered at the time the third largest bank 
failure in the US history43.  In the summer of 2008, the weak financial position of the 
mortgage bank was pinpointed by Senator Charles Schumer. The senator expressed 
his worries over the troubled bank in a letter addressed to regulators.  In the days that 
followed the bank experienced a run on its deposits. A total of   £1.3 billion deposits 
were withdraws 11 days after the fears over its solvency were raised by the senator 
(Paletta and Enrich 2008). IndyMac was seized by federal regulation in July 2008. 
The FDIC temporarily ran the bank, under a new name, IndyMac Federal Bank, FSB,  
until it sold it to OneWest Bank, FSB in March 2009 (FDIC 2009a).  
 
BankUnited Financial Corporation, the parent company of BankUnited FSB, the 
largest bank headquartered in Florida, raised fears of being on the verge of collapse, 
after failing to comply with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
mandatory rules in disclosing their fiscal accounts for 2008.  The company also 
received notification from Nasdaq Stock Market, indicating that the inability to file its 
accounts on time threatened its continued listing.  BankUnited company was expected 
to have suffered losses of at least $327 million, in the last quarter of 2008 alone 
(Hielscher 2008). In March 2009 it filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy (Gale 2009).  
                                                        
43 The failure of Continental Illinois in 1984, with assets worth $40 billion was 
considered the largest failure in US history, followed by the collapse of the American 
Saving & Loan Association in 1988.  
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Because its last available accounts are in 2007, and because of the actual distress the 
bank experienced in 2008, its failure is recorded in 2008 in the sample data used in 
this research.  
Downey Savings &Loan after suffering major losses in late 2007 and early 2008, 
failed on November of the same year.  FDIC announced that U.S. Bank, National 
Association acquired all Downey Savings assets worth $12.8 billion as of September 
30, 2008.  In November 2008, U.S. National Association also purchased PFF Bank 
and Trust, which was closed by regulators on the same month (FDIC 2008b) .  
Countrywide Financial Corporation the largest US mortgage lender at the time was 
rescued by the Bank of America in January 2008. The rescue came after the giant 
mortgage lender run into financial difficulties and lost substantial market value, as 
economic conditions in the mortgage market worsened.  Bank of America agreed to 
purchase the company for around $4 billion (Mildenberg 2008) 
 
National City Corporation sold First Franklin, one the country’s main subprime 
lenders, to Merrill Lynch in 2006.   Since then the bank experienced major financial 
difficulties and in 2008 applied for federal bailout funds but was rejected (Engel and 
McCoy 2011).  In October of the same year National City Corporation was acquired 
by the PNC Financial Services Group. 
 
Capital One Financial Corp. announced in December 2008 the purchase of Chevy 
Chase for $445 million in cash and $75 million in stock (Dealbook 2008).  
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In August 2009, the OFS closed Guaranty Bank, and its receiver FDIC immediately 
arranged its sale to Spanish bank BBVA Compass. As of June 2009, the bank had 
assets of around $13 billion out of which BBVA Compass purchased $12 billion, the 
remaining assets were held by FDIC (FDIC 2009b). On the same month, August 
2009, Colonial BancGroup filed for bankruptcy Chapter 11 after its banking units was 
closed by the Alabama State Banking Department, naming the FDIC its’ receiver.  
FDIC then quickly facilitated its sale to Branch Banking and trust (BB&T) (FDIC 
2009c).  
 
The 120th bank failure in 2009 was United Commercial Bank, which was seized by 
federal regulators in early November that year (Campbell 2009).  FDIC announced 
later that East West Bancorp acquired all the United Commercial’s deposits.  
 
Corus Bank was seized by the government in September 2009, and was immediately 
sold to MB Financial Bank.  In December of the same year, the OTS closed AMTrust 
bank, and was later sold to New York Community Bank (FDIC 2009d).  
 
5.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 As in Bunn and Redwood44 (2003) the explanatory variable, Tier I capital ratio, is 
obtained from bank reported accounts in the year preceding the year of non-failure 
                                                        
44 Although they estimate a probit model to examine the determinant of failure of both 
individual public and private UK’s companies, the same methodology can be applied 
to the  logit model as the only difference  between the two models is that the probit 
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/failure, since it is not always possible to obtain data for the year in which banks have 
defaulted.  Table 5.3.2.1 presents summary statistics for the Tier I capital ratio 
variable for all banks. Banks included in the sample are divided into two groups, 
failed and non-failed, and the t-test of the mean is calculated.  
 
Table 5.3.2-1:  Tier I ratio variable mean used in the sample  
 All banks Failed Non-Failed Difference 
in Mean 
T-test on 
the 
difference 
Tier I 
capital ratio 
9.034 9.934 8.842 -1.096 -1.667*** 
Size45  0.601 0.388 0.647 0.258 2.054** 
Net interest 
margin ratio  
3.093 2.748 3.166 0.418 1.860*** 
Asset 
quality ratio  
0.008 1.585 0.629 -0.955 -3.356* 
Liquidity 
ratio  
15.66 15.321 15.741 0.419 0.087 
Unweighted 
capital ratio  
9.626 7.793 10.015 2.221 0.009* 
*, **, *** Represents significant the 1%, 5% and 10 % level, respectively 
 
The mean Tier I capital ratio of banks that failed is 9.93 which is higher than 8.84 the 
mean of banks that survived. The t-test mean difference is significant at a 10 percent 
level, hence the null hypothesis of equal difference in mean is rejected.  Put 
differently, the mean of Tier I capital ratio of failed banks is different from that of 
non-failed banks. The mean of big sized banks that failed is lower than the mean of 
                                                                                                                                                              
model uses the cumulative  standard normal distribution whereas the logit model 
assumes the cumulative standard  logistic  distribution 
45 Because this is a dummy variable, its’ mean is the proportion of big sized banks  
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big sized banks that did not fail. This implies that bigger banks are less likely to fail. 
Non-failed banks have a significant lower mean asset quality ratio and higher 
significant net interest margin ratio.  The mean of the liquidity ratio of failed banks is 
slightly lower than the non-failed banks, but not statistically significant.   
 
5.4 Results  
5.4.1 The simple logit model 
 
The simple logit model estimates the probability of bank failure as a function of Tier I 
capital ratio.  Two year dummies are included in the model to allow the intercept to 
differ across years.46   A further dummy variable is added to the model to account for 
different bank sizes in the data sample. Banks with assets over $100 billion are 
considered ‘big’ and the dummy variable takes the value of 1. Those banks with fewer 
assets than $100 billion are considered ‘small-medium’ sized and the dummy variable 
takes the value zero.  
The results of the estimated logit regression47   are  presented below:  
 
Table 5.4.1-1.  Results of the Logit model  
                                                        
46 The year dummy variable is included to reflect that the population may be different 
for different years. 2007 was taken as the reference year. 
47 The Pearson X2 goodness of fit test used reveals that the number of covariate patters 
is the same as the number of observations therefore the Hosmer and Lemeshow 
goodness of fit test with 10 groups is used. The Homser and Lemeshow goodness of 
fit, obtained by calculating the percentiles of the estimates probabilities, shows that 
the model fits the data reasonably well. The output of the test are as follows: X2 (8)= 
5.84, prob>X2= 0.66  (See Appendix 3) 
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 Coefficient Robust SE48 Marginal effect49 
Tier I capital ratio 0.165** 0.084 0.018 
Size (big) -1.098** 0.536 -0.132 
Year dummy: 
2008 
2.127** 0.944 0.296 
Year dummy: 
2009 
1.840** 0.964 0.273 
Constant -4.044 1.381  
Number of observations=103; Wald Χ2(4)= 11.71; p>  Χ2=0.019; pseudo R2=0.153 ; log-
likelihood= -40.3852 
*, **, *** Correspond to the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively 
 
 
 
The sign of the capital adequacy ratio coefficient reveals a positive relationship 
between the probability of default and Tier I capital ratio.  This relationship indicates 
that banks with higher Tier I capital ratio have a higher probability of default.  This 
leads to the acceptance of the hypothesis of this research that the higher the Tier 1 
capital ratio the higher the probability of default.  As stated above, the sign of the 
coefficient in a logit model gives only the direction of the relationship between the 
Tier I capital ratio and the probability of banks default. Therefore to interpret the 
magnitude of the coefficient the marginal effect of the estimated Tier I capital ratio 
                                                        
48 Because the data is pooled and some individual banks appear as a separate 
observation in each sample year, the analysis uses cluster standard errors at the bank 
level, in order to allow correlation between the error term of the same bank but not 
between banks.  
49  The marginal effects are calculated at the sample mean for each variable. The 
marginal effect for continuous variables measures the change in predicted probability 
given a small change in that explanatory variable.  For dummy variables the marginal 
effect shows how the predicted probability of failure changes as the variable changes 
from zero to one, holding other variables at their means.  
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coefficient is calculated. As can be seen from Table 5.4.1-1, the marginal effect 
associated with the Tier I capital ratio implies that a one percentage increase in Tier I 
capital ratio increases the probability of a bank default in the next year by 1.8 
percentage points.  The coefficient associated with bank size is negative and 
significant at the 5 percent significance level.  This implies that big banks are less 
likely to fail than the small-medium asset size banks.  The year dummies are both 
significant at the 5 percent level. The coefficient of 2008-year dummy is significantly 
high at 0.29, implying that in this year the probability of bank default substantially 
higher than the year 2007.  Similarly the coefficient associated with the 2009 dummy 
variable is positive and high.  These results indicate that both these coefficient capture 
additional factors not explained by the explanatory variables in the estimated model.  
 
As a measure of accuracy in the ability of the model to correctly predict the depended 
variable the estimated probability is compared with actual bank failures50.  In other 
words this would show the degree to which predictions are in line with the data.  
To define a particular bank as failure or non- failure one needs to define the threshold 
value or cutoff probability.  Therefore, if the predicted probability of a particular bank 
is equal or exceeds the cuttoff point, the bank is classified as predicted to fail and thus 
the binary variable takes the value of one.  In contrast, if the predicted probability is 
less than the cutoff point the bank is classified as non-failure.  The most widely used 
threshold value is 0.5.  However, Wooldridge (2009) argues that this classification 
                                                        
50 Because real probabilities are unattainable the actual bank failures are used as a 
measure to compare it with the estimated probability  
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rule has been heavily criticised by researchers, because the observed proportion of an 
outcome may not always be 50 percent. As an alternative approach in choosing an 
appropriate cutoff point, the share of failures in the sample data can be used.  For 
example in this study the fraction of non-failed banks is approximately 17 percent 
(see Table 5.3.1.2).   
 
Another way to determine the optimal cutoff point is obtained by plotting sensitivity 
and specificity against the predicted probabilities. The point of intersection between 
the sensitivity and specificity is said to yield the optimal cutoff point that correctly 
classifies failed and non-failed banks.  Applying this methodology in this paper, the 
graph shows that sensitivity and specificity intersect at around 0.17, which is the same 
as the fraction of bank failure in the sample (see Table 5.3.1-2). Therefore this value 
could be used as the optimal cut off point.  This threshold point is used here because it 
yields better prediction results51 that the traditional alternative method (the default 
cutoff point of 0.5) explained above.  The results are presented in Table 5.4.1-2.  
 
Table 5.4.1-2  Model predicting accuracy  
Classified Failed Non-failed Total 
Failed 12 30 42 
Non-failed 6 55 61 
Total 18 85 103 
    
Sensitivity p(+failed) 66.67%  
Specificity p(-non-failed) 64.71%  
                                                        
51 The overall classification of the model at a 0.5 cutoff point is approximately 83 
percent with a sensitivity of 11.11 percent and specificity of 98.82 percent therefore 
increasing Type I error. 
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Correctly classified  65.05%  
 
 
 
The results indicate that the model’s overall accuracy of prediction is 65.05 percent. 
This means that it has correctly classified 65.05 percent of the observations.  The 
model failed to accurately predict 6 of the 18 failed banks, a sensitivity52 of 66.67 
percent and mistakenly predicted 30 of the 85 sound banks as failure, a specificity53 of 
64.71 percent.   
 
Another measure used in the literature to assess the accuracy of predictions is the area 
under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve. The ROC curve plots the 
sensitivity against 1 minus specificity at different cutoff points. The 1 minus 
specificity is the proportion of banks misclassified as failure.  
 
Applying the same reasoning as Peng and So (2002), the obtained ROC curve for the 
model developed in this thesis, suggests that in order for the logit model to correctly 
classify a large proportion of failed banks, for example 75 percent of banks, it has to 
misclassify nearly 25 percent of non failed banks as failed.  Peng and So (2002) also 
argue that the trade off between a higher sensitivity and a lower 1 minus specificity is 
key in choosing the best model. The area under the ROC curve, which varies between 
0.5 and 1, is of interest to researchers and it shows the overall measure of predictive 
                                                        
52 Sensitivity refers to the share of banks that have failed that are correctly specified  
53 Specificity is the percentage of non-failed banks that are correctly classified.  
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power.  So for a model to have some predictive power the area under the ROC curve 
has to be greater than 0.5.  
Figure 5.4.1-1 Area under receiver ROC  
 
 
For the logit model presented here, the area under the ROC curve for is 0.7627, 
shown in Figure 5.3.1-1. According to Lemeshow and Hosmer (2004) a value 
between 0.7 and 0.8 is considered acceptable level of discrimination between banks 
that have failed and have not failed.   
 
5.4.2 Results for the multivariate logit model  
 
Despite the evidence provided by Jagtiani et al (2003) and Estrella et all (2000), that   
a simple EWS model with Tier 1 as the sole explanatory variable, performs better 
than a complex EWS model using various financial variables to predict bank 
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probability of default, the latter model is most commonly used by the literature. This 
paper estimates both a simple logit model presented above, and a multivariate logit 
model, in an attempt to find a model with the highest predictability accuracy.  In such 
attempt, the analysis here adds three additional financial variables 54to the previous 
model.  Furthermore the unweighted capital ratio, equity to total assets, is included in 
the model.  
 
The net interest margin ratio is used as a proxy for profitability.  The relationship 
between this ratio and the probability of default is expected to be negative, so the 
higher the profitability ratio the lower the probability of bank default. The ratio of 
liquid assets to deposits and short-term funding is used as a proxy for liquidity ratio 
and it intends to gauge the ability of banks to meet customer deposits and short term 
funding in the event of sudden large withdrawals.  The higher the ratio of liquid assets 
to customer deposits and short term funding the more liquid a bank is supposed to be, 
hence the lower the probability of default. As a measure of banks’ asset quality the 
net charge-off and average gross loans ratio is used. The ratio intends to measure the 
percentage of bad loans that is not recoverable. The lower this ratio is the lower the 
probability of banks’ defaults.  
The results of the multivariate logit model are presented below:  
 
Table 5.4.2-1 Results of the multivariate logit model 
 
                                                        
54 The analysis has made use of all the financial ratios available from Bankscope 
database.    
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The sign and marginal effect of the Tier 1 coefficient is similar to the simple logit 
model; positive and significant.  The negative sign of the net margin interest ratio is 
as expected and significant at the 5 percent significance level. These results imply that 
an increase in net margin interest ratio reduces the probability of bank failure by 10 
percent.  Similarly, the higher the liquidity ratio the less likely a bank is to fail. An 
increase in the liquidity ratio reduces the probability of default in the following year 
by 0.3 percentage points.  Whereas in relation to the asset quality ratio, the higher the 
net off-charge to average gross loan ratio the higher the probability of failure. A one 
percent increase in the asset quality ratio increases the probability of default by 12 
percent.  The coefficients associated with the year dummies are not statistically 
significant in this model. This indicates that after controlling for, Tier 1, liquidity, 
asset quality and net interest rate margin ratios, there are no additional factors that 
 Coefficient Robust SE Marginal effect 
Tier I capital 
ratio 
0.181** 0.095 0.015 
Net Interest 
margin 
-0.7833*** 0.433 -0.068 
Liquidity ratio -0.036* 0.015 -0.003 
Asset quality 1.174* 0.424 0.102 
Unweighted 
capital ratio 
-0.317* 0.123 -0.027 
Year dummy: 
2008 
1.925** 1.012 0.218 
Year dummy: 
2009 
-0.544 2.024 -0.064 
Number of observations=101 ; Wald Χ2(6)= 24.79; p>  Χ2=0.0008; pseudo 
R2=0.328 ; log-likelihood= -31.801 
*, **, *** Correspond to the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively 
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affect the probability of bank default. The coefficient associated with unweighted 
capital ratio is negative and significant. This implies that a one percentage point 
increase in unweighted capital ratio reduces the probability of default by 2.7 
percentage points. The findings here are to some extent paradox. The two capital 
ratios, the risk-weighted and unweighted capital ratio, are both significant but have 
opposite signs. In other words the higher the risk-weighted capital ratio the higher the 
probability of default and the higher the unweighted capital ratio the lower the 
probability of default.  
The above relationships can be best summarised as follows 
 
PDit = α1.(E/TA)it+ α2.(Tier 1/RWA)it + Ω Xit + uit 
Where:  
PD is the probability of default  
E is a  bank’s equity  
Tier 1 is Tier 1 capital  
TA is bank’s total assets  
RWA is risk weighted assets  
Ω is a matrix coefficient  
X is a vector of all other variables included in the multivariate model estimated above 
 
 
Focusing only on the two coefficients associated with unweighted capital ratio and  
Tier 1 risk-weighted capital ratio,  α1 and α2,  the estimated results indicate that α1 >0 
and α2 <0, respectively. This says that the coefficient associated with unweighted 
risk capital ratio is negative and hence smaller than 0. Whereas the coefficient 
associated with risk-weighted capital ratios is positive, and thus greater than 0.  
In an attempt to explain such paradox results the focus is given to the way the 
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two capital ratios are constructed.  Assuming the numerators to be the same in 
both ratios the denominators are further elaborated. This is because in effect 
Tier 1 capital and Equity can be taken to be common to both ratios. However the 
denominators are constructed differently.  The difference between them consists 
in that TA contains all assets at book value and RWA is equal to TA minus risk-
free assets, and a proportion of all other assets proportionate to the estimated 
risk in their asset class.  A possible explanation is that true risk is in inverse to 
estimated risk. This on the other hand suggests that many experts have 
estimated risk wrongly and consistently.  
 
A more likely explanation may be found by understanding the market process 
that would give rise to such paradox results. The conventional risk-weighting 
approach presumes that risk is intrinsic to particular asset categories distinct 
probability of default on payment to the bank holding them. Such ‘risky’ assets 
therefore have their liquidity permanently reduced (a bank holding them must 
set aside capital against the risk that is supposed to be inherent in the assets). 
The risk here is the risk of insolvency.  
 
However this ignores the risk of illiquidity in the capital market.   The assets that 
would be more vulnerable to this kind of risk are more likely to be risk-free 
assets, which are traded more commonly in the capital market. They are 
therefore more vulnerable to a fall in the liquidity of the capital market.  Such a 
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fall would arise, according to the capital market inflation theory, if liquidity is 
taken out of the market, with outflows being greater than inflows into the capital 
market.  The fall in liquidity would affect the value of ‘risk-free’ asset more than 
the value of risky assets, whose markets have less liquidity in any case.  
Consider the situation of a bank with a given amount of capital and a given 
amount of assets distributed in a given way across different risk categories. A 
shift of its asset portfolio towards more risky assets, shifting away from ‘risk-
free’ assets, would reduce its Tier 1/ RWA ratio, but would also reduce the 
bank’s vulnerability to illiquidity in the markets for safe assets. Whereas a shift 
of its asset portfolio towards ‘risk-free’ assets would increase its Tier 1 
capital/RWA ratio but would also increase its vulnerability to illiquidity in the 
market for safe assets. Thus the results can be explained by the risk of illiquidity 
in the capital market, a risk that is not taken into account in the regulatory 
capital ratios.  
 
Looking at the prediction accuracy of the multivariate logit model, it is evident that 
this model works better than the simple logit model (table 5.4.2-2).  
 
Table 5.4.2-2 Predictability accuracy of the multivariate logit model 
Classified Failed Non-failed Total 
Failed 13 18 31 
Non-failed 5 66 70 
Total 18 83 101 
    
Sensitivity p(+failed) 78.31%  
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Specificity p(-non-failed) 72.22%  
Correctly classified  77.23%  
 
 
Using the same threshold value, 0.17,  as previously,  the model’s accuracy of 
prediction is 76.24 percent. The multivariate model fails to predict 5 of the 18 failed 
banks and mistakenly predicts 18 of the 83 healthy banks.  
Figure 5.2.1-2 Area under receiver ROC-multivariate logit model  
 
 
The above graph (Figure 5.2.1-2) shows the area under the curve (AUC) for the 
multivariate model, which is 0.848155.  As discussed above, according to Lemeshow 
and Hosmer (2004) a level between 0.7 and 0.8 is considered acceptable 
                                                        
55 See Appendix 4 for more details on the results and the tests carried out for the multivariate 
logit model  
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discrimination. However, in this case the AUC is slightly higher than 0.8, which 
makes it excellent discrimination.  This provides evidence that in this analysis the 
multivariate logit model works better than the simple model in predicting bank 
failure.  
 
5.5 Implications  
 
The empirical results presented in this chapter imply that banks with higher Tier I 
capital ratios have a higher probability of default.  The use of Tier I capital ratio as the 
main predictor of the probability of default was chosen to better capture the effect of 
such regulation on the capital markets, and thus on the rest of the economy.  Even 
though the elements of Tier I capital ratios are mainly shareholder’s equity and 
retained earnings, this analysis assumes that banks adjust to higher capital standards 
by means of issuing equity.  The analysis has also incorporated other financial ratios 
as potential factors in determining the probability of defaults. All these variables are 
found to have significant power in determining the likelihood of banks’ failure.  
However, the main variable of interest to the analysis has been the Tier I capital ratio 
which supports the assumptions of this thesis. The results not only validate the 
assumptions of the capital market inflation theory, but also implicitly stress the 
consequences of these requirements on the rest of the economy, which can be far-
reaching.  The point of the argument is that forcing banks to maintain higher risk-
weighted capital ratios not only does not make them safer; on the contrary it increases 
their probability of default, crowds out private investment which further damages the 
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economy and concentrates risk in the shadow banking system.  Furthermore the 
findings of this chapter suggest that the higher the unweighed capital ratios the lower 
the probability of default. The implication of such paradox results is that the current 
risk-weighted capital requirements only account for risk of insolvency.  There is 
however a more important risk that needs to be taken into accounts, that of liquidity in 
the capital market which explains the negative relationship between the simple  
unweighted capital ratios and the probability of banks default.  
 
As explained above, most banks on the verge of collapse can be rescued by 
governments.  Thus, even though bank failure, in itself, could indeed have major 
consequences for the functioning of the economy, governments to some extend lessen 
their negative impact by means of providing funds so they continue to operate and 
also by providing 100 percent insurance to their depositors. However, inadequate 
productive investment in the economy, conducted by non-financial corporations, 
proves to be a very hard disease to cure.  The low levels of fixed capital formations 
have raised concerns over the last few years in the US.  Smithers (2014) argues that 
US corporations’ debt levels have increased whilst their capital investment remains 
very low in proportion to the cash flow.   The implications of the reduced levels of 
productive investment by US non-financial corporations in the US could be a 
contributing factor in the slow recuperating process of a struggling economy. In fact, 
the importance and the role of productive investment by corporations have also been 
evident in the Japanese economy during the 1990s, that is further examined in the 
next chapter.  
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5.6 Data Appendix  
 
Table 5.6   Data used  to estimate the logit model(s) in Chapter 5  
 
Tier I Banks 
Asset 
quality  
Interest 
margin 
Liquidity 
ratio 
Unweighted 
capital ratio 
(equity/total 
assets) 
 
17.6 Downey Savings 0.01 3.3 1.02 9.25 
2007 8.96 Washington Mutual 0.34 3.02 4.6 9.34 
2007 11.35 Indymac 0.08 2.33 7.52 6.88 
2007 7.92 Netbank 0.39 2.56 22.96 6.62 
2007 7.42 Wachovia 0.11 2.9 14.59 10.3 
2007 9.93 Guaranty bank 0.1 2.73 3.84 6.74 
2007 9.09 Colonial bancgroup 0.11 3.79 5.81 9.03 
2007 11.6 Countrywide 0.15 1.79 44.46 7.16 
2007 13.8 
Bankunited financial 
corporation 0 2.13 0.93 5.55 
2007 8.95 Wells Fargo 0.64 4.93 8.07 9.52 
2007 8.59 Citigroup 1.16 2.59 52.81 6.36 
2007 8.7 JP Morgan Chase & co 0.67 1.97 62.29 8.57 
2007 8.64 Bank of America  0.71 2.98 30.26 9.27 
2007 8.97 National City Corporation 0.4 3.7 5.39 10.4 
2007 9.19 Chevy Chase bank -0.05 3.73 4.99 6.77 
2007 8.8 US Bancorp 0.38 3.72 5.69 9.67 
2007 8.28 Bank of New York Mellon 0.12 1.79 37.94 10.32 
2007 10.22 Capital One Financial corp 1.66 5.19 5.11 16.85 
2007 8.58 BOFK  0.07 2.45 8.44 6.68 
2007 4.19 Bancwest corp 0.17 3.34 6.7 10.93 
2007 8.43 TD bank holding 0.18 4.6 10.88 20.8 
2007 10.43 PNC financial 0.27 2.8 12.95 11.46 
2007 7.72 Suntrust banks 0.19 2.93 5.76 10.3 
2007 9.63 Valley national bank 0.12 3.61 4.28 8.57 
2007 6.52 US bank 0.37 3.74 7.38 10.18 
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2007 9.21 Branch Banking and Trust  0.19 4.18 4.44 10.85 
2007 6.87 Key bank 0.24 3.69 4.93 9.04 
2007 8.38 HSBS USA bank  0.85 2.25 37.51 7.4 
2007 8.07 Regions Financial corp 0.18 3.46 5.56 14.44 
2007 8.39 Fifth Third bancorp 0.43 3.19 3.97 9.96 
2007 9.38 Morgan Stanley 
 
2.22 54.47 13.37 
2007 7.87 Compass bank 0.34 3.85 3.22 8.92 
2007 6.47 Huntington 0.31 3.34 5.98 7.34 
2007 9.85 LaSalle bank 0.08 3.27 8.77 9.67 
2007 10.4 AmTrust 0.09 2.98 0.98 7.25 
2007 9.67 United commercial bank 0.16 3.24 6.34 9.71 
2007 12.99 Corus bank 0.03 4.09 5.01 9.87 
2007 10.25 PFF bank 0 4.18 2.02 8.72 
2008 18.1 Downey Savings 0.58 3.04 0.85 10.72 
2008 8.92 Washington Mutual 0.83 3.06 2.59 9.27 
2008 9.56 Indymac 0.26 2.09 10.02 5.61 
2008 7.35 Wachovia 0.21 2.83 13.92 10.25 
2008 9.63 Guaranty bank -0.03 2.7 2.94 6.69 
2008 8.22 Colonial bancgroup 0.31 3.5 13.73 9.88 
2008 11.8 Countrywide 0.64 1.67 40.23 6.92 
2008 14.6 
Bankunited financial 
corporation 0.08 2.33 7.09 5.4 
2008 7.59 Wells Fargo 0.93 4.71 4.31 8.28 
2008 7.12 Citigroup 1.43 2.59 58.58 5.19 
2008 8.4 JP Morgan Chase & co 0.91 2.1 65.41 7.89 
2008 6.87 Bank of America  0.8 2.58 28.41 8.56 
2008 6.53 National City Corporation 0.58 3.46 3.18 8.92 
2008 8.86 Chevy Chase bank 0.07 3.69 4.75 6.55 
2008 8.3 US Bancorp 0.52 3.48 5.42 8.86 
2008 8.24 Bank of New York Mellon 0.14 1.92 45.97 7.89 
2008 10.13 Capital One Financial corp 1.88 5.36 5.48 16.13 
2008 7.83 BOFK  0.19 2.42 11.89 6.28 
2008 4.55 Bancwest corp 0.3 3.1 6.41 10.56 
2008 12.19 TD bank holding 0.31 4.98 14.78 17.73 
2008 6.79 PNC financial 0.32 2.93 12.33 11.88 
2008 6.93 Suntrust banks 0.32 2.97 12.01 10.11 
2008 9.28 Valley national bank 0.14 3.5 10.2 8.49 
2008 6.48 US bank 0.5 3.52 7.65 9.77 
2008 8.76 Branch Banking and Trust  0.24 3.49 3.05 10.73 
2008 6.67 Key bank 0.38 3.49 5.85 8.82 
2008 7.2 HSBS USA bank  1.09 2.22 43.33 6.26 
2008 7.29 Regions Financial corp 0.28 3.73 5.51 14.06 
2008 7.72 Fifth Third bancorp 0.58 3.28 3.38 8.26 
2008 6.96 Morgan Stanley 
 
1.98 60.54 8.97 
2008 6.57 Compass bank 0.13 1.28 3.34 22.29 
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2008 6.64 Huntington 1.48 3.39 8.08 11.5 
2008 9.77 LaSalle bank -0.01 0.86 16.47 20.11 
2008 11.27 AmTrust 0.59 2.48 0.83 7.66 
2008 8.59 United commercial bank 0.13 3.37 5.41 10.58 
2008 13.5 Corus bank 0.94 3.37 8.52 10.71 
2008 10.5 PFF bank 1.3 3.63 1.83 8.64 
2009 8.45 Guaranty bank 1.67 2.46 1.89 4.66 
2009 8.58 Colonial bancgroup 3.77 2.89 18.04 6.35 
2009 7.84 Wells Fargo 1.21 3.08 9.85 7.81 
2009 11.92 Citigroup 2.58 2.97 54.89 7.31 
2009 10.9 JP Morgan Chase & co 1.55 2.38 52.15 7.67 
2009 9.15 Bank of America  1.73 3.04 22.8 9.74 
2009 8.48 Chevy Chase bank 1.68 3.2 9.4 6.17 
2009 10.6 US Bancorp 1.05 3.65 3.55 9.89 
2009 11.26 Bank of New York Mellon 0.19 1.85 65.14 6.01 
2009 13.76 Capital One Financial corp 3.42 5.62 6.55 16.04 
2009 7.96 BOFK  0.89 3.05 11.23 5.37 
2009 4.74 Bancwest corp 0.8 3.13 8.02 9.68 
2009 -1.54 TD bank holding 0.69 4.01 15.15 9.45 
2009 9.59 PNC financial 0.43 2.12 13.13 9.5 
2009 10.87 Suntrust banks 1.19 2.91 13.11 11.89 
2009 8.91 Valley national bank 0.21 3.55 5.66 8.53 
2009 6.56 US bank 1.03 3.67 6.31 8.73 
2009 10.8 Branch Banking and Trust  0.68 3.3 2.94 11.19 
2009 7.83 Key bank 1.65 2.83 10.5 9.47 
2009 7.5 HSBS USA bank  1.76 2.81 43.44 6.98 
2009 10.38 Regions Financial corp 1.59 3.16 11.27 11.5 
2009 10.59 Fifth Third bancorp 3.19 3.51 4.42 10.08 
2009 12.92 Morgan Stanley 0.23 1.12 86.77 10.01 
2009 7.41 Compass bank 0.92 4.4 3.52 20.39 
2009 6.45 Huntington 1.17 3.42 3.61 10.91 
2009 8.7 AmTrust 5.12 2.35 21.49 5.71 
2009 11.93 United commercial bank 1.36 3.08 7.49 11.98 
2009 10.99 Corus bank 8.44 1.43 29.31 8.08 
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Chapter 6.  The Probability of Bank Default – The Case of 
Japan  
 
This chapter provides empirical evidence on the impact of capital adequacy regulation 
on the probabilities of default of Japanese banks, using the same methodology as in 
chapter 5. However, contrary to the time period chosen for the US banking sector, that 
of 2007-2009 which is associated with Basel II Accord, for Japan the period between 
1998-2000, during which Basel I capital requirements were in place, is chosen to 
empirically evaluate such impact on the Japanese banking sector.  This time period is 
chosen to reflect the large number of bank failures associated with the Japanese 
banking sector at the time, discussed in detail in section 6.2 of this chapter. Section 
6.3 discusses the empirical results which, as in the case of US, indicate that banks 
with a higher Tier I capital ratios have a higher probability of default. Section 6.4 
concludes.  
 
6.1  Probability of bank default- the case of Japan  
 
The 2007-2008 US banking crisis serves as a warning that such a crisis can be 
inevitable even for a (perceived) healthy and sophisticated financial system.   The 
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1990s Japanese banking crisis and its aftermath, however, serves as a lesson that the 
costs of having such crises can be so considerable as to cause the economy to remain 
stagnant for years, as in the case of Japan.  Prior to the bubble burst, the Japanese 
economy was characterised by a period of high economic growth, dubbed ‘miracle’ 
economic growth in the period from mid 1953 to early 1973.  After the occupation 
period ended, Japan’s economy growth rate was at the average with the rest of the 
world, but it soon became one of the highest growth economies, averaging 10 percent 
growth per year. During the early 1970s its growth rated slowed, to an average of 4 
percent per annum, but was still considered the highest amongst other advanced 
economies. In the late 1980s Japanese banks were considered to be among the 
strongest in the world. In 1988, seven Japanese banks were ranked among the world’s 
top ten largest banks by assets (Hoshi 2001). However, in the aftermath of its stock 
market crash in 1989, the Japanese economy entered a prolong slump from which it 
has yet to fully recover. The slowdown in economic growth and the onset of asset 
price deflation had a significant negative impact on the health of Japanese banks and 
other financial institutions. In the years that followed the stock market crash, the 
soundness of the Japanese banking system weakened, culminating in 1997 with the 
spectacular failures of several highly important financial institutions. The large 
number of banks failures occurred despite the then newly introduced Basel I capital 
requirements. As explained earlier, Basel I was introduced in 1988 and was fully 
implemented in Japan in March 199356.  
 
                                                        
56 The end of fiscal year 1992, in Japan 
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Judging just on the number of bank failures the country experienced during the 1990s 
and early 2000s one can easily reject the notion of the Basel capital requirements 
aiming to make banks more secure. Furthermore the research in this thesis provides 
empirical evidence that does not support the capital regulatory standards, arguing that 
under conditions of capital market deflation requiring banks to hold higher capital 
ratios makes them more prone to failure.  
 
After more than a decade of repeated failures and poor performances Japanese banks 
now not only seem to have recovered but also are trying regain their position at the 
international level.   The Economist in 2011 published an article about Japanese 
banks, titled ‘Back from the dead’, where it is argued that not only the country’s three 
main banks are amongst top 30 largest banks in the world, by assets, but also how 
these banks used the crisis in their favour by expanding internationally in countries 
such US, Europe and Asia (see below)(The Economist 2011a).  Nevertheless, in terms 
of economic (growth) performance Japan still has yet to recover fully. Following a 
slight expansion in mid 2000s, the global financial crisis and the Tahoku Earthquake 
and Tsunami of 2011 brought yet more obstacles in achieving sustainable growth.  
Lipscy and Takinami (2013), note that in nominal terms Japan’s GDP has remained 
the same in two decades. In 1991 Japanese nominal GDP was recorded to have been 
470 trillion yen and in 2012 this figure was nearly the same totalling 471 trillion yen.  
 
This chapter makes use of the same empirical and methodology framework as the 
previous one. Using the capital market inflation theory the probability of bank default 
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is estimated using Tier I capital ratio as the sole predictor. A simple logit model is 
estimated on a pool cross sectional data for the period 1998-2000.   
 
As discussed in chapter 3, even though this thesis find no explicit evidence of the 
capital market inflation since 1990, the empirical predictions on the relationship 
between Japan’s central bank stock purchases and Nikkei stock price movement 
indicate that the capital market inflation still holds. Furthermore, the arguments 
presented below and elsewhere in the literature are sufficient to conclude that 
inflation has been a phenomenon in the country’s capital market prior to the period 
under consideration57.  
 
Analysing the Japanese banks probability of default during the 1990s financial crisis 
is perhaps more revealing than the case of US or any other country. That is mainly for 
two reasons. The first reason is the timing of both the financial crisis and the 
introduction of capital requirements that occurred during the 1990s. In the aftermath 
of the financial crisis, banks were under major pressure to meet the regulatory capital 
standards in deteriorating market conditions. As argued below, the introduction of the 
Basel capital requirements had a huge negative impact on Japanese banks. For 
example, Peek and Rosengren (1999) argue that most international active Japanese 
banks, such as Daiwa, Yasuda Trust, Mitsui Trust and Nippon Credit Bank, in the 
1990s announced plans to close their overseas operations as a consequence of the 
                                                        
57 And during banks capital adjustment process in meeting the Basel regulatory 
standards which began in 1988. 
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difficulties they faced to comply with the international capital requirements. 
Operating only as domestic banks allowed them to hold lower capital ratios. One 
interesting fact about these banks is that, following their decision to close 
international operations, all of them either failed, or were rescued by the government, 
or were forced to merge with another bank (as explained below). Shimizu (2007), on 
the other hand argues that the Basel regulatory framework failed to take into account 
the conditions of the Japanese financial market. He states that ‘when, however, some 
macro shocks emerged for which individual banks has no control, the BIS regulation 
should aggravate the macro economic conditions of the BIS criteria did not adjusted 
somehow. This is a lesson we can learn from Japan’s experience in the 1990s’ 
(Shimizu 2007, pg. 4) 
 
These facts provide a foundation in building an argument that identifies the timing of 
these regulatory standards as a possible added factor in exacerbating the problems in 
the Japanese banking sector.  
 
The second reason is linked to the capital market inflation theory this thesis employs 
to explain probability of bank default. The underlying assumptions of this theory are 
closely associated with the evidence that the crisis has brought about. Not only did the 
country experienced a prolonged recession that lasted over 15 years, but also the 
productive investment of the Japanese corporations steadily declined during this 
period. As argued above, the Basel capital requirements were implemented at a time 
when the capital market conditions were weak, in the aftermath of the stock market 
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crash in 1990. Therefore banks had to offer a higher price in order to raise their 
needed regulatory capital.  There is mounting evidence in the literature that records 
the substantial reduction in the productive investment by Japanese corporations 
during the 1990s. These facts support the underlying assumptions of the capital 
market inflation theory, that forcing banks to hold higher capital ratios is a way of 
crowding-out the nonfinancial sector, which may lead to a decline in fixed capital 
formation. Banks inelastic demand for capital at the time could have indeed been a 
factor contributing to the reduction of productive investment by Japanese corporations 
during the crisis. If banks would have not been under major demand to meet such 
regulatory capital ratios, the capital market might have  been an (alternative) 
important source of funding that would have assisted the Japanese firms not only to 
overcome the difficulties they faced in the aftermath of the crisis but also to fund 
future productive  investment.  
 
6.2 The Japanese banking system 
 
Given the vast amount of literature devoted to Japan it is perhaps safe to claim that its 
economy is one of the most studied economies of all times.  This is both in explaining 
the high economic growth the country experienced during the period 1953-1973, and 
the prolonged recession the country experienced during the 1990s and the subsequent 
slow recovery.  During the boom decades the Japanese annual average real economic 
growth was around 10 percent, making Japan the world’s second largest economy, 
after the US (Ohno 2006). Over the same period Japan also became the world’s 
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leading exporter of steel and automobiles  (Krugman 2009).  However, the high 
economic growth era ended after 1973, when growth rates fell to around 4 percent.  
 
Barsky (2009) states that the economy started to shows signs of recovery, in 1986, 
when figures of GDP, corporate earning and dividends started to increase. Many mark 
this period as the start of the  ‘bubble economy’ and associate it with the Plaza 
Accord in 1985. The agreement reached between the G5 nations, called for a 
depreciation of the US dollar against the yen58. As a result, the yen appreciated 
substantially, increasing by nearly 46 percent against the dollar. This  damaged 
Japanese exports, and subsequently the economy. The Japanese government 
undertook different policy measures to stimulate the economy.   Interest rates were 
reduced by approximately 3 percentage points59, followed by the introduction of a 
large fiscal package in 1987. By the time of the fiscal stimulus the Japanese economy 
had already started to recover, as stated above the economy started to grow again in 
1986. The boom was associated with growing credit and rising asset prices. An 
exceptionally large increase occurred in  stock and land prices, which tripled form 
1985 to 1989 (IMF 2011).  Indeed prices were so high that the land surrounding the 
Imperial Palace in Tokyo was reported to be worth more than the whole state of 
California (Krugman 2009). However, in the summer of 1990 the bubble burst and the 
stock market crashed.   
 
                                                        
58 The agreement aimed to devalue the dollar against the deutsche mark as well, given 
that Germany and Japan were the two countries with a current account surplus  
59 And kept within this range until 1989 
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Krawczyk (2006), argues that the privatization programmes undertaken during the 
1980s, such as the privatisation of Japan Railway and Nippon Telephone and 
Telegraph, together with the partial financial liberalization contributed greatly to the 
asset bubble that characterised the Japanese economy at the time.  
In the financial markets liberalisation  started in the 1970s. Before that the Japanese 
financial system was bank based, known as the ‘main bank system’. Corporate firms 
had limited access to bond markets and equity issuance was rather minimal (Hoshi 
and Kashyap 1999).  Therefore, banks were the main external source of finance for 
Japanese corporations.  With the dissolution of the Keirestu in the 1990s, Japanese 
corporations were left with large debts that they could not refinance into equity.  
In late 1970s a secondary market for government bonds was created marking the start 
of deregulation. This gave investors an alternative investment opportunity to, for 
example, bank deposits, which offered rather low interest rates.  Financial institutions 
at the time in Japan were subject to interest rates controls, which were set in 1947 
under the Temporary Interest Rate Adjustment Law (TIRAL). The law permitted the 
Bank of Japan (BOJ) to place ceilings on all kinds of deposits rates and on short term 
lending rates. All financial institutions, apart from the government financial 
institutions and postal savings, were subject to these restrictions. Whereas, shinkin 
banks60, agricultural cooperative and the credit cooperatives were not subject to 
                                                        
60 Shinkin banks are non-profit cooperatives known also as credit associations. They 
are relatively small in size and are owned by members living in the same geographical 
area as the institutions’ headquarters or branches. They operate in the same way as 
commercial banks but restrict their lending mostly to members.  They could however 
locate up 20 percent of their loans to non-members (Hutchison and Westermann 
2006).   
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lending rates regulation. The introduction of certificates of deposits (CD) in 1979, for 
which TIRAL regulation did not apply, marked the start of the deregulation of interest 
rates. The restrictions were gradually lifted for all other deposits in stages and in 1994 
they were completely abolished (Kanaya and Woo 2000).  
 
The liberalisation of  domestic corporate bond and equity markets also started in mid 
1970s.  Also, the lifting of the foreign exchange controls in 1980 and the abolition of 
the ‘real demand principle’ in 1984, allowed firms to obtain finance abroad.  Another 
step towards financial liberalization was the opening of the Tokyo offshore banking 
market in December 1986. These developments created new ways, by which firms 
could raise funds, thus reducing their reliance on bank borrowing.  Hoshi (2001) 
shows that the ratio of bank loans to total assets of large manufacturing firms in the 
1970s was nearly 0.35 but declined steadily thereafter, falling to 0.15 in 1990.   
In the mean time, banks deregulation was a slower process, and in many respects they 
were still subject to tight regulation during the 1980s.  For example, banks could not 
engage in loan securitization and fee-generating activities until late 1990’s (Hoshi and 
Kashyap 1999). Furthermore, the banking industry was still subject to the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 194761, which separated investment and commercial banking 
activities. With this regulation in place, the role of banks was limited to the traditional 
approach, in which deposits are used to make loans. However, when banks lost their 
best borrowers to capital markets, they engaged in high- risk lending activities such as 
real estate, small and medium businesses, private equity etc.  
                                                        
61 Similar to the US 1933 Glass- Steagall  Act.  
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When the bubble burst, banks were highly exposed to land, through its use as 
collateral but also by lending to jusen companies (see below). As a consequence, the 
quality of banks loans deteriorated substantially in the aftermath of the bursting of the 
land price bubble.  In 1998 the non-performing loans of Japanese banks were 
equivalent to 7 percent of GDP (Hoshi and Kashyap 1999). 
 
Japanese banks were only able to be more competitive and engage in non-traditional 
operations when the ‘Financial Big Bang’ was were first introduced in 1996 and fully 
implemented in 2001. The Big Bang reforms aimed to make the Japanese financial 
sector “ free, fair and global”. The programme lifted any restrictions that were in 
place between banks, securities industry and insurance sector (Montgomery and 
Takahashi 2011).  
 
Thus the stock market crash and the collapse of land prices placed Japanese banks 
under considerable financial stress.  Kanaya and Woo (2000) provide the following 
link of the events that led to the deterioration of the health of the banking system: 
Firstly the significant decline in land prices reduced the quality of real estate loans; 
secondly, the value of collateral was wiped out; thirdly the lost value of banks’ equity 
holdings undermined bank capital and fourthly, debtors were unable to meet their loan 
obligations due to weaker economic conditions (Kanaya and Woo 2000, pg. 8).   
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The Japanese banking sector started to show signs of weakness in late 1994 when the 
operations of two credit cooperatives, Tokyo Kyowa and Anzen Credit were closed.  
Tokyo Kyodo Bank was created, funded by the Bank of Japan, commercial banks and 
credit cooperatives, by the regulatory bodies to assume all assets and liabilities of the 
two insolvent credit cooperatives (Kanaya and Woo 2000).  A year later two credit 
unions, the Cosmo Credit Corporation and Kizu Credit Cooperative, and one region 
bank, also collapsed.  These failures were followed by a scandal over Daiwa bank 
later in November  that year. The bank was forced to close its operations in the US 
following accusations of illegal activities in covering-up around  $1.1 trillion in bond 
trade losses (Truell 1995).  
 
During the same period Japan experienced the so-called jusen crisis. The jusen 
companies, which were specialised housing loan companies, were created in the 
1970s by banks and other financial institutions  to provide mortgage loans.  As non-
deposit taking financial institutions the jusen companies, unlike commercial banks, 
were not subject to tight interest rate restriction. During late 1980s and early 1990s 
they provided loans in the real estate market (Krawczyk 2006).  They were mainly 
funded by agricultural cooperatives, which even though they were regulated by the 
MOF, were not restricted to lend in the real estate sector (Kanaya and Woo 2000).  
When the real estate market started to decline substantially in early 1990’s the quality 
of the lending of jusen companies by 1992 became a serious concern.  In mid 1995, 
after a special evaluation of the jusen companies conducted by the MOF which found 
that over 74 percent of their loans were nonrecoverable, seven out of eight jusen 
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companies were dissolved (ibid). In order to prevent a panic, which could have led to 
massive withdrawals from other financial institutions, which had provided finance to 
jusen companies, the Japanese authorities designed a plan to use public funds to 
facilitate the liquidation of the seven jusen companies.  A special account was 
established in the Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC) to assist such liquidations, 
which included nearly 680 billion yen in government funds (GAO 1996). These funds 
covered around 10 percent of the losses. While, the parent banks covered the largest 
percentage of the losses, some 55 percent, worth 5.3 trillion yen, 27 percent of the 
losses was covered by other creditor banks and only 8 percent by the agricultural 
cooperatives (Krawczyk 2006).  
 
The jusen crisis together with the failure of the above mentioned financial institutions 
led to the so –called  ‘Japan Premium’- a premium on borrowing costs of Japanese 
banks on international financial markets. Spiegel (2001) relates the premium to 
government policy. He states that the failure of Hyogo Bank, the first listed bank 
failure in Japan, with assets worth $37 billion, influenced the ‘Japan Premium’. This 
is because prior to Hyogo collapse, the Japanese government intervened when needed 
to prevent any possible financial institution failure, by arranging a merger of the 
insolvent bank with a sound bank62. Within such a policy framework the market 
perceived Japanese banks to be solvent and quite safe. However, when the authorities 
                                                        
62 For example, in 1992, Toho Sogo Bank, a small local banks, became insolvent and 
the Deposit Insurance Corporation assisted its’ merger with Iyo Bank.   
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failed to save Hyogo Bank this perception changed and Japanese banks had to face a 
premium on their borrowing costs (Spiegel 2001).  
 
In 1996 some Japanese banks were downgraded by credit rating agencies. The 
reduction in credit rating had started since 1989, however in 1996 the reduction was 
quite radical. For example for some banks, such as Long Term Credit Bank of Japan, 
Nippon Credit Bank, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Daiwa, credit ratings were 
reduced from A to BBB (Miyajima and Yafeh 2003). 
 
In 1997, the Japanese economy experienced another recession when higher 
consumption taxes were implemented.  In April 1997, the operations of Nissan Life 
Insurance were suspended by the MOF.  On 3 November that year Sanyo Securities, a 
second-tier securities firm in Japan, filed for bankruptcy, under the Corporate 
Rehabilitation Law.  On the same day, Sanyo also defaulted on overnight interbank 
loans market. This was the first default in the Japanese interbank market.  By mid 
November, Yamaichi Securities, one of Japan’s large four securities companies, and 
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, one of the country’s city banks, collapsed. On the 26 
November, the failure of Tokuyo City bank, a small regional bank, was announced 
(Montgomery and Shimizutani 2009). These failures were associated with massive 
disruptions in the interbank market, a sell-off of bank shares in the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange and an increase in the ‘Japan Premium’ (Kanaya and Woo 2000; Krawczyk 
2006).   
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Prior to these events Japanese depositors were guaranteed up to 10 billion yen 
(approximately $100,000) per account. However, this changed on 26 November 1997, 
when then the Minister of Finance announced that the Japanese government would 
guarantee 100 percent of the deposits until March 2001.  In February 1998, the 
Japanese government passed two laws for financial stabilization, allowing the DIC to 
use 30 trillion yen of public money to bail out troubled banks and to strengthen 
depositor protection.   17 trillion yen was made available to provide full deposit 
protection, and the remaining 13 trillion yen went to banks with financial difficulties 
(Montgomery and  Shimizutani 2009).  
 
In March 1998, 21 banks applied for government funds, with the exception of Tokyo-
Mitsubishi bank that was persuaded to apply for a capital injection. All major city 
banks received on average 100 million yen each, whereas three Regional banks, 
Yokohoma Bank, Ashikaga Bank and Hokuriku Bank applied for smaller funds (ibid).  
In total, 1.8 trillion yen was spent on capital injections, mainly in the form of 
subordinated debt, for the banking system.  
 
However financial stabilisation was far from achieved as the crisis continued further 
in 1998. In June 1998, the newly created financial regulatory, Financial Supervisory 
Agency (FSA), took over supervisory powers from the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
and other regulatory bodies to supervise banks and other financial institutions, such as 
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securities firms, insurance companies, shinkin banks and credit cooperatives63.  In 
October 1998, the Diet passed two laws: the Financial Revitalization and Financial 
Early Strengthening Law in an attempt to resolve the problems in the banking system.  
Under these laws authorities were able to better deal with bank failures, rather than 
just focusing on finding suitable healthy banks to take over failed banks, as well as 
having more funds at their disposal for bank resolution.  A total of 60 trillion yen (12 
percent of GDP) of government funds became available to strengthen the Japanese 
banking sector. Out of the 60 trillion yen, 25 trillion yen was allocated to recapitalize 
weak but solvent banks, 18 trillion yen for the insolvent banks, to assist their 
liquidation and/or nationalisation and 17 trillion yen to fully protect the deposits of 
insolvent banks (Kanaya and Woo 2000).  
 
Following the new legislation, in October 1998 the Long Term Credit Bank of Japan 
(LTCB) was nationalised.  In 1989 LTCB was the ranked the 9th largest bank in the 
world by assets, applied voluntarily for nationalisation after suffering massive losses 
as a result of the non-performing loans accumulated by lending to the real estate 
sector and jusen companies. In March 2000, the bank was sold to the US investment 
fund, Ripplewood Holdings, and reopened for business as a private commercial bank, 
under the name Shinsei Bank. In November 1998, another nationalisation took place, 
that of Nippon Credit Bank. The credit bank was involuntarily nationalised, since 
                                                        
63 MOF had previously supervised banks, securities firms, insurance companies and 
other non-bank financial institutions, whereas the Regional Financial Bureaus had 
been the supervisor of shinkin banks, and credit cooperative were under the 
supervision of prefectural governments (Kanaya and Woo 2000).  
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previous attempts to strengthen its financial position were not successful. The bank 
was reported to have had a capital deficit of 94 billion yen as of March 1998 (Harada, 
Ito and Takahashi 2013). Nippon Credit Bank was later sold and renamed Aozora 
Bank in 2001.  
 
In 1999, a second round of capital injection of around 15 trillion yen was provided to 
a total of 15 banks.  However, this time rather than a standard capital amount, banks 
received government funds in accordance to their individual financial needs. In order 
to qualify for the requested capital injection, the Financial Revitalization Commission 
(FRC), which was established under the Financial Revitalization Law, required banks 
to provide a restructuring plan, which had to include plans to raise capital in the 
private sector (Montgomery and  Shimizutani 2009).  
 
The year 1999 marks the beginning of the so-called ‘merger-wave’ period. In May 
that year, Mitsui Trust and Chuo Trust announced their merger plans (Kanaya and 
Woo 2000). A few months later, Industrial Bank of Japan, Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank and 
Fuji Bank revealed their merger plans, forming Mizuho Group.  All three banks were 
amongst the largest banks in Japan, with total assets worth, 42.09 trillion yen, 52.53 
trillion yen and 46.38 trillion yen, respectively (Harada and Ito 2012).   In October of 
the same year Sumitomo Bank and Sakura bank, which had 51.53 trillion yen and 
48.30 trillion yen in assets, respectively, also announced that the two banks were to 
merge to form Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group (ibid).   
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In March 2000 Asahi Bank, Tokai Bank and Sanwa Bank announced their plan to 
merge, forming UFJ Holdings64.  At the time of the announcement, Sanwa Bank had 
47.59 trillion yen in assets and Tokai Bank’s assets were worth 30.36 trillion yen 
(ibid). In April, the creation of the Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group was announced. 
The group was formed by the merger of Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, which had a total 
of 69.81 trillion yen in assets, Mitsubishi Trust Bank, a rather smaller bank with 16.37 
trillion yen in asset, and Nippon Trust Bank.  In 2001 Daiwa bank and Asahi bank 
merged to form Resona Holdings.   
 
Kawai (2003) suggests that the reason behind the ‘merger wave’ period in which large 
Japanese banks decided to merge with one another, was financial distress.  Merging 
was seen not only as a way of becoming more efficient but also, and most 
importantly, to avoid failure. Harada and Ito (2008) use the Distance to Default 
approach to evaluate the merger effect in the Japanese banking sector for the period 
between 1985 and August 2005.  They examined four merger cases: that of Mizuho 
GF, UFJ Holdings, Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group and Mitsubishi Tokyo 
Financial Group, in order to determine whether a merger bank financially improved, 
worsened or remain on average, in comparison with predecessor banks. The evidence 
show that merged banks did not necessarily become better off, in the sense that 
merging did not ameliorate their financial health (Harada and Ito 2008). 
 
                                                        
64 Even though Asahi Bank did not join the formation of UFJ Holdings. 
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By late 1999, the Japanese banking system took a turn towards stability.  Between 
1999-2002 there is no recorded major bank failure. This was achieved not only the 
capital injection provided by the government but also following the new guidelines of 
the newly created FSA to restructure the banking sector. The restructuring was 
conducted using different measures such as reducing the number of bank branches 
and overseas operations, tighter loan classification65, better provisioning and write-
offs66 and others (Kawai 2003).  
 
However, 2003 proved to be another difficult year for the Japanese banking sector.  
The newly created, 5th largest bank in 2003,  Resona Bank came  under considerable 
stress after suffering a massive capital shortage. Resona Holdings capital adequacy 
ratio was reported to have been well below 4 percent.  In May 2003, As a result the 
government injected 1.96 trillion yen of public funds through its subsidiary Resona 
Bank. This was followed by the nationalisation of Ashikaga Bank in November of the 
same year.  
 
                                                        
65 Banks in Japan had been able to have a tax-deductible general reserve accounts for 
any potential loan losses since 1964. The accounts allowed the classification of 
‘normal’ and ‘substandard’ loans, for which any additional specific provision against 
the latter classification did not apply. On the other hand banks were required to make 
specific provisions not only for loss loans but also for those loans that were doubtful, 
out of which 50 percent were tax deductible.  
66 Japanese banks were known to have been slow at writing off loans with low 
chances of recovery. One reason for this is due to tax rules, which only allowed banks 
to write-off loans after losses accruing to those loans had been ascertained in 
bankruptcy. Another possible reason was the worry of sending wrong signals to their 
customers.  
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After more than a decade of repeated failures, insolvency and financial weakness the 
Japanese financial system started to gain strength. The economy also started to pick 
up around 2003, with GDP growing more than 2 percent and the rate of 
unemployment declined (Krugman 2009).  The Japanese banking sector, has also now 
recovered and in the 2007-08 US crisis looked in much a better position than that of 
US.  The situation changed in favour of Japan’s banks, which were once heavily 
criticised for their structure and took much of the blame for the economic stagnation 
the country experienced. Most of the criticism came from commentators in western 
developed countries, urging the Japanese authorities to change the regulatory 
framework and promote inventiveness (Montgomery and Takahashi 2011). As 
explained above, the Japanese banking sector has been heavily regulated and even 
after the Big Bang deregulation reforms were implemented its banking sector 
remained traditional, in the sense that financial innovation never really took off. In 
contrast the US banking sector, with a free market regime, came to be too complex for 
its own good, as reflected in the 2007-08 financial crisis. However, during this crisis it 
was the US banks that faced major difficulties, and for some it was the Japanese 
banks that came to the rescue. For example, in January 2008 Mizuho Financial Group 
invested $1.2 billion in purchasing 18 percent in preferred shares, in Merrill Lynch 
(Montgomery and Takahashi 2011; Taniguchi and Sato 2011).  In September 2008, 
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group purchased a fifth of Morgan Stanley in a $9 billion 
dollars deal (Story and Sorkin 2008).  In the same month Nomura Holding Inc., 
Japan’s biggest brokerage firm, announced the purchase of Lehman Brother’s equities 
and investment banking operations in Europe and Middle East (Slater 2008).  
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These deals provide evidence that the balance sheet of Japanese banks might have 
finally repaired and with the economy stepping towards recovery. This is far reaching, 
considering that with stock and land prices falling since 1990, the country 
experienced not only the worst and longest recession in post-war history but also 
suffered the highest loss of wealth, amounting to a total of 1,500 trillion yen (Koo 
2008). As stated above, there are many studies that have examined the causes of the 
Japanese crisis that lasted from 1990 to the early 2000. While many blame the 
problems on the banking sector as the main cause, others identify the mismanaged 
monetary policy as well as structural and cultural factors.  
 
Koo(2008) argues that the prolonged recession that the Japanese economy 
experienced since 1990 was a ‘balance sheet recession’.   The stock market crash and 
falling land prices not only destroyed the wealth of Japanese corporations but also 
severely damaged their balance sheets. On the one hand corporations saw the value of 
their assets, i.e. a property or land, sharply reduced, and, on the other hand, they were 
still liable for repayments on the loans used to acquire those assets. With mounting 
debt levels, Japanese firm began paying down their debts, thus moving away from the 
standard approach of profit maximisation to debt minimisation.  He argues that 
corporations did this through all the 1990s and early 2000s. This argument is based on 
the fact that corporations were not borrowing despite interest rates being virtually 
zero through this period. By 2000 Japanese corporations had net savings higher than 
households. As consequence of firms’ demand for credit declined by more than 20 
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percent of GDP. Only when firms stopped repaying their debt and began to borrow 
again the Japanese economy started to recover (Koo 2008).   
 
An important feature of  the above arguments is that indebtedness of the corporate 
sectors plays an important part in bringing about a recession. This statement is 
perhaps the most important point that this research attempts to illustrate within a 
capital market inflation theory framework, taking into account the capital 
requirements imposed on banks. The important role of the corporate sector in the 
economy is also highlighted in Shimizu (2007).  His argument is built upon the causes 
and consequences of the fall in demand for loans by Japanese corporations. He 
analyses the impact of the Basel regulation on the Japanese economy and argues that 
the result of the imposed capital requirements was a reduction in bank lending, hence 
a reduction in corporate borrowings. He argues that once firms realized that banks 
were unable to continue lending in the aftermath of the stock market crash, firms 
changed their credit demand expectations and halted their investment plans. 
According to Shimizu (2007) the lack of confidence of corporations in economic 
conditions is one of the major sources for the prolong recession in Japan (Shimizu 
2007).  Japanese companies as of 2011 were still reluctant to invest preferring to 
hoard large amounts of cash, which totalled nearly 200 trillion yen.  This is despite  
having lowered their debt levels. The Economist argues that nearly half of the 
Japanese listed companies had more cash than debt, in 2011 (The Economist 2011b).  
However, when financing is needed capital markets play the key role rather than 
banks. An important feature of this method of financing by Japanese corporations 
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provides some evidence that Japan has moved away from a bank-based system, and 
towards a market oriented financial system.   
 
Similar to the vast amount of studies conducted on the prolonged Japanese recession, 
the literature also provides extensive studies examining the banking crisis that the 
country experienced till mid 2000s. Some argue that the crisis was as a consequence 
of the regulatory framework that characterised the Japanese banking sector. Some 
blame the slow process of deregulation of the financial market whilst others pinpoint 
the corporate governance framework as the main cause for the banking crisis. One 
small group of studies examines the consequences of the introduction of the Basel 
capital requirements and many of them blame such regulation for the credit crunch the 
country experienced during the 1990s.  However, none of them explicitly examine the 
impact of the international regulation on the probability of bank default.  
 
Before the introduction of the Basel capital regulatory standards, Japanese banks were 
required to hold a minimum of 4 percent of deposits in capital.  By March 1993, when 
Basel I was fully implemented all Japanese banks met the capital regulatory 
standards, 8 percent of total risk weighted assets, despite the stock market crash in 
1990 (Kanaya and Woo 2000). Many argue that a reason for banks not having any 
difficulties in meeting the capital requirements was that domestic regulation allowed 
the inclusion of 45 percent of unrealized gains-the difference between book value and 
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market67 value- towards their Tier II capital.  However, Kanaya and Woo (2000) 
argue that the proportion of the unrealized gains to total bank capital in March 1998 
was approximately 25 percent68.  It is worth noting here that the inclusion of 45 
percent of unrealized gains toward Tier II was allowed only if the proportion of Tier I 
capital toward total capital was at least 50 percent (Peek and Rosengren 1999).   
 
Furthermore, general loan loss reserves69, dated subordinated debt and dated preferred 
stocks were included in the calculation of Tier II capital. Also since 1998, up to 45 
percent of any land revaluation was countable toward Tier II.  In March 1999, banks 
were allowed to include deferred tax assets in calculating Tier 1 capital ratios.   
It is been suggested that some of these changes70 in the calculation of the capital ratios 
was in response to the difficulties that banks faced in late 1990’s in meeting the 
regulatory capital standards. As stated above, when Basel I was a first introduced 
Japanese banks had no problems in adjusting their capital ratios partly due to the 
above mentioned factors and partly because they had already raised capital in the 
market, by issuing equity, when market conditions were booming.  In fact at the time, 
Japanese banks held nearly one-fifth of the total Japanese common stock (Peek and 
                                                        
67 Prior to the introduction of the mark-to-market accounting approach in 2001, banks 
were able to choose between these two methods. Before 1997, Japanese banks used 
the market value approach to value their stock holdings.  
68 Referring to a study conducted by Fukao (1998), the authors claim that the market 
value of stocks held by banks at the time was 56.4 trillion yen, whereas the book 
value was 34.5 trillion yen.  
69 For the Basel capital requirements, the general loan loss reserve that counts toward 
Tier II capital is limited up to 1.25 percent of risk-weighted asset. 
70 Specifically, the option to choose what accounting method (fair or market method) 
to use when valuing the securities held and the inclusion of the 45 percent of land 
revaluation toward Tier II.   
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Rosengren 1999).  Thus the collapse of the stock market had a significant impact on 
banks’ capital. Another factor contributing to the (temporary) decline of some of the 
banks in Japan was the large proportion of non-performing loans.  
 
Nevertheless, as in the case of US banks71, some of the Japanese banks that failed 
during the crisis had reported high capital ratios prior to their collapse. Hokkaido 
Takushoku Bank had one of the highest capital ratios amongst city banks, of 9.34 
percent, months before its demise. Similarly, LTCB that failed in October 1998 
reported a 10.34 percent Tier I capital ratio in March that year.  Japan Credit Bank, 
another bank that failed in December 1998, had a Tier I capital ratio of 8.19 percent 
two months before its collapse. In line with others, Harada and Ito (2008), argue that 
this was due to the way capital ratios were calculated. For example, the use of 
subordinated debt toward Tier II and loan misclassification72, together with the 
inclusion of tax deferred in Tier I capital, overstated their true capital ratios.   
 
The practice of double gearing (explained in chapter 3) between banks and insurance 
companies also helped Japanese banks increase their equity capital in order to meet 
Basel I capital requirements standards. Banks issued to insurance companies 
substantial amount of subordinated debt, which counts towards Tier II capital.  
 
                                                        
71For example, Lehman Brothers had a Tier I capital of 11 percent two weeks before 
its demise in 2008 
72 Because banks were reluctant to classify a large amount of non-performing loans, 
resulted in inadequate loan loss reserves  
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The problem whether the recorded capital ratios of Japanese banks during the crisis 
reflect their true value, could indeed be a major concern in the research of this 
dissertation.  However, because no other data is available, this supposition is ruled out 
and their published capital ratios are taken to show their true value.  Also this research 
uses Tier I capital as a measure for capital adequacy so any practices undertaken by 
banks to boost their Tier II capital ratios does not effect the results.  
 
 
6.3 Methodology  
 
The same methodology as in the previous chapter is employed here to estimate the 
probability of bank default applied to a sample of Japanese banks, for the period 
1998-2000. In contrast to the pervious chapter, due to data limitation73, the following 
simple logit model is estimated using only Tier I capital ratios as explanatory 
variable:  
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔 [
𝑃𝑖
(1−𝑃𝑖)
] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝐼 + 𝛽2 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛿1𝑦99 + 𝛿2𝑦00 + 𝑢   (6.1) 
 
The model also includes a dummy variable, β2, to account for bank size, and two year 
dummy variables, δ1 and δ2, to allow the intercept to differ across years.   
                                                        
73 Bankscope database provides limited information for some of the Japanese banks 
used in this analysis. Whilst other various sources we used to construct the dataset the 
information was still limited and only Tier I capital ratios for some banks were 
available.  
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The literature provides enough evidence to support the simple model used in this 
research. For example, Estrella et al (2000), state that a simple model using only 
capital ratios as sole predictor can accurately predict bank failure. Similarly Jagtiani et 
al (2003), provide empirical evidence that a simple model using only lagged capital 
ratio and lagged change in capital ratio as explanatory variable to predict bank failure 
performs better than a multivariate logit model using 48 different financial ratios as 
explanatory variables.  
 
The same classification criteria as in the previous chapter is used here, in which the 
conditions for a bank to be considered as failure are: 1) bank that failed for Chapter 
11 bankruptcy protection; 2) was seized by the government or financial institutions 
and 3) merged with another bank or 4) is still operating because of a government 
bailout which otherwise would not be. For bank regulatory target capital adequacy 
ratio the Tier I capital ratio is used, obtained mainly from Bankscope database74.  
 
6.3.1 Sample summary  
 
Banks that failed during the 1998-2000 period are included in this research.  This 
period was chosen to reflect the large the number of bank failures as well the massive 
                                                        
74  For some banks the following sources were used to construct the dataset used in 
this research.  1998 Tier I capital ratio for : Nippon Trust Bank; Fuji Bank; Daiwa 
Bank; Sanwa Bank; Industrial Bank of Japan; Long-Term Credit Bank; Yasuda Trust; 
and Toyo Trust were obtained from Kanaya and Woo (2001). 1999 Tier I capital ratio 
for: Fuji; Daiwa, Sanwa and Industrial Bank of Japan was obtained from Suzuki 
(2006). The rest of the data was obtained form Bankscope.  
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government financial aid that the banking system received in order to be able to 
survive. The period under consideration is mainly due to data limitation. Firstly, 
banks’ Tier 1 capital ratio data prior to 1998 was difficult to obtain75. Secondly, most 
banks merged after 2000; therefore their individual data no longer exist.  Because of 
these restrictions the model is limited to a three-year period with a total of 57 
observations.  According to the classification criteria, outlined above, there were 12 
bank failures out of 57 observations, thus the frequency rate for failure is 21 percent ( 
Table 6.3.1-1).   The dummy variable takes the value zero for banks that have failed 
and the value one if the bank has not failed.  A bank is defined as failed in a particular 
year, when it meets one of the above criteria, and its last reported Tier I capital ratio 
was in the previous year.  
 
Before the Big Bang reforms there were four types of banks in the Japanese banking: 
city banks, regional banks, trust banks and long-term credit banks.  
City banks, the largest groups, are commercial banks that operated throughout the 
country, with some even having oversees branches.  They are the main lenders to 
Japanese corporations, mainly by extending short-term loans (Flath 2005). In  2003, 
city banks held more than 25 percent of the deposits and around 28 percent of credits 
were supplied by these banks (Bou-Said and Saucier 2003).  
 
                                                        
75  Bankscope database only provides information for a very few banks prior to this 
year 
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Regional banks conduct the same activities as city banks but have branches only in 
one of the Japanese prefectures, and tend to provide finance to smaller companies. 
They are also a major source of finance to city banks in the interbank market.  Some 
of the Japanese regional banks are as large as city banks (Flath 2005).  
 
Trust banks are somewhat different from city banks and regional banks. A 
distinguishing activity between them is that trust banks were allowed to manage trusts 
and corporate pension funds. They were originally funded mainly by accepting trust 
deposits, such as ‘money trust deposits’, which are nearly the same as passbook 
savings accounts, and ‘loan trust deposits’, which are trust certificates with maturities 
varying between two to three years (Flath 2005).  
 
Long-term credit banks specialized in providing long- term credit mainly to large 
corporations.  They were mainly funded by issuing debentures with one year and five 
year maturities.  The amount of issuance however was limited up to 30 times of the 
capital held by them (Bou-Said and Saucier 2003). 
 
The sample data used in this chapter consist of nine city banks, seven trust banks, six 
regional banks and two long-term credit banks. Regardless of the different types of 
banks that characterise the Japanese banking sector, the banks size dummy variable is 
constructed based on the asset size, as in chapter 5. Banks with asset value of 10 
trillion yen or less are classifies as small-medium banks and those that exceed the 10 
trillion yen are classified as big banks.  
Chapter 6.  The Probability of Bank Default – The Case of Japan  241 
 
Table 6.3.1-1  Sample Summary 
Year of 
failure/non-
failure 
Number of 
non-failed 
banks 
Number of 
failed banks 
% of banks 
that failed 
Total number 
of banks 
1998 17 2 10.5 19 
1999 15 6 28.5 21 
2000 13 4 23.5 17 
Total 45 12 21.0 57 
 
 
The dataset used in this study is a pooled cross-section between 1998 and 2000. An 
individual bank can appear as a separate observation in each sample year.  Data 
contains 57 observations, which includes 24 individual banks. Table 6.3.1-1 provides 
the sample summary of the data used in the analysis.  
 
As can be seen, in 1998 two banks are classified as failures. It is worth noting here 
that all major banks received a standard 100 billion yen of capital injection in 1998, 
which makes it difficult to apply the fourth classification criteria to determine the 
failure of an individual bank.   The two banks that are identified as failed in 1998 are: 
Long Term Credit Bank and Yasuda Trust. The former was temporarily nationalised 
in October 1998, and a month later, Fuji and Dai-Ichi Kangyo banks announced the 
take over of Yasuda Trust. 
 
Table 6.3.1-2 Banks included in the sample 
 Failed Banks Non-Failed Banks 
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1 Dai-Ichi  Kangyo Bank  
 
Sumitomo Bank Ltd 
 
2 Asahi bank  
 
Sumitomo Trust 
 
3 Sakura bank  
 
Tokyo Mitsubishi 
 
4 Tokai  
 
Daiwa 
 
5 Nippon Trust bank  
 
Sanwa 
 
6 Mitsubishi Trust  
 
Toyo 
 
7 Fuji  
 
Bank of Yokohoma 
 
8 Industrial Bank of 
Japan 
 
 
Hokkaido bank 
 
9 LTCB  
 
Bank of Fukuoka 
 
10 Mitsui Trust  
 
Shiga bank 
 
11 Yasuda  
 
Ashikaga 
 
12 Chuo Trust  
 
Gunma  
 
 
 
The number of bank failures was  highest in 1999.   Dai-ichi Kangyo, Fuji Bank and 
Industrial Bank of Japan announced their merger plans in August 1999. Therefore all 
these three banks are classified as failed.  Similarly, Mitsui Trust and Chuo Trust are 
also classified as failed as on the same year they announced their agreement to merge.  
There was another merger announcement on October of the same year, that of 
Sumitomo Bank and Sakura Bank.  This announcement was seen as a rescue for 
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Sakura Bank, which faced greater financial difficulties than Sumitomo Bank 
(CNNMoney 1999).  The bank was reported to have had bad loan problems 
amounting to 1.8 trillion yen on March 31 1999.  Therefore, only Sakura Bank is 
classified as failed.  
 
Another reinforcing fact for choosing these banks as failed is the amount of capital 
funds they received in March 1999.  For example, Fuji Bank received the largest 
capital injection, a total of 1000 billion yen, followed by Dai-Ichi Kangyo with 900 
billion yen. Sakura Bank also was among the highest receivers of government funds 
with 800 billion yen (Montgomery and Shimizutani2009).  
 
In March 2000, Sanwa, Asahi and Tokai banks announced their plans to establish a 
joint holding company, creating the second biggest Japanese institution at the time 
worth $1 trillion (Chicago Tribune 2000). There is no data available in Bankscope 
database for Sanwa Bank in 2000; hence only Asahi76 and Tokai are classified as 
‘failed’ (and Sanwa bank for this year is dropped from the dataset).  A month later, 
Mitsubishi, Nippon and Tokyo Trust banks announced their plans to merge.  Together 
with Tokyo Mitsubishi Bank they were to create a joint holding company (Kawai 
2003).   Because there is no data available for Tokyo Trust only Nippon and 
Mitsubishi Trust are identified as failure in 2000.   
 
                                                        
76 Even though Asahi did not go through with the merger,  because the announcement 
is taken as an indication of failure, this research treats this case as one.  
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6.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 6.3.2-1 presents summary statistics for the Tier I capital ratio and bank size 
dummy.   Banks included in the sample are divided into two groups, failed and non-
failed, and the t-test of the mean is calculated. 
 
Table 6.3.2-1  Tier I ratio variable mean used in the sample  
 All banks Failed Non-Failed Difference 
in Mean 
T-test on 
the 
difference 
Tier I 
capital 
ratio 
6.233684 6.946667 6.043556 -0.9031111 -1.952477 
Bank size 0.5789474 0.5833333 0.5777778 -0.0055556 -0.0340 
 
 
The mean Tier I capital ratio of banks that failed is higher than that of banks that 
survived. The t-test mean difference is significant at a 5 percent significance level, so 
the null hypothesis of equal difference in the mean is rejected.   Put differently, the 
mean of Tier I capital ratio of failed banks is different from that of non-failed banks.  
The banks size dummy variable is not statistically significant, indicating that the 
likelihood of failure is the same for all banks, regardless of their size.  
 
6.4 Results 
 
The logit model estimates the probability of bank failure as a function of Tier I capital  
                                                        
77 Significant at the 5 percent level  
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ratio, banks size dummy78 and year dummies79. The latter are included in the model to 
allow the intercept to differ across years. The results of the estimated logit model80 are 
presented below:  
 
Table 6.4-1 Logit Model  
 Coefficient Robust SE Marginal effect 
Tier I capital ratio 0.528** 0.248 0.077 
Year dummy: 
1999  
0.760 1.002 0.001 
Year dummy: 
2000 
0.421 1.183 0.065 
Bank size dummy 0.648 0.632 0.092 
Constant -5.595* 1.767 - 
Number of observations= 57; Wald Χ2(4)= 8.43; p>  Χ2=0.07; pseudo R2=.094; 
log-likelihood= -26.570 
*, **, Correspond to the 1% and 5% significance level, respectively   
 
 
 
As in the case of US, the coefficient associated with Tier I capital ratio is positive and 
statistically significant. This positive relationship implies that banks with higher 
                                                        
 
79 The base year is 1998 
80 The Pearson X2 goodness of fit test used reveals that the number of covariate patters 
is the same as the number of observations therefore the Hosmer and Lemeshow 
goodness of fit test with 10 groups is used. The Homser and Lemeshow goodness of 
fit, obtained by calculating the percentiles of the estimates probabilities, shows that 
the model fits the data reasonably well. The output of the test are as follows: X2 (8)= 
=8.53, prob>X2= 0.38 (See Appendix 5) 
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capital ratios have a higher probability of default.  This findings support yet again the 
hypothesis of this research, under the capital market inflation theory framework.  
Table 6.4-1 shows the marginal effect of Tier I capital on the probability of banks 
default. As can be seen, the marginal effect associates with Tier I capital ratio implies 
that a one percentage increase in Tier I capital ratio increases the probability of a bank 
default in the next year by 7.7 percentage points. The year dummies are both 
statistically insignificant, thus the probability of default was the same in both years.  
Also the bank size is not statistically significant, implying that size is not a factor in 
predicting the likelihood of bank failure.  
 
In order to determine the ability of the model to correctly predict probabilities the 
fraction of bank failure in the sample data is used, as opposed to the commonly used 
value of 0.5. The results are presented in Table 6.4-2.  
 
Table 6.4-2 Model predicting  accuracy  
Classified Failed Non-failed Total 
+ 8 18 26 
- 4 27 31 
Total 12 45 57 
    
Sensitivity p(+failed) 66.67%  
Specificity p(-non-failed) 60%  
Positive predictive value p(failed+) 30.77%  
Negative predictive value p(non-failed-) 87.10%  
Correctly classified  61.40%  
Classified + if predicted p (failed) ≥0.21(i.e. symmetric loss function)’ non-
failed denotes failure=0 
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The model’s overall accuracy of forecasting is 61.4 percent at a cut off point of 
0.2181.  The threshold value for the cutoff point was used in accordance to the 
proportion of bank failure in the sample data (see Table 6.3.1-1). The model failed to 
accurately predict 4 of the 12 failed banks, and mistakenly predicted 18 of the 45 
sound banks as failure.   
Figure 6.4-1 Area under receiver ROC- Japan logit model  
 
Figure 6.4-1 shows the area under the ROC curve, which is 0.6861.  As discussed in 
Chapter 5, an AUC above 0.5 is needed in order for the model to have some 
predictability power. However, an AUC value between 07 and 0.8 is the considered 
acceptable discrimination, which clearly is not obtained in the case of Japan.  This 
implies that the simple logit model in this chapter does not have a high predictability 
power to discriminate between banks that have failed and have not failed.  This could 
be due to the relatively small sample of banks included in the model.  In other words 
                                                        
81 The overall classification of the model at a 0.5 cutoff point is just over 80 percent, 
with a sensitivity of  8.33 percent and specificity of 100 percent.  
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the small sample may be a factor that limits the ability of the model to accurately 
discriminate between failed and non-failed banks.  
 
 
 
6.5 Concluding remarks  
 
The empirical evidence of both Japanese and US bank failures presented in this 
chapter and the previous one support the hypothesis of this research, that a bank with 
higher capital ratio has a higher probability of default than a bank with a lower Tier I 
capital ratio. These findings are in contrast with the common belief that higher capital 
ratios serve as a cushion to withstand any unanticipated losses, thus lowering banks 
probability of default. It has been argued that the reason for this is that, when banks 
raise capital by issuing equity under conditions of capital market deflation, they drain 
out the long-term finance that corporations need to conduct their business operations, 
thus limiting their productive investment potential.   
 
Another common characteristic of the crisis in Japan in the 1990s and in US in 2007-
09 is the subsequent lower productive investment by firms in both countries.  In 
relation to Japan, Shimziu (2007) argues that when regulators impose higher capital 
requirements banks reduce their lending to firms so firms reduce their investment.   
Toporowski argues that firms that cannot refinance their debts into equity reduce 
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investment. In the case of Japan this phenomenon is more evident and linked to debt 
overhang from dissolution of keiratsu explained above. 
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6.6 Data Appendix  
 
Table 6.6 Data used to estimate the logit model in Chapter 6  
 
 
 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio  Banks 
1998 4.63 Dai-Ichi  Kangyo  
1998 4.69 Asahi 
1998 4.56 Sakura  
1998 5.41 Tokai 
1998 4.76 Sumitomo Bank  
1998 9.26 Nippon Trust Bank  
1998 5.27 Sumitomo Trust 
1998 4.65 Tokyo Mitsubishi 
1998 5.92 Mitsubishi Trust 
1998 4.79 Fuji 
1998 5.35 Daiwa 
1998 4.8 Sanwa 
1998 4.95 
Industrial Bank of 
Japan 
1998 5.16 LTCB 
1998 6.02 Mitsui Trust 
1998 7.14 Yasuda 
1998 5.78 Toyo 
1998 7.95 Chuo Trust 
1998 4.83 Bank of Yokohoma 
1999 5.86 Dai-Ichi Kangyo 
1999 6.3 Asahi  
1999 7.23 Sakura  
1999 7.75 Tokai 
1999 5.58 Sumitomo Bank 
1999 7.55 Nippon Trust Bank  
1999 7.11 Sumitomo Trust 
1999 5.99 Tokyo Mitsubishi 
1999 7.46 Mitsubishi Trust 
1999 5.7 Fuji 
1999 7.8 Daiwa 
1999 6 Sanwa 
1999 5.99 
Industrial Bank of 
Japan 
1999 9.34 Mitsui Trust 
1999 8.85 Chuo Trust 
1999 5.04 Bank of Yokohoma 
1999 6.23 Bank of Fukuoka 
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1999 2.41 Hokkaido bank 
1999 6.59 Shiga bank 
1999 2.15 Ashikaga 
1999 7.14 Gunma 
2000 6.1 Dai-Ichi Kangyo  
2000 6.43 Asahi  
2000 7.46 Sakura  
2000 7.9 Tokai 
2000 5.88 Sumitomo Bank  
2000 6.49 Nippon Trust Bank  
2000 6.63 Sumitomo Trust 
2000 6.53 Tokyo Mitsubishi 
2000 7.27 Mitsubishi Trust 
2000 9.59 Mitsui Trust 
2000 6.04 Chuo Trust 
2000 5.67 Bank of Yokohoma 
2000 6.86 Bank of Fukuoka 
2000 5.42 Hokkaido bank 
2000 6.89 Shiga bank 
2000 6.43 Ashikaga 
2000 7.74 Gunma 
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Chapter 7. Conclusion 
 
This thesis has empirically examined the impact of capital adequacy regulation on the 
probabilities of bank default and has theoretically analysed the impact of such 
regulation on the economy as a whole.  The analysis began by giving an overview of 
how the capital markets actually work, with a particular focus on explaining how it 
links the sectors of the economy. Understanding such link and the market conditions 
in which banks operate provides a platform from which the impact of the Basel 
capital requirements on banks at an individual level can be examined.  
 
The US and Japan case studies chosen in this thesis to examine the impact of capital 
adequacy regulation on the probabilities of bank default are not without intention. 
Firstly is the large number of bank failures during the periods under consideration, US 
during the latest crisis starting in 2007 and Japan during the 1990s, which has perhaps 
been the most revealing hint in doubting the effectiveness of capital adequacy 
regulation in promoting a safe and sound financial system. The large number of bank 
failures occurred despite the fact that most banks not only met the Basel capital 
standards, but also held capital in excess to the regulatory requirements. Secondly, 
during these periods, the banking crisis and the subsequent recessions, both countries 
experienced a significant decline in private investment.  The previously inflated 
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capital markets fostered a delusion that capital adequacy is the most effective 
prudential regulation of the banking system.  
 
This concluding chapter provides a concise summary of the research conducted in this 
thesis.   The evidence provided in this thesis suggests that capital adequacy regulation 
gives misleading signals about the soundness of banks.  Therefore, it is argued that 
such regulation is theoretically flawed, taking no account how banks are 
overcapitalised, or put differently it takes no account of balance sheet reconstruction 
to achieve overcapitalisation.  Some of the implications associated with the current 
framework of bank capital regulation are discussed in section 2. Section 3 reflects on 
the empirical results presented in this thesis, and provides recommendations for future 
regulatory capital requirements, using the ideas put forward by both Toporowski and 
Minsky.  
 
7.1 Summing up  
 
This thesis consists of 7 chapters. The first chapter gave an outline of the objectives, 
motivations, the methodological approach and the structure of the thesis. The second 
chapter gave an historical background of the Basel Accords, together with the 
literature review on capital adequacy regulation.  Two fundamental flaws were 
identified in this chapter in relation to the existing literature: the first one is the lack of 
the literature in providing empirical evidence on the impact of Tier I capital ratios on 
the probabilities of bank default and the second one concerns the lack of the literature 
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in providing an analysis of the impact of such regulation that considers the economic 
system as a whole.  
 
Chapter 3 presented a detailed explanation of the theoretical aspects of the capital 
market inflation theory.  It then developed a simple model to estimate stock price 
movements taking into account the net excess inflows into the capital market. The net 
excess inflows is calculated using the demand and supply for equity capital, derived 
from the flow of funds accounts. The demand for equity capital represents issues of 
equity capital from the non-financial and financial sector. The supply for equity 
capital represents purchases of corporate equity from the household, institutional 
investors and the external sector. The results of the time series regression provide 
evidence that the excess supply of capital does affect stock price movements. 
However, whilst these results empirically validate the assumptions of the capital 
market inflation theory when applied to the US, the model does not yield the same 
results when applied to the Japanese capital market.  Various factors were highlighted 
which could explain such results. In particular the Japanese central bank purchases of 
shares and other equities were argued and shown empirically to have a positive effect 
on the Nikkei 225 stock price index. This on the other hand suggests that these 
purchases offset private sector outflows of credit form the capital market. Therefore, 
capital market inflation theory may still be valid in this case.  
 
The purpose of this chapter was to provide a platform from which the effectiveness of 
the capital adequacy regulation in promoting the soundness of the banking sector can 
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be examined.  An effective analysis for banking distress cannot be conducted by 
considering the banking sector in isolation from the other sectors in the economy. 
Therefore it is imperative to understand how a capitalist economy works, the 
development is other sectors of the economy and how these sectors are linked, in 
order to better examine the behaviour and soundness of banks, given any capital 
regulatory restrictions.   
 
From a macro-perspective the capital market inflation theory argument is that in 
conditions of capital supply rationing bank overcapitalisation makes the financial 
system in general more fragile, because it crowds out available capital for non-
financial firms. This fragility then appears as growing risky debt in the banking 
system. This statement, which is supported empirically in this thesis, is then used to 
explain the probability of default of individual banks.  
 
The discussion on the shadow banking system, presented in chapter 4, enters as a way 
in which banks  ‘dress-up’ their balance sheets by transferring those risky assets in the 
non-bank subsidiaries. In this way shadow banking, provides an explanation of how 
banks respond to the growing riskiness of their assets.  
 
Chapter 5 provides an empirical evaluation of the relationship between capital 
adequacy ratios, and the probability of default of US banks.  The analysis employs a 
logit model to estimate the probability of bank default on a pooled cross sectional data 
over the period 2007-2009. The results imply that a 1 percentage point in Tier I 
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capital ratios increases the probability of default by 1.8 percentage points. In contrary 
a 1 percentage point increase in the unweighted capital ratios lowers the probability of 
default by 2.7 percentage points. It was argued that the unweighted capital ratio 
coefficient is the effect of illiquidity in the market for relatively risk-free assets, 
whereas the risk-weighted capital ratio, i.e. Tier 1 capital ratio, is the effect of 
crowding out in the capital market.  In other words the current risk-weighted capital 
requirement account only for risk of insolvency, ignoring the risk of illiquidity in the 
capital market.  
 Similarly, chapter 6 provides empirical evidence on the impact of capital adequacy 
regulation on the probability of default of Japanese banks, over the period 1998-2000, 
using the same methodology as in chapter 5. However, due to data limitation only 
risk-weighted capital ratio was used to estimate the probability of bank default. The 
results indicate that when Tier I capital ratio is increased by 1 percentage point, banks 
probability of default increases by 7.7 percentage points.    
 
7.2 Some further comments  
 
 
This thesis has provided empirical evidence arguing against the capital adequacy 
regulation currently placed on banks.  However, despite this, it is of great importance 
to stress that in this thesis, these results do not provide evidence against such 
regulation per se. Rather these results provide evidence against the framework of 
capital adequacy regulation.  In other words this thesis does not advocate restricting 
banking regulation, i.e. a lighter regulatory regime, but it rather argues that any 
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regulatory restrictions placed on banks need to take into account developments in 
other sectors of the economy and on the fringes of the banking system itself.  
 
The banking sector is closely connected to all sectors in the economy, by means of 
providing credit and liquidity. Perhaps the most important role of all of the banking 
sector, is the provision of credit to facilitate investment expenditure, with the latter 
being a crucial component of aggregate demand.  Therefore, any factor limiting the 
willingness and ability of banks to increase the money supply and credit is bound to 
have a direct effect of the level of investment, and hence on economic activity. 
However the banking sector is connected with other sectors in the economy also on its 
liability side, especially in the most developed economies, as argued in this thesis. 
This way, in which the activities of the banking sector affect the rest of the economy 
should not be ignored.  
 
7.3 Recommendations for future regulatory capital standards  
 
As outlined above this thesis argues that capital adequacy regulation is theoretically 
flawed.  Therefore, this thesis suggests that theory on banking regulation needs to 
move beyond an unsophisticated model of a single bank balance sheet to a more 
complex view of how bank balance sheets are integrated with other balance sheet in 
the economy.  This section borrows the ideas put forward by Toporowski and Minsky 
to provide recommendations that should be taken into account when placing 
regulatory standards on banks.  
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As a recommendation tool for banking regualtion, an important argument that is 
derived from Toporowski’s argument against the Basel capital requirements is bank 
heterogeneity.  He states that  ‘The strategy of securing banks stability by enforcing 
capital adequacy is based on a fallacy of composition: what is good for one  bank is 
not necessarily good for all banks taken together’ (Toporowski 2009, pg. 1).  This line 
of reasoning is also given by Minsky (1967, 1975a). As explained in chapter 2, 
Minsky suggests a bank examination approach in order to determine an exact 
appropriate level of capital and liquidity for a bank.  His argument is built upon the 
suggestion that each bank needs to be assessed individually. Minsky states ‘the 
liquidity of an institution cannot be measured by assigning universal predetermined 
liquidity quotients to assets and similar liquidity requirement factors to liability’ 
(Minsky 1967, pg.6). However, the information obtained from each bank then needs 
to be incorporated with market aggregates. That is because, ‘liquidity is not an innate 
attribute of an asset but rather that liquidity is a time related characteristic of an 
ongoing, continuing economic institutions’ (Minsky 1967, pg. 6).  
 In order to better determine the liquidity needs of a particular bank it is necessary not 
only to examine its initial balance sheet but also to estimate cash flows taking into 
account future economic conditions that are likely to effect the banks’ ability to adjust 
its cash position82.  This way, regulatory bodies would be better informed not only on 
the financial position of a particular bank but also would have a more in depth 
                                                        
82 Minsky notes that banks generate cash flows not only from ordinary operations but 
also by operating in asset and liability markets.  He refers to the activities that banks 
undertake to adjust their cash position as position- making activities.  
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knowledge on their operation activities as well as on their interactions with other 
financial institutions, and most importantly with shadow banks which Minsky called 
‘fringe banks’. The importance of the latter point was highlighted in Chapter 4, in 
which it was argued that prior to the 2008 financial crisis US regulatory bodies had 
little knowledge on the banks interactions with the shadow banking system.   
Examining bank’s balance sheet will not only serve to gather accurate information 
about the position making ability of a particular bank and the interactions with other 
financial institutions but will also reveal the connections it has with other sectors in 
the economy. When all data is generated for each individual bank is then aggregated 
to give a real picture of all markets in which banks operate.   
 
This thesis advocates a banking framework proposed by Minsky, which recognizes 
that the ability of banks to convert assets into cash, thereby the ability of banks to be 
liquid is more important than raising capital, which has major implications for the 
productive investment process by non-financial corporations. But this is not to say 
that this is the full remedy for promoting stability in the economy. Whilst regulating 
the banking sector is indeed an importance task for governments, other sectors in the 
economy could also benefit from government monitoring.  The monitoring process 
here is meant to say, not heavily regulating for example the non-financial corporate 
sector or institutional investors, but is intended to say that if governments were better 
informed on their business activities it can give them better information and assist in 
finding ways to discourage their over-reliance on the financial markets to continue 
their business operations.  As Toporowski (2009b) states, ‘Economic activity must be 
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reorganised to make the real economy more stable and financial markets more boring, 
so that enterprise is focussed on innovations that enhance welfare, rather than 
financial inflation’ (2009, pg. 9).  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1.  Capital market inflation theory – Empirical Results  
 
Dlprice- first difference of log S&P 500 stock index price 
SD- excess supply of capital (supply –demand) 
 
Table A1-1 S&P 500 stock price index price estimation- US (in million $) 
Dependent Variable: DLPRICE   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/24/13   Time: 20:55   
Sample (adjusted): 1965 2010   
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.066081 0.024068 2.745592 0.0088 
SD 5.26E-06 2.66E-06 1.978937 0.0543 
SD^2 1.80E-11 9.85E-12 1.827952 0.0745 
     
     
R-squared 0.088018     Mean dependent var 0.058880 
Adjusted R-squared 0.045600     S.D. dependent var 0.163986 
S.E. of regression 0.160203     Akaike info criterion -0.761754 
Sum squared resid 1.103598     Schwarz criterion -0.642495 
Log likelihood 20.52034     F-statistic 2.075032 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.984064     Prob(F-statistic) 0.137944 
     
     
 
Table A1-2- ADF stationary test for first difference of log price index  
 
Null Hypothesis: DLPRICE has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=9) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -6.705683  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.584743  
 5% level  -2.928142  
 10% level  -2.602225  
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     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(DLPRICE)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 20/02/15   Time: 09:34   
Sample (adjusted): 1966 2010   
Included observations: 45 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DLPRICE(-1) -1.029219 0.153485 -6.705683 0.0000 
C 0.059389 0.026400 2.249554 0.0297 
     
     R-squared 0.511176    Mean dependent var 0.001913 
Adjusted R-squared 0.499808    S.D. dependent var 0.236841 
S.E. of regression 0.167504    Akaike info criterion -0.692188 
Sum squared resid 1.206482    Schwarz criterion -0.611892 
Log likelihood 17.57423    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.662254 
F-statistic 44.96618    Durbin-Watson stat 1.997525 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
 Table A1-3-PP stationary test for first difference of log price index  
 
 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: DLPRICE has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Bandwidth: 1 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -6.705580  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.584743  
 5% level  -2.928142  
 10% level  -2.602225  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  0.026811 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  0.026660 
     
          
     
Phillips-Perron Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: D(DLPRICE)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 20/02/15   Time: 09:34   
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Sample (adjusted): 1966 2010   
Included observations: 45 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     DLPRICE(-1) -1.029219 0.153485 -6.705683 0.0000 
C 0.059389 0.026400 2.249554 0.0297 
     
     R-squared 0.511176    Mean dependent var 0.001913 
Adjusted R-squared 0.499808    S.D. dependent var 0.236841 
S.E. of regression 0.167504    Akaike info criterion -0.692188 
Sum squared resid 1.206482    Schwarz criterion -0.611892 
Log likelihood 17.57423    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.662254 
F-statistic 44.96618    Durbin-Watson stat 1.997525 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
 
 
Table A1-4 KPSS stationary test for first difference of log price index  
 
 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: DLPRICE is stationary  
Exogenous: Constant   
Bandwidth: 2 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
         LM-Stat. 
     
     Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test statistic  0.138124 
Asymptotic critical values*: 1% level   0.739000 
  5% level   0.463000 
  10% level   0.347000 
     
     *Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992, Table 1)  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  0.026307 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  0.022806 
     
          
     
KPSS Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: DLPRICE   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 20/02/15   Time: 09:35   
Sample (adjusted): 1965 2010   
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.058880 0.024178 2.435236 0.0189 
     
     R-squared 0.000000    Mean dependent var 0.058880 
Adjusted R-squared 0.000000    S.D. dependent var 0.163986 
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S.E. of regression 0.163986    Akaike info criterion -0.756575 
Sum squared resid 1.210110    Schwarz criterion -0.716822 
Log likelihood 18.40123    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.741683 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.039728    
     
     
 
 
 
Table A1-5- ADF stationary test for net inflows   
 
 
Null Hypothesis: SD has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 9 (Automatic - based on SIC, maxlag=9) 
     
        t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.444823  0.5499 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.621023  
 5% level  -2.943427  
 10% level  -2.610263  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(SD)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 20/02/15   Time: 09:36   
Sample (adjusted): 1974 2010   
Included observations: 37 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SD(-1) -4.139693 2.865190 -1.444823 0.1605 
D(SD(-1)) 3.515732 2.772233 1.268195 0.2160 
D(SD(-2)) 3.460042 2.749070 1.258623 0.2194 
D(SD(-3)) -0.305918 2.674906 -0.114366 0.9098 
D(SD(-4)) 3.103018 2.187388 1.418595 0.1679 
D(SD(-5)) 1.110718 2.188681 0.507483 0.6161 
D(SD(-6)) -0.570240 2.019830 -0.282321 0.7799 
D(SD(-7)) 0.424374 1.496439 0.283589 0.7790 
D(SD(-8)) 4.405098 1.323372 3.328692 0.0026 
D(SD(-9)) -5.013828 1.620706 -3.093608 0.0047 
C -9176.342 6125.325 -1.498099 0.1462 
     
     R-squared 0.851557    Mean dependent var 397.8378 
Adjusted R-squared 0.794464    S.D. dependent var 60983.49 
S.E. of regression 27647.53    Akaike info criterion 23.53423 
Sum squared resid 1.99E+10    Schwarz criterion 24.01316 
Log likelihood -424.3833    Hannan-Quinn criter. 23.70308 
F-statistic 14.91517    Durbin-Watson stat 2.873109 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Table A1-6- PP stationary test for net inflows   
 
 
Null Hypothesis: SD has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Bandwidth: 3 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
        Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     Phillips-Perron test statistic -5.685640  0.0000 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.581152  
 5% level  -2.926622  
 10% level  -2.601424  
     
     *MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  1.67E+09 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  1.47E+09 
     
          
     
Phillips-Perron Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: D(SD)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 20/02/15   Time: 09:36   
Sample (adjusted): 1965 2010   
Included observations: 46 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     SD(-1) -0.858438 0.149650 -5.736317 0.0000 
C -6290.229 6258.666 -1.005043 0.3204 
     
     R-squared 0.427868    Mean dependent var 313.0435 
Adjusted R-squared 0.414865    S.D. dependent var 54545.59 
S.E. of regression 41724.17    Akaike info criterion 24.15805 
Sum squared resid 7.66E+10    Schwarz criterion 24.23756 
Log likelihood -553.6352    Hannan-Quinn criter. 24.18784 
F-statistic 32.90533    Durbin-Watson stat 1.952019 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001    
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Table A1-7- KPSS stationary test for net inflows   
Null Hypothesis: SD is stationary  
Exogenous: Constant   
Bandwidth: 1 (Newey-West automatic) using Bartlett kernel 
     
         LM-Stat. 
     
     Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test statistic  0.291585 
Asymptotic critical values*: 1% level   0.739000 
  5% level   0.463000 
  10% level   0.347000 
     
     *Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992, Table 1)  
     
     
     Residual variance (no correction)  1.66E+09 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  1.90E+09 
     
          
     
KPSS Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: SD   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 20/02/15   Time: 09:37   
Sample: 1964 2010   
Included observations: 47   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -7224.362 6014.533 -1.201151 0.2358 
     
     R-squared 0.000000    Mean dependent var -7224.362 
Adjusted R-squared 0.000000    S.D. dependent var 41233.56 
S.E. of regression 41233.56    Akaike info criterion 24.11294 
Sum squared resid 7.82E+10    Schwarz criterion 24.15230 
Log likelihood -565.6541    Hannan-Quinn criter. 24.12775 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.711934    
     
     
 
 
 
Table A1-8  Granger causality – 2 lags  
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 09/22/14   Time: 12:38 
Sample: 1964 2010  
Lags: 2   
    
    
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
    
    
  DLPRICE does not Granger Cause SD 44  0.02556  0.97478 
  SD does not Granger Cause DLPRICE  5.04214  0.01128 
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Table A1-9  Granger causality – 4 lags  
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 20/02/15   Time: 09:39 
Sample: 1964 2010  
Lags: 4   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     DLPRICE does not Granger Cause SD  42  0.32119 0.8617 
 SD does not Granger Cause DLPRICE  3.63288 0.0147 
    
    
 
Table A1-10 Granger causality – 1 lag  
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 20/02/15   Time: 09:41 
Sample: 1964 2010  
Lags: 1   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     DLPRICE does not Granger Cause SD  45  0.34576 0.5597 
 SD does not Granger Cause DLPRICE  8.67153 0.0052 
    
    
 
 
 
 
Table A1-11 Ramsey Reset Test 
 
Ramsey RESET Test:   
     
     
F-statistic 3.381462     Probability 0.043486 
Log likelihood ratio 6.867831     Probability 0.032260 
     
     
     
Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: DLPRICE   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 04/25/13   Time: 00:27   
Sample: 1965 2010   
Included observations: 46   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.295721 0.309877 0.954318 0.3454 
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SDB 0.015019 0.007872 1.907888 0.0633 
FITTED^2 236.3397 100.2745 2.356927 0.0232 
FITTED^3 -4653.613 2582.586 -1.801920 0.0787 
     
     
R-squared 0.153462     Mean dependent var 0.058880 
Adjusted R-squared 0.092995     S.D. dependent var 0.163986 
S.E. of regression 0.156175     Akaike info criterion -0.792740 
Sum squared resid 1.024404     Schwarz criterion -0.633728 
Log likelihood 22.23303     F-statistic 2.537945 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.896101     Prob(F-statistic) 0.069436 
     
     
 
 
 
Table A1-12 Test for autocorrelation  
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 0.342554     Probability 0.711967 
Obs*R-squared 0.756024     Probability 0.685222 
     
     
     
Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 09/22/14   Time: 12:41   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.000830 0.024477 0.033894 0.9731 
SD 3.38E-08 2.73E-06 0.012372 0.9902 
SD^2 3.78E-14 1.01E-11 0.003743 0.9970 
RESID(-1) 0.009027 0.157177 0.057433 0.9545 
RESID(-2) -0.132939 0.160787 -0.826804 0.4131 
     
     
R-squared 0.016435     Mean dependent var 1.22E-17 
Adjusted R-squared -0.079522     S.D. dependent var 0.156603 
S.E. of regression 0.162710     Akaike info criterion -0.691369 
Sum squared resid 1.085460     Schwarz criterion -0.492604 
Log likelihood 20.90149     F-statistic 0.171277 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.962539     Prob(F-statistic) 0.951846 
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Table A1-13 Test for heteroskedasticity  
White Heteroskedasticity Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 1.278351     Probability 0.294183 
Obs*R-squared 3.848855     Probability 0.278254 
     
     
     
Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/10/15   Time: 15:35   
Sample: 1965 2010   
Included observations: 46   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.021551 0.005709 3.775076 0.0005 
SD 4.09E-07 7.61E-07 0.537107 0.5940 
SD^2 3.68E-11 2.22E-11 1.662643 0.1038 
(SD^2)^2 -4.67E-22 2.67E-22 -1.748873 0.0876 
     
     
R-squared 0.083671     Mean dependent var 0.023991 
Adjusted R-squared 0.018219     S.D. dependent var 0.037072 
S.E. of regression 0.036733     Akaike info criterion -3.687363 
Sum squared resid 0.056670     Schwarz criterion -3.528351 
Log likelihood 88.80935     F-statistic 1.278351 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.682079     Prob(F-statistic) 0.294183 
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
Table  A1-14 Test  for normality of residuals  
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Appendix 2 Capital market inflation theory- Empirical results for Japan  
 
 
Table A2-1 Nikkei 225 stock price estimation  
 
Dependent Variable: DLPRICE   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 09/23/14   Time: 14:45   
Sample (adjusted): 1981 2010   
Included observations: 30 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.015858 0.052888 0.299841 0.7665 
SUPPLY-DEMAND -1.41E-08 7.85E-07 -0.017902 0.9858 
     
     
R-squared 0.000011     Mean dependent var 0.016405 
Adjusted R-squared -0.035702     S.D. dependent var 0.232250 
S.E. of regression 0.236360     Akaike info criterion 0.017415 
Sum squared resid 1.564243     Schwarz criterion 0.110828 
Log likelihood 1.738775     F-statistic 0.000320 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.699425     Prob(F-statistic) 0.985844 
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Series: Residuals
Sample 1965 2010
Observations 46
Mean       1.22e-17
Median   0.023549
Maximum  0.310716
Minimum -0.407596
Std. Dev.   0.156603
Skewness  -0.695700
Kurtosis   3.335807
Jarque-Bera  3.926789
Probability  0.140381
Appendices  300 
 
 
Table A2-2 Ramsey rest test  
 
Ramsey RESET Test:   
     
     
F-statistic 0.733431     Probability 0.489932 
Log likelihood ratio 1.646511     Probability 0.439000 
     
     
     
Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: DLPRICE   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 09/23/14   Time: 14:43   
Sample: 1981 2010   
Included observations: 30   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -618.5187 591.3699 -1.045908 0.3052 
SUPPLY-DEMAND 0.000840 0.000799 1.051217 0.3028 
FITTED^2 3610679. 3467832. 1.041192 0.3074 
FITTED^3 -72599398 70414989 -1.031022 0.3120 
     
     
R-squared 0.053416     Mean dependent var 0.016405 
Adjusted R-squared -0.055806     S.D. dependent var 0.232250 
S.E. of regression 0.238642     Akaike info criterion 0.095865 
Sum squared resid 1.480705     Schwarz criterion 0.282691 
Log likelihood 2.562031     F-statistic 0.489059 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.943978     Prob(F-statistic) 0.692889 
     
     
 
Figure A2-3 Test of autocorrelation  
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 0.358482     Probability 0.702136 
Obs*R-squared 0.805066     Probability 0.668624 
     
     
     
Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/10/15   Time: 15:40   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.012226 0.056062 0.218084 0.8291 
SD 3.15E-07 8.94E-07 0.352099 0.7276 
RESID(-1) 0.156662 0.209441 0.748000 0.4612 
RESID(-2) 0.070988 0.226888 0.312875 0.7569 
     
     
R-squared 0.026836     Mean dependent var 2.22E-17 
Adjusted R-squared -0.085453     S.D. dependent var 0.232249 
S.E. of regression 0.241968     Akaike info criterion 0.123546 
Sum squared resid 1.522266     Schwarz criterion 0.310372 
Log likelihood 2.146808     F-statistic 0.238988 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.958294     Prob(F-statistic) 0.868345 
     
     
 
Figure A2-4 Test of heteroskedasticity  
White Heteroskedasticity Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 0.076350     Probability 0.926691 
Obs*R-squared 0.168713     Probability 0.919104 
     
     
     
Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/10/15   Time: 15:40   
Sample: 1981 2010   
Included observations: 30   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.053577 0.015175 3.530588 0.0015 
SD -1.04E-07 3.62E-07 -0.286083 0.7770 
SD^2 -1.21E-12 3.10E-12 -0.389086 0.7003 
     
     
R-squared 0.005624     Mean dependent var 0.052141 
Adjusted R-squared -0.068034     S.D. dependent var 0.064423 
S.E. of regression 0.066579     Akaike info criterion -2.486225 
Sum squared resid 0.119683     Schwarz criterion -2.346105 
Log likelihood 40.29338     F-statistic 0.076350 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.363051     Prob(F-statistic) 0.926691 
     
     
 
 
Figure A2-5 Test of heteroskedasticity  
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Figure A2-6 ADF stationary test for first difference of  log price index- NIKKEI 225  
Null Hypothesis: DLPRICE has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=7) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.466876  0.0014 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.679322  
 5% level  -2.967767  
 10% level  -2.622989  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(DLPRICE)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/10/15   Time: 15:41   
Sample (adjusted): 1982 2010   
Included observations: 29 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
DLPRICE(-1) -0.855935 0.191618 -4.466876 0.0001 
0
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Series: Residuals
Sample 1965 2010
Observations 46
Mean       1.22e-17
Median   0.023549
Maximum  0.310716
Minimum -0.407596
Std. Dev.   0.156603
Skewness  -0.695700
Kurtosis   3.335807
Jarque-Bera  3.926789
Probability  0.140381
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C 0.012447 0.044220 0.281474 0.7805 
     
     
R-squared 0.424957     Mean dependent var 0.002850 
Adjusted R-squared 0.403659     S.D. dependent var 0.308008 
S.E. of regression 0.237853     Akaike info criterion 0.032148 
Sum squared resid 1.527505     Schwarz criterion 0.126444 
Log likelihood 1.533856     F-statistic 19.95298 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.981813     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000128 
     
     
 
 
 
Figure A2-7 PP stationary test for first difference of  log price index- NIKKEI 225  
 
Null Hypothesis: DLPRICE has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Bandwidth: 4 (Newey-West using Bartlett kernel) 
     
     
   Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     
Phillips-Perron test statistic -4.418312  0.0016 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.679322  
 5% level  -2.967767  
 10% level  -2.622989  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     
Residual variance (no correction)  0.052673 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  0.046284 
     
     
     
     
Phillips-Perron Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(DLPRICE)  
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/10/15   Time: 15:42   
Sample (adjusted): 1982 2010   
Included observations: 29 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
DLPRICE(-1) -0.855935 0.191618 -4.466876 0.0001 
C 0.012447 0.044220 0.281474 0.7805 
     
     
R-squared 0.424957     Mean dependent var 0.002850 
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Adjusted R-squared 0.403659     S.D. dependent var 0.308008 
S.E. of regression 0.237853     Akaike info criterion 0.032148 
Sum squared resid 1.527505     Schwarz criterion 0.126444 
Log likelihood 1.533856     F-statistic 19.95298 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.981813     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000128 
     
     
 
 
 
 
Figure A2-8 KPSS stationary test for first difference of  log price index- NIKKEI 225  
 
Null Hypothesis: DLPRICE is stationary  
Exogenous: Constant   
Bandwidth: 2 (Newey-West using Bartlett kernel) 
     
     
    LM-Stat. 
     
     
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test statistic  0.256698 
Asymptotic critical values*: 1% level   0.739000 
  5% level   0.463000 
  10% level   0.347000 
     
     
*Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992, Table 1)  
     
     
     
Residual variance (no correction)  0.052142 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  0.064339 
     
     
     
     
KPSS Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: DLPRICE   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/10/15   Time: 15:42   
Sample (adjusted): 1981 2010   
Included observations: 30 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.016405 0.042403 0.386895 0.7017 
     
     
R-squared 0.000000     Mean dependent var 0.016405 
Adjusted R-squared 0.000000     S.D. dependent var 0.232250 
S.E. of regression 0.232250     Akaike info criterion -0.049240 
Sum squared resid 1.564261     Schwarz criterion -0.002534 
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Log likelihood 1.738604     Durbin-Watson stat 1.698288 
     
     
 
Figure A2-9 ADF stationary test for net inflow-Japan  
 
 
Null Hypothesis: SD has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant   
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=7) 
     
     
   t-Statistic   Prob.* 
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -3.736458  0.0085 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.670170  
 5% level  -2.963972  
 10% level  -2.621007  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(SD)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/10/15   Time: 15:44   
Sample (adjusted): 1981 2010   
Included observations: 30 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
SD(-1) -0.695004 0.186006 -3.736458 0.0008 
C -26499.54 12488.23 -2.121962 0.0428 
     
     
R-squared 0.332716     Mean dependent var 1846.267 
Adjusted R-squared 0.308884     S.D. dependent var 65357.00 
S.E. of regression 54333.48     Akaike info criterion 24.70801 
Sum squared resid 8.27E+10     Schwarz criterion 24.80142 
Log likelihood -368.6201     F-statistic 13.96112 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.783097     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000848 
     
     
 
 
 
 
Figure A2-9 PP stationary test for net inflow-Japan  
Null Hypothesis: SD has a unit root  
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Exogenous: Constant   
Bandwidth: 16 (Newey-West using Bartlett kernel) 
     
     
   Adj. t-Stat   Prob.* 
     
     
Phillips-Perron test statistic -3.384829  0.0196 
Test critical values: 1% level  -3.670170  
 5% level  -2.963972  
 10% level  -2.621007  
     
     
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.  
     
     
     
Residual variance (no correction)  2.76E+09 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  1.42E+09 
     
     
     
     
Phillips-Perron Test Equation  
Dependent Variable: D(SD)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/10/15   Time: 15:46   
Sample (adjusted): 1981 2010   
Included observations: 30 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
SD(-1) -0.695004 0.186006 -3.736458 0.0008 
C -26499.54 12488.23 -2.121962 0.0428 
     
     
R-squared 0.332716     Mean dependent var 1846.267 
Adjusted R-squared 0.308884     S.D. dependent var 65357.00 
S.E. of regression 54333.48     Akaike info criterion 24.70801 
Sum squared resid 8.27E+10     Schwarz criterion 24.80142 
Log likelihood -368.6201     F-statistic 13.96112 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.783097     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000848 
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Figure A2-10 KPSS stationary test for net inflow-Japan  
Null Hypothesis: SD is stationary  
Exogenous: Constant   
Bandwidth: 8 (Newey-West using Bartlett kernel) 
     
     
    LM-Stat. 
     
     
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test statistic  0.253977 
Asymptotic critical values*: 1% level   0.739000 
  5% level   0.463000 
  10% level   0.347000 
     
     
*Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992, Table 1)  
     
     
     
Residual variance (no correction)  2.93E+09 
HAC corrected variance (Bartlett kernel)  2.47E+09 
     
     
     
     
KPSS Test Equation   
Dependent Variable: SD   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 03/10/15   Time: 15:43   
Sample: 1980 2010   
Included observations: 31   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -38327.13 9888.891 -3.875776 0.0005 
     
     
R-squared 0.000000     Mean dependent var -38327.13 
Adjusted R-squared 0.000000     S.D. dependent var 55059.02 
S.E. of regression 55059.02     Akaike info criterion 24.70193 
Sum squared resid 9.09E+10     Schwarz criterion 24.74818 
Log likelihood -381.8798     Durbin-Watson stat 1.363209 
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2-11 Granger causality test- 2 lags 
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Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 03/11/15   Time: 12:38 
Sample: 1980 2010  
Lags: 2   
    
    
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
    
    
  SD does not Granger Cause DLPRICE 28  0.38135  0.68717 
  DLPRICE does not Granger Cause SD  1.95528  0.16435 
    
    
 
 
Figure A3-12 Granger causality test- 4 lags 
 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Date: 03/11/15   Time: 12:38 
Sample: 1980 2010  
Lags: 4   
    
    
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
    
    
  SD does not Granger Cause DLPRICE 26  0.32795  0.85533 
  DLPRICE does not Granger Cause SD  0.89689  0.48734 
 
 
Table A2-13 Japanese central bank equity purchases  
Banks: commercial banks  
CB: Central bank  
 
Dependent Variable: DLPRICE   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 02/10/13   Time: 03:29   
Sample (adjusted): 2003 2011   
Included observations: 9 after adjustments  
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -0.093539 0.088831 -1.053000 0.3405 
BANKS -1.90E-06 7.32E-06 -0.259521 0.8056 
CB(-1) 5.02E-05 1.40E-05 3.570102 0.0160 
CB -8.69E-05 2.51E-05 -3.464496 0.0180 
     
     
R-squared 0.803045     Mean dependent var -0.003549 
Adjusted R-squared 0.684872     S.D. dependent var 0.252750 
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S.E. of regression 0.141885     Akaike info criterion -0.766504 
Sum squared resid 0.100656     Schwarz criterion -0.678849 
Log likelihood 7.449269     F-statistic 6.795500 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.660796     Prob(F-statistic) 0.032501 
     
     
 
 
 
Table A2-14 Test for  autocorrelation  
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     
F-statistic 0.480477     Probability 0.659147 
Obs*R-squared 2.183462     Probability 0.335635 
     
     
     
Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 09/22/14   Time: 13:02   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C -0.002405 0.115654 -0.020797 0.9847 
BANKS 1.31E-06 9.21E-06 0.141810 0.8962 
CB -1.05E-05 3.56E-05 -0.295098 0.7872 
CB(-1) 5.44E-06 1.80E-05 0.302410 0.7821 
RESID(-1) -0.636037 0.649897 -0.978674 0.3999 
RESID(-2) -0.482245 0.901348 -0.535027 0.6297 
     
     
R-squared 0.242607     Mean dependent var -4.01E-17 
Adjusted R-squared -1.019715     S.D. dependent var 0.112170 
S.E. of regression 0.159412     Akaike info criterion -0.599933 
Sum squared resid 0.076236     Schwarz criterion -0.468449 
Log likelihood 8.699696     F-statistic 0.192191 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.299220     Prob(F-statistic) 0.946327 
     
     
 
 
 
 
Table  A2-15 Test for heteroskedasticity  
White Heteroskedasticity Test:  
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F-statistic 8.240927     Probability 0.112153 
Obs*R-squared 8.650116     Probability 0.194232 
     
     
     
Test Equation:   
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 09/22/14   Time: 13:03   
Sample: 2003 2011   
Included observations: 9   
     
     
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
C 0.032093 0.004785 6.706674 0.0215 
BANKS 4.67E-06 9.45E-07 4.947056 0.0385 
BANKS^2 2.03E-10 6.17E-11 3.292903 0.0812 
CB 2.32E-06 1.04E-06 2.239404 0.1545 
CB^2 -4.57E-10 2.13E-10 -2.144954 0.1651 
CB(-1) 1.55E-06 1.20E-06 1.286342 0.3271 
CB(-1)^2 -2.71E-10 2.08E-10 -1.299287 0.3234 
     
     
R-squared 0.961124     Mean dependent var 0.011184 
Adjusted R-squared 0.844496     S.D. dependent var 0.013883 
S.E. of regression 0.005475     Akaike info criterion -7.525921 
Sum squared resid 5.99E-05     Schwarz criterion -7.372524 
Log likelihood 40.86664     F-statistic 8.240927 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.984072     Prob(F-statistic) 0.112153 
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TableA2-16 Test for normality of residuals  
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Appendix 3 Empirical results for U.S. simple logit model 
 
Tier- Tier I capital ratio  
D08- 2008 dummy variable  
D09- 2009 dummy variable  
Size- Bank size dummy variable 
 
Table A3-1 Result of simple logit model  
 
 
 
Table A3-2 Result of marginal effects, for simple logit model  
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
2.4
-0.2 -0.1 -0.0 0.1 0.2
Series: Residuals
Sample 2003 2011
Observations 9
Mean      -4.01e-17
Median  -0.032941
Maximum  0.186411
Minimum -0.188073
Std. Dev.   0.112170
Skewness   0.054374
Kurtosis   2.369662
Jarque-Bera  0.153432
Probability  0.926153
. 
                                                                              
       _cons    -4.044033    1.38124    -2.93   0.003    -6.751214   -1.336852
         d09     1.840682   .9641751     1.91   0.056    -.0490664    3.730431
         d08     2.127516   .9446655     2.25   0.024      .276006    3.979027
        size     -1.09822   .5367322    -2.05   0.041    -2.150195   -.0462437
        tier     .1657921   .0848963     1.95   0.051    -.0006016    .3321857
                                                                              
     failure        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 38 clusters in id)
Log pseudolikelihood = -40.385233                 Pseudo R2       =     0.1538
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0196
                                                  Wald chi2(4)    =      11.72
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        103
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -40.385233
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -40.385355
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -40.413974
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -41.149972
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood = -47.725037
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Table A3-3 Tier I variable mean test  
 
 
 
Table A3-4 Bank size dummy variable mean test  
 
 
 
Table A3-5 Net interest margin ratio variable mean test  
 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
                                                                              
     d09*    .2738615      .14733    1.86   0.063  -.014903  .562626   .271845
     d08*    .2965114       .1299    2.28   0.022   .041907  .551116   .359223
    size*   -.1325574      .06491   -2.04   0.041  -.259785  -.00533   .601942
    tier     .0181783      .00823    2.21   0.027   .002057    .0343   9.03447
                                                                              
variable        dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X
                                                                              
         =  .12536018
      y  = Pr(failure) (predict)
Marginal effects after logit
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0493         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0986          Pr(T > t) = 0.9507
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      101
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -1.6672
                                                                              
    diff             -1.096621    .6577462               -2.401412    .2081705
                                                                              
combined       103    9.034466     .251955    2.557064    8.534715    9.534218
                                                                              
       1        18    9.939444    .6669037    2.829433    8.532401    11.34649
       0        85    8.842824    .2680394    2.471202    8.309798    9.375849
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9787         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0425          Pr(T > t) = 0.0213
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      101
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   2.0545
                                                                              
    diff              .2581699    .1256581                 .008898    .5074418
                                                                              
combined       103    .6019417    .0484675    .4918912    .5058067    .6980768
                                                                              
       1        18    .3888889    .1182356    .5016313    .1394335    .6383443
       0        85    .6470588    .0521415    .4807207    .5433698    .7507479
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
Appendices  313 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3-6  Liquidity ratio variable mean test  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TableA3-7 Asset quality ratio variable mean test  
. 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9671         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0658          Pr(T > t) = 0.0329
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      101
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   1.8602
                                                                              
    diff              .4184902     .224971               -.0277918    .8647722
                                                                              
combined       103    3.093689    .0864591     .877464    2.922198    3.265181
                                                                              
       1        18    2.748333    .1475093    .6258289    2.437116    3.059551
       0        85    3.166824    .0985003    .9081276    2.970945    3.362702
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.5346         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.9307          Pr(T > t) = 0.4654
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      101
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   0.0872
                                                                              
    diff              .4195098    4.813452               -9.129084    9.968104
                                                                              
combined       103    15.66786    1.819039    18.46123    12.05981    19.27592
                                                                              
       1        18    15.32167    3.634584    15.42023    7.653365    22.98997
       0        85    15.74118    2.074198    19.12316    11.61641    19.86595
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
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TableA3-8 Unweighted capital ratio variable mean test  
 
 
 
 
Table A3-9 Parson X2 goodness to fit test, simple logit model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3-10  Results of model predicting accuracy  
 
. 
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0006         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0011          Pr(T > t) = 0.9994
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       99
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -3.3568
                                                                              
    diff              -.955917    .2847696               -1.520962   -.3908723
                                                                              
combined       101          .8    .1144386    1.150094     .572957    1.027043
                                                                              
       1        18    1.585556    .5107608    2.166975    .5079444    2.663167
       0        83    .6296386    .0756272    .6889962    .4791921    .7800851
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9950         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0099          Pr(T > t) = 0.0050
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =      101
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =   2.6280
                                                                              
    diff              2.221961    .8454822                .5447514     3.89917
                                                                              
combined       103     9.62699    .3302455    3.351626     8.97195    10.28203
                                                                              
       1        18    7.793333    .5141399    2.181311    6.708593    8.878074
       0        85    10.01529    .3726618    3.435772    9.274215    10.75637
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
. 
                  Prob > chi2 =         0.6651
      Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2(8) =         5.84
             number of groups =        10
       number of observations =       103
  (Table collapsed on quantiles of estimated probabilities)
Logistic model for failure, goodness-of-fit test
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Table A3-11 Optimal cutoff point 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3-12 Area under  receiver ROC 
                                                  
Correctly classified                        65.05%
                                                  
False - rate for classified -   Pr( D| -)    9.84%
False + rate for classified +   Pr(~D| +)   71.43%
False - rate for true D         Pr( -| D)   33.33%
False + rate for true ~D        Pr( +|~D)   35.29%
                                                  
Negative predictive value       Pr(~D| -)   90.16%
Positive predictive value       Pr( D| +)   28.57%
Specificity                     Pr( -|~D)   64.71%
Sensitivity                     Pr( +| D)   66.67%
                                                  
True D defined as failure != 0
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .17
   Total            18            85           103
                                                  
     -               6            55            61
     +              12            30            42
                                                  
Classified           D            ~D         Total
                       True         
Logistic model for failure
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Appendix 4 Empirical results of US multivariate logit model  
 
 
Interest- Net interest margin ratio 
Asset- Asset quality margin ratio  
Liquidity- Liquidity ratio  
Leverage- Unweighted capital ratio (Equity/Total Assets) 
 
Table A4-1 Result of multivariate logit model  
 
0
.0
0
0
.2
5
0
.5
0
0
.7
5
1
.0
0
S
e
n
s
it
iv
it
y
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
1 - Specificity
Area under ROC curve = 0.7627
Appendices  317 
 
 
Table A4-2 Marginal effects  
 
 
 
Table A4-3  Parson X2 goodness to fit, multivariate logit model 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons     .5440427   2.024541     0.27   0.788    -3.423984     4.51207
         d08    -.0751217   1.253673    -0.06   0.952    -2.532276    2.382032
         d07     1.925221   1.012669     1.90   0.057    -.0595742    3.910016
    leverage    -.3171703   .1239734    -2.56   0.011    -.5601538   -.0741869
   liquidity    -.0364474   .0150969    -2.41   0.016    -.0660368    -.006858
    interest    -.7833716   .4335364    -1.81   0.071    -1.633087    .0663442
       asset     1.174078   .4247322     2.76   0.006     .3416178    2.006537
        tier     .1810537   .0951448     1.90   0.057    -.0054267     .367534
                                                                              
     failure        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 38 clusters in id)
Log pseudolikelihood = -31.801979                 Pseudo R2       =     0.3282
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0008
                                                  Wald chi2(7)    =      24.79
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        101
Iteration 5:   log pseudolikelihood = -31.801979
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood =  -31.80198
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -31.804674
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -31.972392
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood =  -33.78636
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood =  -47.33671
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
                                                                              
     d08*   -.0064664      .10702   -0.06   0.952  -.216223   .20329   .277228
     d07*    .2184713       .1189    1.84   0.066  -.014559  .451501   .356436
leverage    -.0276705      .01038   -2.67   0.008   -.04802 -.007321   9.59644
liquid~y    -.0031797      .00174   -1.82   0.068  -.006596  .000237   14.8394
interest    -.0683427      .04589   -1.49   0.136   -.15828  .021595   3.11337
   asset     .1024286      .04887    2.10   0.036   .006644  .198214        .8
    tier     .0157954      .00853    1.85   0.064  -.000929   .03252   9.05158
                                                                              
variable        dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X
                                                                              
         =  .09656691
      y  = Pr(failure) (predict)
Marginal effects after logit
. 
                  Prob > chi2 =         0.5614
      Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2(8) =         6.77
             number of groups =        10
       number of observations =       101
  (Table collapsed on quantiles of estimated probabilities)
Logistic model for failure, goodness-of-fit test
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Table A4-4 Model predicting accuracy results  
 
 
 
 
 
Table A4-5 ROC curve  
                                                  
Correctly classified                        77.23%
                                                  
False - rate for classified -   Pr( D| -)    7.14%
False + rate for classified +   Pr(~D| +)   58.06%
False - rate for true D         Pr( -| D)   27.78%
False + rate for true ~D        Pr( +|~D)   21.69%
                                                  
Negative predictive value       Pr(~D| -)   92.86%
Positive predictive value       Pr( D| +)   41.94%
Specificity                     Pr( -|~D)   78.31%
Sensitivity                     Pr( +| D)   72.22%
                                                  
True D defined as failure != 0
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .17
   Total            18            83           101
                                                  
     -               5            65            70
     +              13            18            31
                                                  
Classified           D            ~D         Total
                       True         
Logistic model for failure
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Appendix 5 Empirical results of  Japan logit model  
 
Table A5-1 Results of logit model  
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Table  A5-2 Marginal effect 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A5-3 The Parson X2 goodness to fit test  
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
       _cons    -5.595542   1.767489    -3.17   0.002    -9.059757   -2.131328
        size     .6484714   .6327005     1.02   0.305    -.5915987    1.888541
         d99     .7600944   1.002448     0.76   0.448    -1.204667    2.724856
         d00     .4215844     1.1838     0.36   0.722     -1.89862    2.741789
       tier1     .5288622   .2483225     2.13   0.033      .042159    1.015565
                                                                              
     failure        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 24 clusters in id)
Log pseudolikelihood = -26.570651                 Pseudo R2       =     0.0942
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0769
                                                  Wald chi2(4)    =       8.43
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         57
Iteration 4:   log pseudolikelihood = -26.570651
Iteration 3:   log pseudolikelihood = -26.570651
Iteration 2:   log pseudolikelihood = -26.572235
Iteration 1:   log pseudolikelihood = -26.736199
Iteration 0:   log pseudolikelihood =  -29.33523
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
                                                                              
    size*    .0927452      .08826    1.05   0.293  -.080249  .265739   .578947
     d99*     .119487      .16247    0.74   0.462  -.198939  .437913   .368421
     d00*    .0656175      .19216    0.34   0.733  -.311007  .442242   .298246
   tier1     .0779984      .03346    2.33   0.020   .012415  .143582   6.23368
                                                                              
variable        dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X
                                                                              
         =  .17981798
      y  = Pr(failure) (predict)
Marginal effects after logit
                  Prob > chi2 =         0.3834
      Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2(8) =         8.53
             number of groups =        10
       number of observations =        57
  (Table collapsed on quantiles of estimated probabilities)
Logistic model for failure, goodness-of-fit test
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Table A5-4 Tier I variable mean test 
 
 
 
 
Table A5-5  Bank size dummy variable mean test  
 
 
Table A5-6 Optimal cutoff point  
 Pr(T < t) = 0.0280         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0560          Pr(T > t) = 0.9720
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       55
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -1.9524
                                                                              
    diff             -.9031111     .462562               -1.830106    .0238839
                                                                              
combined        57    6.233684    .1932549    1.459043    5.846548     6.62082
                                                                              
       1        12    6.946667    .3672138    1.272066    6.138434    7.754899
       0        45    6.043556    .2175235    1.459192    5.605166    6.481945
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
 Pr(T < t) = 0.4865         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.9730          Pr(T > t) = 0.5135
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       55
    diff = mean(0) - mean(1)                                      t =  -0.0340
                                                                              
    diff             -.0055556    .1632976               -.3328113    .3217001
                                                                              
combined        57    .5789474    .0659772    .4981168    .4467792    .7111155
                                                                              
       1        12    .5833333    .1486471    .5149287    .2561633    .9105034
       0        45    .5777778    .0744603    .4994947     .427713    .7278426
                                                                              
   Group       Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Two-sample t test with equal variances
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Table A5-7 Model predicted accuracy   
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Correctly classified                        61.40%
                                                  
False - rate for classified -   Pr( D| -)   12.90%
False + rate for classified +   Pr(~D| +)   69.23%
False - rate for true D         Pr( -| D)   33.33%
False + rate for true ~D        Pr( +|~D)   40.00%
                                                  
Negative predictive value       Pr(~D| -)   87.10%
Positive predictive value       Pr( D| +)   30.77%
Specificity                     Pr( -|~D)   60.00%
Sensitivity                     Pr( +| D)   66.67%
                                                  
True D defined as failure != 0
Classified + if predicted Pr(D) >= .21
   Total            12            45            57
                                                  
     -               4            27            31
     +               8            18            26
                                                  
Classified           D            ~D         Total
                       True         
Logistic model for failure
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Table A5-8 ROC curve  
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